'National Security Conversations' Episode 2: Ceasefire Violations Along the LoC

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HJ: Hello and welcome to the National Security Conversations with me, Happymon Jacob. Ceasefire Violations (CFVs) in Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan have been a major source of tension between the two sides. In fact in the recent past, CFVs have been taking place on a daily basis. Let’s briefly review the data. Since 2014, India has reported 2,400 CFVs and Pakistan has reported 2,900 CFVs. In the last three months of 2018 alone, Pakistan reported 900 CFVs and India reported around 630 CFVs. This year alone, India has lost 13 civilians and 15 military personnel. This actually follows the violent trend that was set in 2017. 2017 was the bloodiest year since the Ceasefire was agreed to by India and Pakistan in 2003. Make no mistake, CFVs are a major trigger for escalation dynamics between India and Pakistan. It is therefore very important that we have a threadbare and fact based discussion on CFVs and what it means for India Pakistan relations. To talk to us about this and more, today we have  Lt. Gen Syed Ata Hasnain. General Hasnain was the Commander of the Indian Army as the GOC of the 15 Corps, prior to that he was the GOC of the 21 Corps based in Bhopal. He was also the Military Secretary to the Government of India. General Hasnain is currently associated with the Vivekananda India Foundation and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi. It's a pleasure to have you General Hasnain.

General Hasnain, I want to start with some basic questions about what CFVs are. What are CFVs? What do you mean by CFVs – does it mean that one shot by an army personnel constitutes a CFV or is it more than that? I am asking this because there is a lot of misunderstanding about CFVs among the general public. People think, when we talk about 2,500 CFVs, it means just 2,500 shots fired. Can you give us some details about CFVs.

SAH: Dr. Happymon, first of all, it’s a pleasure to be speaking on your show today. I’ll bring whatever experience I have of having commanded in a sub-unit, a unit, a Brigade, a Division and a Corps, all on the LOC. Having said that, whatever I am going to be speaking is probably keeping in mind the 2003 cut-off. We had an environment earlier and we have had CFVs earlier too, but just to explain to your viewers, the CF which was formally in place in 1971, is the CF that we were speaking about at that time. And there were violations to that CF from time to time. But I am going to be specifically focusing on 2003 because through the '90s and the early part of the millennium, while Pakistan and India both exchanged fire across the LOC; the situation dramatically changed on the November 26, 2003 when many people believe that it was a unilateral CF called for by Pakistan which is incorrect. There was tremendous amount of back channel diplomacy which went into it and both India and Pakistan agreed mutually to come for CF. The only thing was that it was not a CF in the written form. It was an understanding; it was based on a couple of telephone calls from the DGMO Pakistan to our DGMO.

HJ: Why was this not a written agreement? As an Army Commander, you would know that what is written in black and white tends to persist.

SAH: I agree entirely with you. I think, to my mind, it why it could not be brought into a written form is primarily because of trust deficit between India and Pakistan. They know very well that putting down something on paper and committing yourself to it will compromise you in some way or the other in the future in contingencies which cannot be foreseen at that particular time.  So it was for this reason that it was led to this convention that we have agreed between us that we will no longer fire across the LOC. After November 26, I was there as a Commander at Uri at that time and I remember walking to the LOC for the first time by day and no one taking a potshot at me and no one firing a me. I thought everyone was very happy. Both in the Pakistani army side and Indian army side. The civilian population on Pakistan side was extremely happy, so was the population on the POK side and so was our population. This situation persisted from November 26 to sometime around 2007-2008 when you found the first triggers of violations coming up primarily in the Krishna Ghati area. Late 2007, whole of 2008 and 2009, it picked up. The activity picked up much more after 26/11 where you found that there was virtually a breakdown in the relationship. Till then, some kind of a peace process was on. That peace process was also facilitated by the lack of exchanges and lack of firing at the LOC. After 26/11, everything suddenly turned berserk. But despite that, from 2008 to 2013, we did find exchanges taking place primarily in the Akhnoor-Rajouri-Poonch sector, much less in the Valley sector and almost nil in Kargil and absolutely nil in the Siachen and Turtuk sector. So it is a very interesting observation, why did CFVs take place after 2008? That’s the question which we need to....

HJ: Lets come to that in a minute, if we sought of focus on the first question that I asked, which is what do we mean by a CFV? Is there a definition of which tells you what CFVs are.

SAH: Unfortunately as you yourself brought out, as the CF is not a written agreement, there was no kind of parleys between the two sides by which you could come to a formal understanding of what could constitute a CFV.

