Chandigarh: A cross-section of Indian military veterans and defence analysts maintain that the recently instituted committee, headed by defence secretary Rajesh Kumar, to fast-track procurements to boost the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) declining combat squadrons and plug its numerous other operational gaps, was intended merely to endorse a ‘pre-determined’ fighter purchase decision by the government.
“There is simply no way that this committee can possibly undertake such a mammoth task in the four week deadline it has been given to submit its recommendations,” said a former senior Ministry of Defence (MoD) official. It appears that the committee has been instituted to ‘validate and ratify’ the long-pending multi-role fighter aircraft (MRFA) buy that has already been decided upon by the IAF and the MoD, he added, declining to be named, as he was fearful of official repercussions for speculating on such a sensitive matter.
“Whether this committee actually comes to a decision on ways to increase the pace of inducting a combat platform (into the IAF) remains to be seen, unless, of course, the selection has already been made and the objective is to provide a veneer of official approval to the same,” said military analyst Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle of the Security Risks consultancy Group in Delhi. Such is the opacity of India’s defence procurement process, he added, that it is difficult to decipher the government’s intended pathway in this regard.
Other IAF veterans endorsed his viewpoint, asserting that constituting such a committee, which included Air Marshal Tejinder Singh, the deputy chief of Air Staff (a post responsible for IAF procurements), Defence Research and Development Organisation chief Samir Kamat and defence production secretary Sanjeev Kumar, defied all ‘accepted logic and pragmatism’.
One two-star IAF veteran averred that the Defence Acquisition Procedure-2020 (DAP-2020) covered the entire scope of all material acquisitions, and no additional proposals or guidelines were needed for this purpose, lest these involved ‘unstated factors’ that were known only to a handful of officials.
Primarily, the committee’s remit is reportedly to suggest ‘approaches’ to swell IAF fighter squadron numbers, which had declined to around 30, and were expected to drop to 28 by 2025-26, some 12-14 short of the 42 squadrons, which military planners have long claimed were needed to prosecute a two-front war with China and Pakistan, alongside force multipliers, like mid-air refuelers and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platforms. Both latter assets too were badly needed, since their prevailing numbers were grossly inadequate, compared with similar platforms operated by India’s two collusive nuclear-armed rivals.
“It appears that this committee itself has been set up as a force multiplier to back the already shortlisted fighter, in all likelihood from the US,” said a three-star IAF veteran. This, he said, also refusing to be named, emanated from the MoD’s objective of ‘playing safe’ and pursuing a ‘controversy-free’ path in effecting the MRFA buy. The 2016 acquisition of 36 Dassault Rafale fighters, he added, had been swathed in allegations of wrongdoing ahead of the 2019 Lok Sabha polls, and the BJP-led government wanted to avoid a repeat of such ‘unnecessary controversies’.
Eight MRFA types were on offer to the IAF from seven overseas original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in response to its request for information (RfI), dispatched in April 2019. The RfI mandated directly importing 18 of the shortlisted fighters and constructing the remaining 96 locally via a collaborative venture between the selected OEM and a domestic strategic partner via a technology transfer, in a project estimated to cost $20-25 billion.
These OEMs included Dassault (Rafale), Eurofighter (Typhoon), Sweden’s Saab (Gripen-E), Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation and Sukhoi Corporation (MiG-35 ‘Fulcrum-F’ and Su-35 ‘Flanker-E’ respectively) and the US’s Boeing and Lockheed Martin (F/A-18E/F ‘Super Hornet’ and F-15EX ‘Eagle’ II and the F-21, principally an upgraded F-16 derivative, configured specially for the IAF).
IAF veterans and analysts ruled out the two Russian platforms, as the ongoing war in Ukraine circumscribed Moscow’s eventual ability to make good its offer. Alternatively, the Typhoon had earlier been rejected during trials conducted 2010 onwards for the IAFs binned Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contract floated in 2007, as was Gripen-E and the US’s F-18 and the F-16-the precursor to the F-21- on multiple operational capability counts.
Besides, the Gripen-E and the F-21- just a fourth generation fighter, were single-engine platforms. And though the MRFA RfI had not specified any preference for fighters with single or dual power packs, the IAF’s intrinsic preference for the latter with regard to overseas fighters, remains unstated. And even though OEM’s like Lockheed Martin claimed that its F-21 had since been equipped with newer and more advanced technologies and weaponry, the IAF, it seems, remained unimpressed with these enhancements.
