Quiet is Not Peace, Revenge is Not Accountability

Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) chief minister Omar Abdullah wished prime minister Narendra Modi a long and healthy life on his birthday and stated that “if nothing else, give us the statehood of J&K, What else do we need?” On September 25, he moved a resolution demanding restoration of full statehood in the Legislative assembly, which passed the resolution on September 28. We also commemorated the anniversary of Uri Surgical strikes launched on the intervening night of September 28-29.

The conventional approach to stabilising J&K rests on a fundamental miscalculation: the belief that lasting peace can be achieved through economic investment and enforced through security metrics. Massive infrastructure development, rising tourism, decline in terrorist initiated incidents, absence of mass street agitations, falling casualty rates among security forces personnel and civilians are projected as proof of a region transformed. However, a quiet street does not mean the underlying political conflict is solved.

For decades, a hostile neighbour has exploited local grievances to fuel a proxy war, seeking to destabilise our great nation while advancing its own geopolitical ambitions. Therefore, for long-term stability and peace, genuine political freedom and respect for local identity is a must.

When civil administration buckled during the armed terrorism of the late 1980s, security forces were forced to pivot from border defence to intensive counter-terrorism. Over subsequent decades, security forces consistently calibrated their strategy – moving from basic conflict stabilisation to outright consolidation by targeted civic outreach to tackling social media driven street agitations.

Current security metrics and evolving threats

Contemporary security metrics point to a significant shift in operational dominance. However, counter-insurgency history demonstrates that a drop in kinetic violence does not inherently mean terrorism has ended, more often, it indicates adaptation. Terror networks have shifted towards a decentralised ‘hybrid model’, often shifting operational bases to the rugged terrain of Pir panjal and chenab valley, to blend seamlessly into the local population and systematically ‘hunt’ soft vulnerable targets : migrant labourers, local vendors and minorities.

The strategic objective behind this is purely psychological: to spark panic, disturb communal harmony and project a continuous image of instability to the world while discarding overt ‘jihadi rhetoric and religious symbols’ to present themselves as secular, indigenous "anti-fascist resistance" movements. A case in point is creation of The Resistance Front (TRF) and People’s Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF) to obscure their ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).

Beyond the statistics towards lasting peace

The belief that a quiet territory is a reconciled one, is nothing but strategic illusion. Economic packages and infrastructure development offer valuable economic foundations, but they cannot serve as a substitute for political rights and institutional autonomy. When a population feels positioned under permanent suspicion, material growth creates only a fragile appearance of normalcy without addressing the core crisis of alienation.

True victory cannot be found by simply counting threats thwarted or calculating financial inputs. In order to secure permanent peace, there is an urgent need to look beyond ‘ neutralised/ eliminated’ numbers, and honestly address the unresolved undercurrents of local alienation. It demands the institutional willingness to restore complete democratic depth, honour local identity and foster a durable settlement grounded in genuine political reconciliation.

We avenged, but accountability?

In 2016, 19 soldiers were killed in action in Uri. In 2019, 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel made the supreme sacrifice in Lethpora, Pulwama. In 2025, 26 civilians were shot dead after their IDs were checked in Baisaran, Pahalgam. After Uri came the surgical strikes, after Pulwama, Balakot and Operation Sindoor – our most integrated multi domain conventional punishment after Pahalgam.

However, three different targets, three different methods, had one pattern: The political and military leadership walked the talk on external retribution.

We never failed to avenge, but we failed to fix accountability. Our capacity to punish our own systemic failures, however, remains opaque and until we fix that, these incidents are likely to recur.

Real accountability is not vindictive, it is corrective. As the Armed Forces Tribunal just reminded us in the Poonch custodial deaths case – upholding "Severe Displeasure" against a Sector Commander – a commander is responsible for what he fails to prevent. Hence, those who take credit for success, cannot abandon accountability when failures occur.

Therefore, we need to declassify lessons, not secrets, fix command responsibility at the top – Division commander and above, not the Commanding officer or the Brigade/Sector Commander and create a tri- services cell that audits ‘on ground’ implementation of various recommendations .

The media also has an important responsibility, much more than oscillating between post-attack jingoism and uncritical praise of individuals during peacetime. Self-censorship does not mean pushing a specific narrative: that cross-border deterrence alone is sufficient, and that investigating internal systemic failures amounts to betrayal of those who made the supreme sacrifice.

Questioning Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)s is mistaken for questioning the soldier, and questioning the soldier is branded anti-national. From Kaluchak in 2002 to Pahalgam, we have been unwilling to ask ‘why and how’. Accountability is not anti-Armed Forces, it is pro-soldier.

Road ahead

Armed groups thrive on narrative dynamics focused on political exclusion, state oppression and systemic disenfranchisement. When democratic avenues are open and effective, violence loses its rationale as a fight for basic rights and is instead reframed as an anti-democratic disruption of public interest.

For long term stability, local population is the centre of gravity, in any counter terrorist operation. Terrorists inherently rely on them for shelter, logistics, intelligence and recruits. Empowerment impacts long-term counter-terrorist operational success by systematic decoupling of the civilian population from terror networks.

Viewing the Awaam (public) from the prism of continuous scrutiny, risks alienating these vital democratic players. After all actionable intelligence and early warning will flow only when they trust the state institutions to protect their long-term interests , rather than treat them with enduring suspicion.

Representatives who derive legitimacy from the electorate, rather than state appointments, possess the credibility to de-escalate public anger before street tensions turn violent. If local youth remain susceptible to radical narratives despite socio-economic growth, it is because their sense of historical alienation has left an emotional vacuum that material wealth cannot fill.

We must maintain technological and intelligence edge to convert temporary operational dominance into permanent stability by executing a proactive and highly credible information warfare campaign, which not merely counters hostile external propaganda, but actively build, protect and sustain local public confidence in state institutions.

The political position reaffirmed by chief minister Abdullah emphasising that internal grievances and regional aspirations must be resolved strictly within the Indian constitutional framework rather than through external intervention underscores the region's commitment to domestic democratic processes, within the nation's institutional architecture.

Relying exclusively on security metrics and fiscal packages creates a fragile, transactional peace, achieving short-term conflict management while leaving the Union territory vulnerable to re-ignition whenever underlying political alienation remains unaddressed.

Rajesh Kalia is a former Colonel in the Indian Army, served as Defence Public Relations Officer in the 3&4 Corps and 14&15 Corps of the Indian Army. His operational background includes service in Siachen, Jammu and Kashmir and Sri Lanka (as part of the Indian Peace Keeping Force). He retired in January 2025.

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