HJ: Let me give you a hypothetical situation. Supposing you have firing by military artillery by the two sides which is happening now for a 24 hour period in a sector of about 50km radius. Would that constitute one CFV or would that be 100 CFVs?

SAH: Very interesting question. There are no black and white answers to that once again. I'll take you back to the initial instructions that came to the Indian Army Forces in 2003-2004, which said that: even if there is firing across the LOC and the firing is ineffective, it is not hitting your bunkers, it is just going astray here and there, it does not constitute a violation and we are not required to respond. What was given to us almost in writing was that, whenever the Indian army responds, it will be a professional response, which means that it will be for effect. Therefore, whatever the Indian Army normally does is always for effect. But what the Pakistani Army does many times with firing is just designed to send across a message.

HJ: So, what is fired for effect gets counted as a CFV?

SAH: Yes, from our side.

HJ: But in terms of the number of shots fired, how do you trace the earlier question that I asked – hundred thousand shots fired in a period of 24 hours in a 50 km radius, would that count as one violation?

SAH: No, what will happen inevitably is that we will segmentise it to sectors. For example, on that particular date, Poonch sector has had a couple of shots fired and there has been a time gap, let’s say about two to three hours in the middle, the common understanding is that this will constitute two different violations. And the reporting procedures of those will be accordingly. Similarly on the same day, if you have a violation in the Uri sector then that will be considered as a separate violation. And in the Uri sector, if you have had violation over a period of six to eight hours, with a break of three to four hours in the middle, then it will constitute two different violations. Both the DGMOs on the Pakistani Army side and the Indian Army side have got different parameters. That is why I always say that statistics is always the best way by which we can actually judge what is happening on the LOC and many a times, casualty may be a better judge on the nature of violations that are taking place.

HJ: In any case, would you agree that there is a great deal of subjectivity that goes into determining what a CFV is on the ground? Is that accurate?

SAH:  Absolutely. And you will have to remember that much depends on the perceptions of the Commanders on the ground. What is the meaning of effectiveness? A commander may just perceive that something that has come as a stray shot is not effective at all. While another military commander may have completely different perception of it based upon his military background. So there is a deal of subjectivity to understanding the whole concept of a violation.

HJ: Let’s discuss about the causes of CFVs. You have written in many places, sort of demythifying the myth that we have in India---that CFVs are solely caused by infiltrations of terrorists from the Pakistani side. You sought of seem to disagree with that assessment. Am I reading you accurately?

SAH: You see this range of CFVs in terms of their effectiveness is diverse. It can go from the sub-tactical level and it can right up to the strategic level. Let me explain that. At the sub-tactical level, it can be just a couple of potshots fired on a patrol along the LOC fence which is going there, not very effective and nothing major has been achieved out of that. And the effect of that remains very local. While you may find a violation of the Jammu international border where you find the targeting of the civil population and the effect of that is very different. Then the messaging of that is very different. Then at the much higher level, if we have a major event taking place in India, a major visit taking place, some sporting event taking place, which is drawing the attention of the world to the Indian subcontinent, this is considered by Pakistan to be a very opportune moment to bring about CFVs so that alongside the media reporting of the event, you also have the reporting of the violations going on the Jammu and Kashmir and the whole issue of Jammu and Kashmir gets holed up into the international media space. So this happens that the nature of violations are all different based upon the situations and the contingencies that exist different place.

HJ: Let’s try and look at something which I have believed to be a major trigger for CFVs which is local military factors. Do you believe that local military factors such as testing fire or a Commander taking matter into his own hands, the personality traits of the commander on the field. Do these things have an implication for how, when and where CFVs take out?

SAH: Actually, you question is linked to your previous question on the aspect of infiltration. I’ll try and answer both these questions together. On the LOC, I must first of all outline the fact that LOC soldiering is something quite different. It is very different to conventional soldiering anywhere else. It is a form of low intensity conflict and at the same time tremendous loss of life takes place. And there is a tremendous level of political level messaging, operational level messaging, which takes place all around this. Having said that, local commanders many a times are given the direction by higher commanders that on the LOC one of the most important aspects for the Indian Army to achieve is moral domination. Moral ascendancy is the actual terminology that we use. Not many people have been able to understand what moral ascendency means.

HJ: Please tell us what it means.

SAH: Moral ascendency translates into the projection of being the better army. Far better domination, better training, capability, discipline, better logistics, all this is a part of it. To show that, here we are, a superior army and you cannot get the better of us. I can also admit that the Pakistani Army to a great extent also tries to follow the same...

HJ: How does that translate into a CFV?

