Inadequate Funding and Lack of Interaction of Political and Army Leadership Make India Less Safe

UK defence minister John Healey and armed forces minister Al Carns resigned this month as they felt the country had become “less safe” and the government was both unable and unwilling to provide funds necessary to rectify the grave constitutional anomaly. British governments on taking office are required by legislation to carry out a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) update. They are also periodically provide monies to support a Defence Investment Plan (DIP) which is based on a percentage of GDP that is also reviewed.

Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty.

Although India’s military system is almost entirely inherited from UK governments, we have managed to defend India without a SDR and a modern defence planning and budgeting system determined by known percentage of GDP to ensure resources match evolving threats and challenges.

Instead, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) prepares an annual defence budget which is updated, factoring inflation and the fluctuating value of the rupee, which have suffered havoc this year. Parliamentary defence oversight committee reports that are invariably critical of lean budgetary allocations resulting in capacity deficits have become notional. The principal lacuna for this void is the absence of meaningful interaction between the higher military and political leaderships.

For example, the prime minister who used to interact with service chiefs and operational commanders annually, now meets them biennially. The instruments employed towards evolving threats and resources for ensuring the safety and honour of the country have been found less than optimal , especially. There is therefore reliance on hope and prayer of no war. And unlike in the UK, understanding of national security among civil service and political class is wanting. Seldom has any of them fought a battle.

Keeping the UK safe has not been easy. I recall meeting in 1991 at Delhi in the post-Cold War era, former UK Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), field marshal Lord Edwin Brammall, who said: “UK faces no threats now” adding “we’re looking for an enemy”. General Richard Barrons (retd) who was associated with drafting SDR 2025 recently noted: “geopolitics has changed; after Ukraine in the next four to five years Russia will be a clear threat to the UK.”

This month a Russian warship appeared on the English channel. In addition, the longer term threat from China is seen as real. Barrons added that military capability has to be built sooner than first thought and the government has to find resources beyond the commitments made earlier.

At the recent Shangri-la Dialogue which focuses on the Indo-Pacific (in contrast the Munich Security Conference spotlight which is on Europe) the White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Homeland Security, Stephen Miller said: “the real world is governed by strength, use of force and power, not international niceties”. What he meant was ‘might is right’.

For the second straight year, while China did not send its defence minister, India was represented by defence secretary Rajesh Singh. Last year, the CDS, general Anil Chauhan attended; and by admitting ‘initial mistakes’ during Op Sindoor created a stir. The revelation during the standoff- conflict with Pakistan was rare since no operational issue such as Doklam, Galwan, Sindoor and even a reference to a book by a former chief of army staff (COAS), which has been banned by the government, has been permitted for discussion in parliament.

Also read: The Indian Military's Inventory is Bewilderingly Diverse – and Increasingly Hard to Sustain

While the government frequently warns Pakistan about cross-border terrorism, occasionally mentioning ‘retaking PoK’, not a word is uttered about China. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in a recent Quad meeting in Delhi noted that India only talks about terrorism from Pakistan. Home minister Amit Shah has mentioned the parliamentary resolution of 1963 on ‘retaking Aksai Chin’ only once in parliament while revoking Article 370 and issuing a new map of India. Foreign minister S. Jaishankar had to make an air-dash to Beijing to placate China saying the map would make no difference on the ground.

Clear-eyed generals and air marshals who waged Operation Sindoor have said that short of Chinese boots on the ground, Pakistan fought the war with full complement of Chinese force multipliers and equipment adding that the next round will be a one-front reinforced war, with India losing its edge in conventional superiority.

Jaishankar recently told a news channel that India could not take on China whose economy is five times bigger. On social media, war veterans have stated that defence funding hovering at around 2% of the GDP since a decade requires a big hike coupled with streamlining defence acquisition process to leap-frog capability-building.

Former navy chief, admiral Arun Prakash said at a seminar recently that delays in decision-making and the convoluted acquisition procedure have seriously impaired capability development. This is best illustrated by the lethargic operationalising of IAF’s acquisition of 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) programmes. While only 36 Rafale aircraft were contracted in 2016, the deal for 114 Rafales has not been realised resulting in avoidable time and cost overruns.

Also read: Rafale Returns? A Decade Later, India is Back to the Same Fighter Deal at Four Times the Price

Further the IAF indigenous Tejas programme has become hostage to jet-engines from US. The combined effect of these erratic projects will reduce the combat inventory to below 25 squadrons by 2030 from the present 29 squadrons against authorised 42 squadrons – despite Air Chief Marshal AP Singh highlighting that this will make India ‘less safe’.

Ministerial resignation is not the norm in India especially when defence minister Rajnath Singh’s authority is circumscribed by NSA Ajit Doval’s whose additional remit is to groom potential CDS through a unique deep selection system - in the latest turnover the CDS appointed is junior to serving Army and Air Force chiefs.

General K.S. Thimayya was the only COAS who resigned over interference by his defence minister though he was made to retract his resignation. V.K. Krishna Menon was the first and only defence minister to resign after the 1962 debacle. Two former service chiefs – admiral Vijay Shekhawat and general Shankar Roy Chaudhury issued threats of resignation over capability diminution – but neither resigned.

The absence of strategic security policy, inadequate funding and diminishing interaction between higher political and military leadership has rendered India less safe in an era when, according to SIPRI 2026, conflict is at its highest since World War 2.

Ashok K. Mehta, a major general, is a founding member of the erstwhile Defence Planning Staff, now the Integrated Defence Staff.

This piece was first published on The India Cable – a premium newsletter from The Wire – and has been updated and republished here. To subscribe to The India Cable, click.

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