Alok Asthana 
Militants’ successes in the Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh regions are increasing at an alarming rate.
Most security experts explain it as resulting from the dilution of forces in these areas, necessitated by the need of more forces to counter the Chinese threat, and surprisingly, on Pakistan’s ‘growing frustration’. Be that as it may, it will also be useful to look at what can be done about this with resources available.
Militant attacks are of two types – those where we have the initiative and those where they have it.
A militant is almost always aware of our actions. He plans his moves accordingly. Examples of these are the attacks on fixed army posts and ambushes of our patrol parties. In such a situation, the army is quite likely to have a few losses in the first few minutes. This cannot be immediately avoided as even when we are pursuing a militant, he is hidden, and we are moving. Hence, the first few losses are often likely to be ours.
However, once he has fired once, the situation changes. Now, both parties know each other’s location. The element of surprise is lost and further progress must depend not on the benefit of the first shots, but on which side has freedom of action.
He who has it, can control the tempo of activities to suit his situation. Here, our own forces have a clear upper hand. The militant has been located and his situation is growing worse with each passing moment, while that of our own side is rapidly getting better. We can wait it out till an opportunity presents itself, while he cannot.
Also read: Who Allowed Militancy to Foster in Jammu and Kashmir?
This is exactly why there is little justification for casualties occurring to our side hours after contact has been established.
If they do occur, it means that the contact once established is lost again and we are back to square one. This loss of contact is always due to either lack of night vision equipment and reliable person-to-person communication between all members of pursuing forces.
If the Indian Army can ensure that its soldiers have these two, it may suffer losses in the first flush of fire with hidden militants, but none thereafter.
Yet another situation faced is of the militant ambush of vehicles – either of the army or civilians – in militancy-affected areas. These may look like situations where the militant has the initiative, but this is not true.
A convoy in a militancy area is an infrequent occurrence, hence its protection is planned for in great detail. Up to a hundred soldiers are employed for 10-12 hours each time a convoy moves out. Yes, it is a target where the militant has the initiative to choose the time and place of attack, but the army can anticipate it and take all measure to blunt it. It has very clear and well established Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for it. The SOP requires that the move not start till clearance is given by the army. This is provided only after a Road Opening Party (ROP) consisting of several scores of soldiers physically moving on the road, securing the road and the area around it.
The detailed system of how ROPs must operate has stood the test of time.
In addition to ROPs, a mobile armed escort accompanies the convoy. If these two elements operate as per procedure, there is just no chance of anyone attacking a vehicle on the road – and getting away with it.
The fact that vehicles still get attacked and militants are able to flee, points to just two possibilities. The most common one is that vehicles, sometimes of army itself, move on the road without any ROP or escort vehicle. In a recent case, two army vehicles were ambushed. Ostensibly, this move violated orders, as two vehicles, unaccompanied by an escort, are not allowed to move under the rules. Was an ROP was not laid? The next common reason is that the ROP is ineffective because the area to be covered is too large and ROP personnel are too tired from such daily chores to do an effective job.
If the ROP was not laid, the unit involved must be penalised. If some vehicle moved on the road without the ROP having given its clearance, the person who gave the order for the vehicle to move without clearance must be penalised. If the ROPs are ineffective due to men being tired, the unit and its controlling HQ must take immediate remedial measures. The exact offender must be localised and punished. This is never done.
The result is as must be expected – another such incident a few weeks later.
Many of the arguments heard are too defensive. It seems to be that we should somehow prevent attacks from happening. If they do happen, our men have to die. That’s not a good argument. Some military thinker, probably Sun Tzu, once said, ‘Defence must stem not from the hope of enemy not coming, but from being confident that even if he comes, he’ll fail
Also read: The Phantasm of Triumphalism on Kashmir
Our units and Formation Headquarters are staffed by officers who spend several years doing expensive specialised courses. Our soldiers too get to train extensively. Logistics and numbers are on our side.
On the other hand, the militant is mostly untrained, working in teams of two or three, and in enemy territory. In some cases, they use reasonably good equipment, but in most cases, they rely on rusty AK-47 type of weapons with a limited, dwindling supply of ammunition. Despite this, they can inflict casualties on our search parties much beyond those inflicted in the first few moments of encounter, and also ambush our vehicles moving on our protected roads.
All this may well happen in the first few months of the deployment of an army group in a militancy-ridden area. But because it happens regularly, year after year, it is blameworthy. It is also unfair to those soldiers who lose their lives. Merely calling them martyrs does not help.
They were men who believed that the system is protecting their movement, but this was not the case. In most cases, they died helplessly due to sheer neglect and inefficiency on someone else’s part. Who is that ‘someone?’ Let us look for accountability within.
After such attacks, there are calls of revenge. This is unprofessional. All we need to do is remedy the ills of the situation. Give our men better night vision devices, assured man-to-man communication and ensure that those that violate the laid down rules of vehicle movement are punished.
Colonel Alok Asthana is a veteran. He is the author of the book The Red Pill on India and Indian Army 2023. He can be contacted at alok.asthana@gmail.com.