SAH: This is what sometimes CFVs happens and this is only one domain of CFVs that we are looking at, the aspect of the local dimension that we are looking at. Many times, it happens that there will be some very aggressive commanders on the ground. And those aggressive commanders might not accept any transgression in their area. Infiltration which may have happened in their area or even a simple casualty that has taken place on the LOC. For them, inevitably it is an immediate response. I need to remind you that in the good old days, much before 1989, there used to be an understanding in the Pakistani Army, that they have the liberty to fire across the LOC at will. While the Indian Army and this used to be the messaging across all times, this used to be told that bring your orders from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. And the Indian Army used to always be seething on this. That has changed. That changed in the 1990s, it changed completely and I think after 2014, particularly after the coming of Prime Minister Modi, it has changed almost completely now. Now the Army has been given much more powers to take the initiative, so to say, and therefore, the limit is only when I too as a Commander go back to my General Officer and say that, there have been violations in my area and I would like to punish my adversary. The only answer was that how much ammunition would you need? So it was only the question of planning of your ammunition and the targeting of that particular area. No one questioned you on your will and the necessity of doing it because that was left to the local commanders. So as I said the personality of the local commanders, there are many commanders who like to keep their areas absolutely quiet. And in their concept, in an area that is quiet, the possibility of infiltration is also that much lesser. So this is a professional understanding which is a perception of different commanders in the manner in which they have been brought up in their units and how they have carried out their activities during their service and how much experience they have had on the LOC.   

HJ: Gen Hasnain, you would agree with me that men in uniform fighting in Jammu and Kashmir, deployed at the LOC are the ones who bear the brunt CFVs that are regularly taking place between India and Pakistan. Let me give you some data. According to a recent report, the Indian Army killed 138 Pakistani soldiers in 2017 and India lost about 28 of its own soldiers. You are talking about the rising of military casualties along the LOC. Is there a feeling within the armed forces that necessary steps should be taken within the armed forces that necessary steps should be taken by the political establishment in order to reduce the violence on the LOC. Let me explain this to you. I recently met some of the BSF officers in Delhi and one of the arguments that they made was that they had been requesting the Home Ministry in India to finalise the Ground Rules Agreement of 1961, which also, as you know, applies to the Jammu sector of the international border in Jammu and Kashmir. Unfortunately that has not been done. So there are steps that the politicians should take in order to ensure that the CFVs do not take place and people like yourselves who have served in the Army know that at the end of the day, it comes down to you and your boys. So is there a feeling in the Army that steps should be taken by the political establishment?

SAH: I have to explain this to your viewers in a slightly different way. Remember no soldier and no Commander ever wishes to go to war. Whatever degree of violence you use is ultimately to create peace. So at the end of the tunnel, there has to be some light. Is you are carrying out CFVs, if you are carrying out domination exercises at the LOC, inevitably it must lead to some chances of peace, So having said that, is this a war in perpetuation along the LOC? Will it be there forever? This is something which we like to ask ourselves many times. Units come and go. They stay 2 and 2 and half years on the LOC. And in that period, every Unit will like to have achieved something by which it would like to show itself. A Chief of the Army Staff Citation for example for having carried out counter infiltration activities and for having maintained total sanctity on the LOC in its place. And therefore soldiers from a professional angle do look forward to these kinds activities of violence along the LOC. But that is a very sub-tactical and tactical way of looking at this whole problem. As higher level military commanders, we should be contributing to the overall national aim. And that contribution should inevitably lead to how to bring about peace on the LOC. Because I am sure the Government of India or any government anywhere in the world which is facing a situation like that would ultimately look for peace. And that peace ultimately transforming into an agreement, an arrangement by which the two countries can live in peace with each other. We as the Army should not be contributing to unnecessary creating more turbulence. So that is the matter in which we need to look. But at the end of the day, what we need to do is, we need to be absolutely certain that by just exchanging fire across the LOC is not going to lead to a military victory. What we need to ensure is that the purpose is the sanctity of the LOC and that sanctity must remain, infiltration must not take place and transgression across the LOC must not take place and no parts of Indian territory which is under our control can exchange hands with the enemy. That is the whole purpose behind it, otherwise, I am sure, no senior commander in his senses would actually look for CFVs.

HJ: I think that is a very wise argument coming from you. Let me ask you a related question. There seems to be a lot of politicisation about what happens along the LOC. In fact, it is very unprecedented. In the 90s, in the 80s, in the 1970s, as you rightly pointed out, there used to be CFV but there was no domestic political angle attached to what happens on the LOC. Today, be it CFV, be it surgical strikes, or displacement of civilians along the Jammu Sector, or about building shell proof bunkers along the LOC in order to safeguard families and people, there seems to be a lot of politicisation on all of these issues. Does that put unnecessary burden on the Commanders and soldiers manning the border with Pakistan?

