From the Technological POV, Was Operation Sindoor a Success?
Much has been discussed in India about Operation Sindoor and its military and strategic implications. However, much of the discussion has not been well informed as regards military technology, and has often been clouded by ultra-nationalist fervor or sometimes even by doubting everything India claims officially. This piece seeks to look beyond these fault lines.
Let me first deal with the looming question of fighter aircraft lost on May 6-7. With current information, it is not possible to make definitive determinations beyond CDS (Chief of Defence Staff) Chauhan’s admission of “some losses,” as against claims by Pakistan or elsewhere abroad of 5-6 Indian aircraft lost. On the other hand, CDS Chauhan’s statement in Singapore that “tactical mistakes” were made by India, which however struck back two days later after “rectifying” them, is more illuminating yet adequately discussed.
Recent comments by India’s defence attache to Indonesia, Captain (Indian Navy) Shiv Kumar, acknowledging at a seminar in Indonesia last month that the Indian Air Force (IAF) lost fighter jets to Pakistan on the night of May 7 during its targeting of Pakistan’s terror-linked sites “only because of the constraint given by the political leadership to not attack the military establishment or their air defenses,” have grabbed political and media attention, as well as vociferous denials by the government
However, these political directions given to the IAF were clearly stated by the Government itself in Press Statements on Operation Sindoor even in early May (as noted in this article when originally written over a week ago). Did anyone really believe that the Pakistani military would quietly watch? International experts aver that this hugely raised risk levels for IAF fighters. The order may be reminiscent of the then Vajpayee government deciding that IAF planes will not cross the LoC during the Kargil conflict, but Op Sindoor was a kinetically more fraught environment. Unlike after Balakot, Pakistani forces seemed better prepared and imposed serious costs on the IAF, even though it inflicted major strikes on several terrorist camps.
It also now appears fairly certain that Pakistan received significant and direct assistance from China, which probably alerted Pakistan to an imminent IAF attack based on satellite monitoring. China had also likely helped Pakistan improve its own China-supplied satellite surveillance of Indian airspace. Write-ups in quasi-official Chinese journals have asserted that efficient networking between China-supplied ground-based radars, fighter aircraft (notably the J10C equipped with PL15E missiles) and Airborne Early Warning Systems (ZDK-03), made for an effective “locked by A, launched by B, guided by C” kill chain against IAF fighters on May 6-7. Some may even conjecture that real-time operational assists were provided by Chinese satellites.
Whatever the finer details – for example the possibility that PL15E missile lock-on was detected by IAF fighters a little late with consequent delay in response times – IAF fighters were taken by surprise and suffered losses.
Few commentators, even those noting some of this, have gone into the correctives by India and resultant outcomes. During May 9-10, India launched what analysts have acknowledged were highly successful counterstrikes against Pakistani air bases and other sites, clearly visible in commercial before-and-after satellite images. All IAF fighter jet types including the Rafale were active, and Pakistan was unable to launch meaningful aerial counter operations. Revising earlier tactics, the IAF first neutralised Pakistani air defences, including the Chinese HQ9 and related radars using various means including decoy drones, anti-radiation missiles and direct strikes, perhaps also recalibrating surveillance and networking systems. This was followed by precision strikes by drones, loitering munitions and mostly air-launched weapons including the Brahmos missile from stand-off positions well inside Indian airspace. India’s air defences proved to be robust, with Pakistan unable to inflict serious damage. The tables had been turned and air dominance by the IAF clearly established. India had also shown that it could have inflicted more damage, but had exercised restraint. Unfortunately, this powerful narrative was later negated by chest-thumping rhetoric of having “destroyed” Pakistani bases.
The losses of May 6-7, linked to the aerial campaign by the PAF, were thus shown not to be an irreversible Indian frailty in BVR (beyond-visual-range) and networked warfare. It may be added that reports are trickling in suggesting that India’s losses may have been less than earlier projected, and that Pakistan may actually have lost more aircraft, including high-value assets. Whatever the final tally of aircraft losses, the broad assessment presented here would not change.
Drawing all strands together, the conflict ended, in my opinion, as a win for India albeit with some significant losses. India and Pakistan, even with China by its side, continue to be near-peers in the aerial domain. On the Indian side, tactical shortcomings and some technology gaps were exposed on May 6-7. Several measures are already underway to augment capabilities through upgraded AEW systems and by accelerating work on a constellation of satellites for surveillance and networking.
On the Pakistan side, there will likely be greater convergence and inter-operability with China in military hardware. China is reportedly supplying new equipment such as J35 stealth fighters apparently being rushed to Pakistan, and additional supplies would surely follow. These will certainly give the IAF headaches, but are unlikely to be game changers. Currently, greater advantage is obtained from improved sensors, radars, networking, missiles and guidance systems operating several hundred kilometres away, than with high manoeuvrability dogfights which are becoming less relevant, with mounting risks of losing expensive aircraft to missiles costing far less. In the near to medium term, new or upgraded equipment are likely to give any only temporary advantage to either India or Pakistan. In such a scenario tactics, training, indigenous capability and industrial strength are likely to play greater roles.
The new factor is that India is no longer just facing two adversaries in the touted two-front scenario, but twin adversaries working jointly with full inter-operability even on the western front alone. I will only flag here attempts to bridge the two land fronts across the Himalayan and Karakoram ranges. We may also take note of the maritime domain. During Op Sindoor, an Indian Navy carrier group lay stationed in the Arabian Sea off Karachi, but was never called to action. If future India-Pak conflicts stretch beyond a few days, the Indian Navy could be a significant factor.
In conclusion, some brief remarks on geopolitics. It is being projected that Op Sindoor has established a “new normal,” spelt out in considerable detail in official statements, and repeated in remarks at the highest level. The “new national security doctrine” is supposedly that any future terrorist actions in India would invite military action against these groups and “their backers” in PoK/Pakistan. It has been reiterated that talks, trade and terror cannot go together, now with already strained cultural ties added, along with the new dimension of Indus waters.
India has painted itself into a strategic corner.
Repeated outbreaks of India-Pakistan military clashes resulting from sporadic terrorist actions on Indian territory will benefit Pakistan more than India in the geo-political arena. The more Pakistan/PoK-based terrorist groups clash with Indian armed forces, the greater their legitimacy and popularity with influential sections in Pakistan. The Pakistani military will gain standing in society, including vis-à-vis the political class.
India on the other hand aspires to be a fast growing economy and every military flare-up will hurt investment climate and dilute India’s brand image. Even a cursory glance at mainstream media abroad would show that the dominant perception is of two quarrelsome neighbours fighting yet again over an age-old Kashmir dispute. Earlier Indian gains towards de-hyphenation are fading. The more often India and Pakistan clash militarily, whatever the provocation, the stronger the hyphenation.
India has severed all but the most essential relations with Pakistan, insists there is no possibility of dialogue, and has cut off all cultural, sporting and people-to-people ties which continue to resonate in Pakistan. India has now left itself only military options with dwindling benefits. This is a dead end for dealing with a festering problem.
D. Raghunandan is with the Delhi Science Forum. Opinions are his own.
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