The extradition of Tahawwur Rana to India should be a reminder that we are just about half-way in the full accounting for the terrible Mumbai terrorist attack of November 26, 2008. On that day, India’s financial capital came under a series of coordinated terrorist attacks. Over the course of three days, ten heavily armed gunmen belonging to the Pakistan-based jihadi group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), unleashed a wave of violence across multiple locations, killing nearly 170 people, and injuring over 300. Nine of the 10 terrorists were shot dead.

Rana’s extradition is but a small step on what remains to be done for the full accounting of the 26/11 event. The LeT leadership, its shadowy Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) associates and other unknown persons who helped organise or facilitate the attack have yet to pay for their role in what was a terrible tragedy.

The terrorists who had embarked from Karachi and hijacked an Indian fishing vessel, landed in a dinghy at Machimar Nagar, Cuffe Parade in Mumbai at around 9:30 PM, and split into groups to target high-profile sites. These included the Taj Mahal hotel at India Gate, the Oberoi Trident Hotel, the Chhatrapati Shivaji railway station, the Nariman Chabad House (a Jewish community center), and other locations such as the Leopold Café. Armed with automatic rifles, grenades, and improvised explosive devices, the attackers struck with chilling precision, aiming to maximise casualties and create widespread panic.

The terrorists had satellite phones and were provided live guidance by handlers in Pakistan. The attack itself was made possible by detailed reconnaissance, which included videography, conducted through several visits to Mumbai by a Pakistani American — Daood Gilani aka David Coleman Headley. Conversations between the terrorists and their handlers were recorded by several intelligence agencies, including the Indian.

The Mumbai Police and the NSG eventually neutralised the threat, but not before immense loss of life, that included 18 security personnel and several foreign nationals. The lone surviving attacker, Ajmal Kasab, was captured and later executed in 2012 after a trial that revealed the LeT’s role and Pakistan’s complicity.

The US authorities arrested Headley, a former Drug Enforcement Agency informant and though it ruled out his extradition, India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) was allowed to question him about 26/11. Kasab and Headley’s interrogation provided a huge pile of evidence that the operation involved the entire Lashkar-e-Taiba leadership from the top down. LeT leadership, including its founder Hafiz Saeed and operational commanders such as Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi and Sajid Mir, devised the attack strategy. The operation relied heavily on Headley who conducted extensive surveillance in Mumbai, posing as a businessman between 2006 and 2008. He provided videos, photos, GPS coordinates, and detailed layouts of the targets, which LeT used to plan the attack. Headley’s work was coordinated by Sajid Mir reportedly an ISI officer and other ISI personnel, Major Iqbal and Major Sameer Ali. The attack was monitored and directed at the LeT’s command centre in Pakistan by Sajid Mir and others who provided detailed guidance to the attackers during the operation using voice-over-IP and satellite communications.

So far the accounting has been of the 10 terrorists who carried out the attack. But its principal organisers have evaded prosecution with Saeed facing intermittent house arrest and a jail sentence in 2022, but for terror financing. It’s not even clear whether the operational commander of the attack Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi, who was ostensibly arrested in 2009 and then released, has served even the five years in jail also on a terror financing charge. After claiming they could not locate Sajid Mir, Pakistani authorities arrested and sentenced him 15 years in jail for terror financing in May 2022 but his whereabouts thereafter are not clear.

Zabiuddin Ansari, aka Abu Jundal, the Indian extremist who was in the Pakistani control room at the time of the attack was extradited to India from Saudi Arabia and is still facing trial. There are other figures like Abu Qahafa who handled the electronic connections between the control room and the terrorists and Yaqub who organised the naval training of the LeT.

There has been no accounting relating to the ISI connection which was brought out clearly in the Headley interrogation. Major Iqbal, Major Sameer Ali, Lt Col Hamza figure in the information. Iqbal funded all of Headley’s reconnaissance missions to Mumbai and also the setting up of the travel agency office.

So where does Tahawwur Hussain Rana, the Pakistani-Canadian businessman and former Pakistan Army doctor, come into all this ? According to G.K. Pillai, former home secretary, he was a “small player.” He probably was, but the evidence before the NIA suggests that there could be more to his case than is known.

Rana was a childhood friend of Headley, whom he met at Cadet College Hasanabdal in Pakistan. Rana owned First World Immigration Services, a Chicago-based firm, through which he supported Headley’s activities. In 2006, at Headley’s request, Rana authorised opening a Mumbai branch of the firm, providing Headley a legitimate cover to travel to India multiple times between 2006 and 2008. Headley used this cover to conduct surveillance on targets.

The NIA interrogation of Headley reveals that he called Rana dozens of times per visit (e.g., 32 calls on his first trip, 66 on his eighth), relaying updates and seeking instructions.

Emails between them reveal that Rana was fully aware of what Headley was up to. Headley testified that he kept Rana informed about his LeT assignments, including meetings with operatives like Sajid Mir and ISI handler Major Iqbal in Pakistan. At what point does knowledge of Headley’s activities become complicity with them? Rana will have to provide answers for this, especially since Headley has said in his testimony that Rana was in touch with the LeT’s handlers all through.

The really big question is about why Rana visited India from November 13–21, 2008, just days before the attacks on November 26. Accompanied by his wife, he stayed at the Taj Mahal Hotel (the primary target) and traveled to cities like Delhi, Agra and Kochi. All this cannot simply be coincidence. There is clearly more to his role than has been brought out.

Rana was arrested by the FBI in Chicago in October 2009, alongside Headley. In 2011, a U.S. court acquitted him of directly plotting the Mumbai attacks but convicted him of providing material support to LeT and aiding a foiled LeT plot against a Danish newspaper (Jyllands-Posten). He was sentenced to 14 years in 2013 and released in 2020 on health grounds, only to be re-arrested for extradition to India.

There are still some unanswered questions about the role of the US in handling Headley. The US reportedly tipped off India about possible attacks in 2006 and September 2008, most likely on information gleaned from Headley. We have no clear picture as to the precise nature of his association with the DEA and other intelligence agencies. They have ensured that we do not get access to Headley. What is it they want to hide ? Why was Headley not arrested immediately after the Mumbai attack? He actually came back to India on another mission in early 2009 and was arrested only in October 2009 when the British tipped off the Americans about the plan to attack the Jyllands Posten newspaper in Denmark.

He struck a deal with the US authorities and got just a 35-year prison sentence and a guarantee that he would not be extradited to India. Washington has allowed Indian authorities to interrogate him in US custody and use his virtual testimony against Abu Jundal but that’s about all.

Manoj Joshi is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.