SAH: That’s a very good question. Let me tell that before 2003, the level of violations was far more and casualties were even far more, many times. But nothing was reported. This world has changed in the last 10 years, and I would particularly say in the last 5-8 years with the coming of social media and a very very national and pro-active electronic media. And therefore every evening you will find the debates and you will find on social media, people making comments, people who know have no idea what the LOC is and who have never been anywhere near it and unwilling to listen to many people who are speaking reason that actually the two countries need to be looking at each other in form of how to promote peace. But having said this, let me tell you this that I think India on its part has played a very active role in trying to bring about an effective CF. It is primarily because from the Pakistani side, infiltration is required and many times the LOC is seen to be an instrument of pro-active diplomacy. As I outlined to you earlier, when there is a visit to India, Pakistan wants to show it to the world, when the UN SC is coming into session, when the UNGA is coming into session, when the Pakistan PM is going to New York to speak, you will find suddenly a high pitch of violations that are taking place. All this has been politicised because of that to a great extent.

HJ: General Hasnain, I agree with you. But let me try and broaden the scope of the question. Is it a good idea for the political class in India to wilfully politicise the activities of the Indian Armed Forces in Jammu and Kashmir in particular. There is an argument that is often made that the Indian Army is some kind of a Holy Cow. That it should not be criticised. That the Army is above criticism, that you cannot talk about things, you cannot discuss, you cannot  criticise what the Army does. Why should that be the case? The Indian Army just like the MEA, or the MOD, or a university is an institution of the Indian State. So on the one hand, the politicisation for political interests of what the Army does by the political class is a bad idea, on the other hand, the Indian Army just like any other institution should also be accountable to the public scrutiny in a democracy like India. Would you agree with that?

SAH: Absolutely and I don’t think the Army itself has ever denied scrutiny of what it does, as such. It primarily because I think, we have a very vitiated political environment in India, cutting across party lines. The political community overall has looked at the aspect of muscular politics in many ways, the aspect of domination by the Indian Army, surgical strikes and everything, all being put into a space which says that if we follow a policy like this then we can get the better of our adversary. This is all temporary. I would say this does not bring about solutions to problems. But it is at the same time, many times, important also to bring about national spirit, a spirit of patriotism within people, but that has its limits. Those limits must be maintained. How to establish those limits is the moot point, is the problem. The Indian Army considered to be the most apolitical organisation, also considered to be one of the most apolitical and professional armies of the world, its unfortunate that it becomes an instrument to be thrown around in such a debate between the political class, which takes place from time to time. It because of this that the Army likes to protect itself many times. And the perception that stems out is that when you start criticising the Army in issues like this, the Army start defending itself. And that defence is taken to be as if the Army is a holy cow. Actually, thats not true. Many a times, the Army does make huge mistakes and many times admits to those mistakes like any other institution should admit to their mistakes. I think, I myself as the Corps Commander in Kashmir, have many times admitted to my mistakes. And suggestions by others to me to do something wrong, I have invariable spurned those suggestions. So I think the Army has got it morals, has got it values quite intact and does not want to be drawn into these debates at all. I would actually, through the medium of your programme would like to actually advise people that the Indian Army should not be treated as a Holy Cow and it should be completely accountable for the actions that it takes and the Army is always willing to do that. It is just that some labels are put on the Army to say that it is undemocratic organisation, a nationalist organisation, a holy cow which cannot be questioned at all- I do not think that is correct.

HJ: I am very happy that you said so. So in this context, as a retired senior commander of the Indian Army, what would be your advice to the Indian strategic community, to the political class or the men who are serving in the Armed Forces today on how to deal with the politicisation of the Armed forces in this country.

SAH: The first of the things I would say is that India’s strategic culture is so lacking that unfortunately no one has an idea about what the ethos of the Armed Forces is, what the Armed forces actually do on the LOC or in the hinterland of Kashmir, or for that matter, on the intense training that is carried out in the desert or the plains of Punjab etc. No one among the intellectual community of India really has much of an idea and we really need to promote this. Its primarily because the ethos of the Army is not fully understood and that it is a completely apolitical and completely professional organisation. The political community many times tends to take the Army for granted and misreads the various aspects of the Army. That unfortunately should not be done and we need to actually educate, if people are willing to be educated, about national strategic affairs, about national security affairs. I do remember, I can tell you anecdotally, that one time I came back after attending a programme in London, a strategic studies programme and I advised the National Defence College here, that why don’t you have members of the political community to join you us here for the Strategic Studeis Programme just like 5 members of the House Commons had joined our programme in London there and they sat with us for one year. Can you imagine the quality of the Defence debate, can you imagine the quality of the budget debate compared to what happens here. The National Defence College did take up the issue but I am sorry to say that we did not even receive a response to it. So that is how, unfortunately in India, there is a mismatch between the Armed forces, who are placed on a pedestal and need to be placed on a pedestal in any society, but place them on a pedestal with a deep understating of what they do, what their limitations and what their strong points are.