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The Rafale, on the other hand, was favourably placed in the MRFA sweepstakes, due not only to its operational superiority over its competitors, as acknowledged by the IAF, but also because Dassault had established maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) depots and simulators at Ambala, near New Delhi and at Hasimara in West Bengal for the fighters, which could be exploited by additional newly inducted platforms.
Dassault had also recently secured clearance to establish a fully self-owned MRO facility near Jewar International airport in Uttar Pradesh to support not just the IAFs fleet of some-50-odd Mirage 2000Hs fighters and eventually 62 Rafale’s-including 26 of the Indian Navy-but also 42 Rafale’s operated by the Indonesian Air Force, thereby enhancing its MRFA acceptability.
And while IAF veterans concurred that acquiring additional Rafales made ‘commercial, logistical and operational’ sense, recent media reports had ruled the French fighter out of the MRFA contest. These assorted accounts had indicated that other than ‘avoiding any controversy’ in the event of the Rafale being shortlisted as the IAFs MRFA choice, Dassault would be unable to supply these fighters for at least 10 years, due to pending orders from various other air forces. Such delays, the reports added, would undermine the MRFA programme’s urgency in making up IAF fighter squadron numbers rapidly, adversely impacting thereby Rafale’s chances in the MRFA contest.
Hence, this process of elimination leaves only Boeing’s twin-engine F-15EX Eagle II all-weather multirole 4.5 generation fighter in the fray. Derived from the erstwhile McDonnel Douglas F-15E ‘Strike Eagle’ model dating back to the mid-1980’s, the upgraded Eagle II had conducted its first flight in 2021 and become operational in June 2024 with the US Air Force that, so far, has placed an order for 104 units.
“Such a buy by the IAF would greatly enhance bilateral military ties between India and the US and would also be hailed by incoming [US] President Donald Trump in keeping with his transactional proclivity for deal-making to further Washington’s influence,” said a former IAF fighter pilot. It may also be recalled that in his first presidential term Trump had, in February 2020, finalised an over $3 billion deal during his India visit to supply the Indian Navy 24 Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky MH-60R multirole naval helicopters and six Boeing Apache AH-64E ‘Guardian’ attack helicopters to India’s Army Aviation Corps.
The DAP-2020, and its previous editions, all permit single vendor procurements, especially via inter-government agreements, which included the US’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. But former MoD officials, once again argued, that such a possible purchase, were it to transpire, does not, in any way necessitate the setting up of a special committee to approve it. They asserted that this can be processed routinely via DAP-2020 and any ‘moral support’ for it from a special committee, only reiterated the MoD’s persistent vacillation on critical issues with regard to military modernisation.
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Meanwhile, there is little doubt that the MRFA is of the highest priority for the IAF, as even air chief marshal A.P. Singh had declared at his annual presser in Delhi in October that these platforms were needed ‘yesterday’. Furthermore, on Boxing Day China unveiled its latest advancement in military aviation: a sixth generation fighter, unofficially designated the J-36 which features artificial intelligence, drone integration and advanced electronic warfare capability.
It also showcases a tailless configuration with a diamond-shaped, modified delta wing design which enhances stealth capabilities by reducing radar cross-section and improving aerodynamic efficiency, making the aircraft harder to detect and more manoeuvrable during long-range missions. Notably, the fighter features air intakes located atop the fuselage, suggesting a potential three-engine arrangement for superior speed and agility.
The J-36’s advanced stealth and long range capabilities challenge the aerial superiority traditionally maintained by the US, and its allies and could well prompt a re-assessment of strategy, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, where China’s growing military hegemony could alter the balance of power. The planned J-36 will supplement the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s twin-engine fifth generation fighters – Chengdu J-20s and Shenyang- J-35s – that make it the world’s second air force to operate two such cutting edge combat platforms.
In the meantime, the IAF remains beset by delays due to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s (HAL) struggles in series producing its indigenously developed, single-engine 4.5 generation Tejas Mk1A variant fighters. The main reason for these delays is the glitch in the US supply of General Electric GE-404-IN20 turbofan power packs.
The IAF is also overwhelmed by its own lack of decision making in advancing its MRFA procurement and a continually shrinking defence budget, which for financial year 2024-25, has fallen below 2% of India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
