Four Things the CDS said at Pune that Deserve Our Attention

New Delhi: The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Anil Chauhan delivered a lecture on “Future War and Warfare” at Savitribai Phule University, in Pune, Maharashtra, on June 3.

What were the key takeaways?

Details on Pakistan combat losses to be assessed and released shortly, immediate war impact on adversary often unclear after the attack, and India wants short wars.

CDS General Anil Chauhan has clarified that in high-tempo military operations, neither side has immediate visibility into the full extent of damage inflicted. Instead, confirmation of results typically comes only after detailed analysis of satellite imagery and intelligence, underscoring the uncertainty that prevails in the early hours of modern conflict. General Chauhan’s remarks highlight India’s strategic preference for swift, decisive operations over drawn-out conflicts, citing both historical experience and the economic burden of prolonged mobilisation. As India prepares to release an official assessment of Pakistan’s combat losses, his comments underscore the realities of contemporary warfare – where the true impact of operations often emerges only after the dust has settled and intelligence is thoroughly reviewed.

India’s estimation of Pakistan’s combat losses will come shortly.

Even as many unverified reports talk about the quantum of combat losses suffered by Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, CDS General Anil Chauhan stated on Tuesday that the Indian military would soon make a rough assessment and then release specific data on the number of Pakistani aircraft and radars destroyed. This happened during the question-and-answer session after his lecture at Savitribai Phule Pune University, when he was specifically asked about Pakistan’s combat losses in Operation Sindoor. General Chauhan responded:

Based on technical parameters like electronic intelligence, signal intelligence, at some point of time, we will take out this particular data and share it with you. We will tell you how many aircraft we destroyed and how many radars did we destroy. We’ll make a rough assessment of that and come out with that shortly.

Also read: CDS Accepts Loss of IAF Fighter Jets

He had prefaced this by clarifying his approach to discussing combat losses:

When I was asked about losses on our side, I said these are not important. The results and how you act are important. It would not be very correct to talk about losses… You see the match. Suppose you go into a football match, and you win 3-2, he scored two goals and you scored four goals. So that's an evenly fought match. Suppose you go in a cricket test match, and you win by an innings defeat, then there’s no question of how many wickets, how many balls and how many players, it is an innings…

India didn’t want a long-drawn conflict.

General Anil Chauhan also made several explicit statements about India’s aversion to a prolonged conflict during his recent remarks in Pune and in other related interviews in recent days. In response to another question at Pune, he said:

From our side, we didn't want to get into a long-drawn kind of a conflict. We've seen our experience in Operation Parakram. We had been there for almost about nine months. It involves a lot of expenditure, disrupts everything.

Earlier in his talk, the CDS had posited:

Our vision is entirely different (from our adversary), and our march of progress should not be stopped. It should be short kind of a war.

He also emphasised the economic and developmental costs of extended wars in Singapore the week prior:

“We do not seek prolonged wars because they slow national development – a goal some adversaries may want to hinder.”

“From an economic standpoint, prolonged mobilisations impose a huge financial burden. India has remained mobilised for months without actual combat, and that is unsustainable. We disengage swiftly once an operation concludes.”

Visibility of effectiveness of operations

When conducting dynamic military operations, General Chauhan explained that immediate visibility into the effectiveness and extent of damage inflicted on the enemy is often lacking, even to the Indian side. Confirmation of results typically relies on later analysis of satellite imagery and intelligence, rather than real-time information. Giving the example of Indian attacks on Pakistani airbases on May 9-10, he said: 

When it’s a dynamic war, then we really did not know. Okay, what is the effect on Sargodha? What is the effect in Muridke? What is the effect on Bulari? So what is the effect on Jacobabad? It’s after once you get a satellite imagery. So the first few hours, you are not very sure. Of course, we were all aided by Pakistanis themselves, because they were putting up things in the social media. So we had some idea of its success, but we had to wait for confirmation from satellite images and other sources, say signal intelligence or otherwise. So we were not quite sure. They were also not sure. They must be hoping that they have also done similar kind of a damage (as we had done). But probably their hopes are belied after three or four days when they would have searched the satellite images from whichever country they’re buying from that they have not done so. By that time, it was too late.”

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