HJ: Sorry for the digression, lets come to the discussion on the CFVs. Do CFVs lead to a escalation between India and Pakistan? I think there is a lot of focus on terrorist attacks in India. That escalation between India and Pakistan in India normally is a result of terrorist attacks in India by terrorist groups based in Pakistan. But in the past we have seen that several times, the escalation that has taken place between India and Pakistan, triggered by CFVs in the absence of terrorist attacks. Do you think therefore that CFVs should be considered as a major national security challenge simply because it leads to crisis escalation between India and Pakistan.

SAH: First of all, to answer the last part of your question. Absolutely, the fact that, many a times we say that a sub-tactical issue at the LOC can become strategic in 5 minutes. That’s the way to understand this whole thing. For example, the beheading of the two soldiers in a tactical operation by the Pakistani border action team in the Rajouri sector became a strategic issue in 2013. You see, every time you have a bad action of this kind against the Indian Army, inevitably you will find that the results of that transcends well beyond the operational and go to the strategic level in a matter of minutes. That is why it is very important for the two sides to have escalation control because once a issue like this takes place anywhere on the LOC, the emotions are very high and escalation will immediately spread. The Indian Army always tries to localise it. But inevitably you will find that there will be an escalatory effect horizontally and definitely vertically. The quality of the exchanges that will take place will move probably from small arms to mortars, to artillery to direct firing weapons and things like that. And then it goes berserk and out of control. That is the time, it goes up to an operational strategic level. That is what needs to be always controlled.

HJ: So what can be done about it? We do have CFVs as spiking and you are correctly pointing out, it leads to a certain amount of crisis escalation between India and Pakistan. What steps need to be taken in order to ensure that the CFVs are mitigated and they are controlled especially at the tactical level, at the level where the militaries are engaged with other at a daily basis.

SAH: You see there is no doubt about it that unless the political environment of the subcontinent is improved, the LOC will remain the most easiest place where both sides can carry out certain kind of military posturing, messaging from time to time. But that is easier said than done because the kind of situation that exists and the relation that exists between India and Pakistan, you will find triggers from time to time that keep coming and I do not foresee a future in which these relations can stabilise completely. Having said that, how can we ensure that is relative stability on the LOC? I think one of the ways is by ensuring effective communications across the LOC. At the moment, you have a hot link between the two DGMOs but they are far removed from the accrual location in which this is happening. In the corridors of the South Block or the corridors of the GHQ in Rawalpindi, it is not very easy, despite the experience, to perceive the situation of what is actually taking place on the ground. Routinely, you will find that things do not get sorted out just through a DGMO call. What happens is that if you have link possibly at the Brigade level and particularly at the identified sectors, both sides we can identity sectors which are considered to be hotter sectors and then even going down to one or two units on an experimental basis—definitely a link between Srinagar and Mari for example, or Srinagar and Rawalpindi with the 10 Corps Headquarters of the Pakistani army, the details can be worked out.

HJ: What about the physical meeting between the two DGMOs? It has not taken place since 2013.

SAH: Yes, absolutely, it has not taken place. But I think now what has happened is that the meeting of the DGMOs has crossed into the domain of politics. I don’t think it is so easy for the two DGMOs to meet because messaging through the meetings of the two DGMOs would mean that India has diluted a stance and therefore it is willing to come on board to start talks with Pakistan. Although back channel talks are on between the two National Security Advisors, but at the end of the day,

HJ: But you would say they should meet?

SAH: I would say, the DGMOs should meet, why not the two Army Chiefs? I would say the two Army Chiefs should meet and the best place to meet is in a place like Hawaii where you have the pacific command from time to time for Chiefs of different Armies to come for small 3 to 4 day programmes. It would be a transformational thing is you can have a situation where the two Army Chief of Pakistan and Army Chief of India go across there and meet each other. Incidentally the two current chiefs have both been commanders of their respective contingents in the United Nations force in Congo, all under one Indian Commander, General Bikram Singh, who was later on our Army Chief. So I don’t see any reason, if you have functioned together in an international security environment, what is preventing you from going and exchanging social niceties, if nothing else, in a location abroad. And that may be the first baby step in improving the military to military relationship.

HJ: General Hasnain, always a pleasure talking to you.    

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