New Delhi: The intelligence and operational lapses that led to the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, in which 26 people were shot dead, regrettably echo a pattern of past blunders – including Kargil in 1999, Mumbai in 2008, Pulwama in 2019 and Ladakh in 2020 – all devastating yet potentially avoidable episodes.

Astonishingly, the Pahalgam incident marks the first such security failure that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP-led government has publicly acknowledged in over a decade. This rare admission came during an all-party meeting in New Delhi on Thursday (April 24) evening, convened three days after the April 22 terrorist strike.

Parliamentary affairs minister Kiren Rijiju told reporters that Intelligence Bureau and home ministry officials had briefed MPs about the massacre in Pahalgam’s unguarded Baisaran meadow, but offered no further details.

Media reports quoting opposition MPs, however, revealed that the official explanation for the glaring intelligence failure was a misguided assumption: that militants would not target tourists, given their contribution to Kashmir’s local economy – an assumption now tragically proven false.

Home minister Amit Shah is also believed to have informed opposition MPs that Baisaran – reachable only by foot or horseback – was opened by local tour operators on April 20, more than two months earlier than usual, and that this “decision” was made without notifying or securing clearance from Union security agencies.

But already questions are being raised about the accuracy of this claim. “Traditionally, [Baisaran] opened only during the Yatra season for about two and a half months, from mid-May to July,” reports Ananya Bhardwaj, citing government sources. “However, since 2020, the spot has remained open year-round, with over 1,000 tourists visiting daily, multiple sources confirmed.” She adds:

“Since the last few years the government has been liberal, insisting that all spots should remain open and accessible to tourists as cordoning off any spot would send out the wrong message. These include spots that do not have adequate security deployment needed in case tourists are visiting the spot in large numbers,” a source in the security establishment said.

In other words, despite upwards of 1,000 tourists visiting the site every day, no security personnel were deployed or present when the gunmen struck.

Even after the attack, response times were painfully slow. A 45-member Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) team took over an hour to reach the scene, after being alerted by the local police control room, which received the first distress call from a woman at around 2:45 pm on April 22.

Media reports citing security sources said the CRPF covered less than half of the seven-kilometre distance from their base on all-terrain vehicles and motorcycles, completing the rest on foot due to the muddy unpaved track. By the time they arrived, the assailants had fled into the surrounding woods.

Twenty-six victims lay dead, some of whom might have survived had they been swiftly transported to a nearby hospital.

An official inquiry by the National Investigation Agency is now underway. However, several veteran military officers who have served in counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir argue that additional safeguards should have been anticipated, particularly after the March 11 hijacking of the Jaffar Express in Balochistan by Baloch militants, which Pakistan blamed on Indian intelligence.

Pakistan’s foreign office and military spokesperson, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, claimed that the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) insurgents responsible for the hijacking and the execution of 24 hostages—including 18 soldiers and paramilitary personnel—were sponsored by India’s Research and Analysis Wing, allegedly operating out of Afghanistan.

Retired Intelligence Bureau officer and security analyst Avinash Mohananey told Rediff.com that the Pahalgam attack was “100% revenge” for the Jaffar Express incident, exposing what he described as criminal negligence by the three-tiered security apparatus responsible for the region—especially as tourist traffic was ramping up, making civilians soft and visible targets.

The Pahalgam-Anantnag axis has a known history of militant activity. Intelligence warnings had reportedly flagged the re-emergence of hybrid militants—Pakistan-trained fighters now collaborating with local operatives—who had recently shifted operations from the Jammu-Pir Panjal region into southern Kashmir.

Security in Pahalgam is typically divided into three concentric layers: the outer perimeter is monitored by the Indian Army’s 3rd Rashtriya Rifles battalion, tasked with overseeing infiltration routes and high-altitude surveillance; the middle layer is managed by the CRPF’s 116th battalion, responsible for securing roads and conducting area domination; and the inner core is handled by the Jammu & Kashmir Police, who gather local intelligence and maintain law and order.

On April 22, all three layers failed simultaneously. The area was left wide open with multiple access routes through surrounding forests and trails. Moreover, the attackers, apparently in Indian Army fatigues, were never sighted en route to the meadow, indicating a severe lapse in surveillance. Their undetected escape further underscored the breakdown in coordination between the Army, CRPF, J&K Police, and Kashmir’s much-touted Unified Command structure.

Even more startling was the absence of any immediate response despite the terrorists firing over 40 rounds from AK-47 rifles over a 15–20 minute window in an acoustically resonant mountainous terrain. There were no drones, surveillance cameras, or alert systems in place at Baisaran, despite its status as a popular tourist site. There was also no evacuation or medical response mechanism. Injured victims were carried on foot by fellow tourists and pony handlers.

“Tuesday’s attack underscores a comprehensive lapse in threat perception, intelligence assessment, and local preparedness,” said a senior security official, speaking on condition of anonymity. He added that preliminary findings indicate a catastrophic multi-agency failure in both anticipating and responding to an act of terror in a known volatile region.

India’s recent history is marred by similar intelligence failures. The Kargil conflict resulted in 527 soldiers dead and 1,300 wounded. The 2008 Mumbai attacks claimed 166 lives. In Pulwama, 40 CRPF personnel were killed. And in 2020, 20 soldiers lost their lives in Galwan during clashes with China. That incident alone prompted a massive, prolonged, and costly military deployment along the Line of Actual Control. All these could potentially have been avoided had the agencies responsible adhered to the enduring axiom that vigilance is the price of safety.