In the immediate aftermath of Operation Sindoor, India, perhaps for the first time, articulated a strategic doctrine. It adopted as the ‘new normal’ swift and sure retaliation to Pakistani terror provocations. It would appear that Operation Sindoor brought about a radical disjuncture, for not only have pronouncements aplenty been made since, but military activity has also picked up.

Understandably, then, a recent commentary, predicting an opportunity for peacemaker Trump to tote up his Nobel chances, cries wolf. The author argues that in any next round, Indians, believing that the nuclear card is Pakistan’s way of instigating American peace initiatives, would likely go for objectives across the Line of Control (LoC). This, he argues, could lead to “uncontrolled escalation”. How real is this danger?

The doctrinal shift

An imagined strategic continuum has a defensive segment at one end and compellence at the other, with deterrence in between. The deterrence segment can be further split into two – defensive deterrence and offensive deterrence. Prevailing in war involves compellence.

From Nehru’s defensive policies to Indira Gandhi’s more combative deterrence, India’s military strategy has shifted significantly. The mechanised warfare experiments of General K. Sundarji are a thing of the past. After nuclearisation, the concept of a “limited war” gained prominence, as seen in the Kargil conflict, and which set the stage for the Cold Start doctrine.

Also read: India Needs a Strategic Reset After Pahalgam Terror Attack, Operation Sindoor

The wellsprings of the doctrinal makeover lay in three sources. At the external level, Pakistan – instrumentalising Kashmir – remained a problem. In the nuclear era, India had to pull its punches, which led to the idea of limited offensive operations across a wide front, known as the cold start doctrine.

At the internal level, riding on the back of an economy unleashed by liberalisation, India saw itself as an emerging power. Cultural nationalism, which too shaped Indian strategic culture, infused an offensive content into the doctrine. During the Manmohan Singh years, the offensive content provided cover for parlays with Pakistan. Later, under the Narendra Modi government, the offensive content was presented as the strategic shift, heralding rupture of his era with the past .

Within the military itself, leaders exerted themselves to stay relevant in the nuclear era. They trimmed their sails to float below the nuclear threshold, hoping to deter Pakistani sub-conventional provocations, without risking nuclear escalation.

India thus moved from a doctrine of defensive deterrence, combining denial through defensive battles and punishment through strike corps counteroffensives, to a posture of offensive deterrence with proactive operations.

Over the three terms of the present regime, this strategic shift appears to have run its course. Not only has India responded to terrorist provocations with military action on three occasions, after Operation Sindoor, it claims to have further raised the stakes. Its updated strategic doctrine now collapses terrorist groups with their state sponsors and promises swift, automatic retribution.

Clearly, the two previous reprisal surgical strikes did not achieve their objectives. Whether this new approach marks a shift towards compellence remains uncertain.

The cautious execution of Operation Sindoor also shows that strategic restraint remains a factor. India petitioned Pakistan after the terror camp strike, kept its own air out of action for three crucial days and threw a parting punch only after knowing the Americans had already contained Pakistan. More recently, official reticence was visible in the two days it took to officially recognise the recent Delhi blast as a terrorist strike.

The next round

While India delayed activating Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) for two decades, Pakistan moved ahead with tactical nuclear developments and doctrinal changes. Almost in response, Operation Sindoor was conducted as a stand-off engagement. Further, post the operation, India appears to be shifting towards a scaled down version of IBGs, named Bhairavs, Rudras and Shaktibaans. It is evident that while India previously stepped back from corps-level offensives, it is now also limiting sub-divisional IBGs, in favour of mini-IBGs.

Also read: Operation Sindoor: How India's Gamble Backfired and Made It More Vulnerable

Notably, IBGs have been criticised as a sign of an inability to work within an Order of Battle. Formations and units are available for operational tasking according to the flow of a campaign, so why create objective-specific IBGs that answer through the threat of confidential reports? What happens to IBGs after first-phase objectives are completed? Do Sanskrit-derived names function as force multipliers? Aware of these limitations, India appears to have settled for taking small bites instead of full chunks of enemy territory and combat capability.

Fortuitously, this is all for the good since the nuclear factor now also looms larger. It has acquired formidable portents with United States President Donald Trump’s “favourite field marshal” taking control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, one which, Trump alleges, continues to be spruced up.

This year’s biggest military exercise was in wake of Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh’s mentions of Karachi and Sindh. Anyone would believe that an exercise that featured a Rudra brigade being put through its paces, and an amphibious landing, must indicate an intent to follow through on Singh’s threats. However, the exercise made no mention of any nuclear angle. Instead, the usual desultory practice of decontamination drills, carrying a hint of the nuclear backdrop sensitivity, were practiced in another – multinational – exercise.

This can imply three things: one, the use of the Rudra brigade suggests India does not intend to trigger any red lines. Two, a more ambitious capability, demonstrated through the amphibious landing, is to deter Pakistan’s chief of army staff, Field Marshal Asim Munir, from upping the conventional ante. And three, the omission of the nuclear dimension implies a belief that Pakistan’s symmetric escalation is retrained by a strengthened Indian nuclear triad.

Also read: Modi May Say Otherwise, But India Is Still Short of ‘Survivable Nuclear Deterrent’

Dangers arise if India finds itself wrong on any of the three counts. One, the escalatory quotient in use of Bhairavs and Rudras depends on the objectives set. If on the LoC, the objectives are proxy war and defensive posture relevant, it would not be escalatory. However, operations that lend an offensive advantage could lower the other’s red lines. Bhairav units launched elsewhere across the border can also instigate escalation.

Two, Munir’s propensity to hold out may draw in components meant to signal escalation dominance – such as the amphibious elements – into actual combat. Mission creep (or expansion beyond its original goals), inadvertence and accidents can also occur.

Finally, Munir’s boast of taking “half the world down” with himself is plausible not only because of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, but also in light of India’s nuclear doctrine, which promises massive retaliation.

These are the unintended outcomes that India ought to avoid. It must be cautious against venturing past offensive deterrence into compellence. This is not a tall order for a regime that reckons it’s not an era of war. It must be receptive to third party off-ramps – diplomatic or mediated avenues to de-escalate conflicts. Since peace deals address both the underlying and immediate causes of war, it must also recognise that Kashmir will feature on the negotiation table, especially if nuclear clouds gather.

Consequently, its best to remember: where a teaser will suffice, don’t reach for the full trailer; and where a trailer is enough, just forget about the entire movie.

Ali Ahmed is a strategic analyst. The original version of this essay first appeared on the author’s Substack. It has been edited and republished with permission.

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