When the recent Galwan incident occurred, the Chinese spokesman was asked why Beijing had not admitted to casualties on the Chinese side and specified how many men they had lost. His reply gives this writer cause to ponder deeply.
The reply was that if the number of Chinese casualties had been disclosed, there would be comparisons made. Either way, that would have raised an outcry of either despair or triumphalism. In the resultant noise, it would have been difficult to pursue a grand strategy in a calm and judicious manner. It was a very impressive answer and raises a number of questions in Delhi.
Presumably, the chief of defence staff (CDS) and his team are not moved or swayed by the cacophonous debate that has ensued in India. Unfortunately, there is serious concern that the political class might lead the country in a race to the intellectual bottom. That’s precisely what has occurred, with the defence minister repeatedly declaring that our grand strategy is: “No one can touch an inch of our land.”
After 73 years of an independent India, it was a justifiable premise that we had built up strategic institutions like the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the CDS, the National Security Advisor, the National Security Staff and a proliferation of meritorious think tanks. Beijing has certainly done so and is already beginning to throw challenges to Washington for the hegemony of the world. In this rapidly changing global scenario, are we going to remain mired in our early post colonial paranoia about the loss of territory?
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True, the invasion of Kashmir in 1948, the Chinese war in 1962 and Pakistan’s attempt to take Kashmir again in 1965 focused the attention of our strategic planners on preserving the frontiers of India. But the world in 2020 is vastly different from 1965, and more than one economic forecast places India with the third largest GDP by 2050. In the armed forces, however, only the Indian Army, a valiant service, has grown 250% in these years. Is that adequate to become a regional power in the 21st century? China’s People’s Liberation Army has an active duty strength of 9,15,000, or 2,95,000 less than that of the Indian army.
In Europe, the frontiers of countries were enshrined in 1648 in the treaty of Westphalia. In Asia we have no such treaty, and post-colonial turbulence has shifted boundaries for a few decades. But it is time that we lost our fear of losing a bit of India to someone else. The majority of Indians are under 35 years of age and don’t remember that in 1962, China after entering deep into the then NEFA, withdrew unilaterally to the Indian claim line.
In the whole controversy over the Line of Actual Control in Galwan in the press, not a single map has been published showing the LAC and the Chinese claim line. Instead of stringing 3,00,000 troops along 4,000 km, it is time that the armed forces are induced to articulate a coherent strategy of ‘punitive retaliation’, whether it be with China or Pakistan. Balakot was a baby step and punitive retaliation against China is probably better planned at sea, in the Indian Ocean. But it is a national shame and disgrace that for a maritime nation, the Indian Navy’s share of the defence budget is 15%.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has articulated a GDP of $5 trillion by 2025, and the forecast by PricewaterhouseCoopers puts the Indian GDP (in purchasing power parity terms) in 2050 as $44 trillion. Armed forces take 10-15 years to change their strategies in a major way. So it is presumed that with India’s growth, the CDS is planning a new grand strategy that goes beyond territoriality.
The air force should be encouraged, along with the navy, to build up expeditionary capability in the Indian Ocean to dominate the straits of Malacca and Hormuz. The navy too has to realise that in a nuclear world, the doctrine of Mahan may have to be altered.
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Much could be achieved in open forums and seminars, where the grand strategy is discussed without being secretive. In 70 years we have not published a single white paper, while the US publishes periodic Global Futures and Nuclear Posture Reviews. Indian soft power is considerable, with a diaspora that remits $70 billion annually, a large chunk of which comes from the Middle East. The Indian community in the US is the richest segment of the diasporia community, and there are three Indians in Boris Johnson’s cabinet.
Only the Indian military doctrine remains dwarfed and stunted, unable to produce a satisfactory aircraft or tank in 70 years. A furtive secrecy stalks South Block, with not a single government official having debriefed an Indian participant of war games with the Pakistan armed forces held in a third country. The CDS needs to initiate a big debate, where questions are asked and answered. Is conventional war over, as Fukuyama says – Is Clausewitz right that war happens only when diplomacy fails? Is the protection of sea lanes relevant in the future? Can a navy exist without primary land attack weapons? Can the air force get past its Battle of Britain strategy?
When the approach papers are ready, the CDS can compile them and task the Integrated Defence Staff to evolve an unclassified military posture, as even Beijing does.
Admiral Raja Menon was a career officer and a submarine specialist in the Indian Navy. He commanded seven ships and submarines before retiring in 1994 as assistant chief of naval staff (operations).
