The Kargil Syndrome: India's Strategic Blind Spot at Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb
Raja Menon
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The Kargil Review Committee, headed by retired IAS officer K. Subrahmanyam, submitted its report on December 15, 1999, with the central finding that the Kargil intrusion was a systemic failure, going far beyond the understanding prevalent at the time that it was simply an intelligence failure. Although the terms of reference of the committee were quite narrow – to review events leading up to the Pakistani aggression and recommend measures against such intrusions in the future – Subrahmanyam, among India’s foremost strategic affairs thinkers, interpreted it much more broadly. The Cabinet Secretary supported him in this endeavour.
All parties concerned were given to understand that the review of the Kargil intrusion was “no witch-hunt”, and that the conduct of operations were not in question. The committee gave its findings in roughly five months. The main finding was that what happened in Kargil was not simply a failure of intelligence, but a failure of the system for managing national security. The committee found deficiencies in how India was assessing intelligence inputs, stemming from previously held assumptions about what the enemy would do.
The lessons from then, however, extend beyond intelligence. In recent months, the Indian economy suffered a serious shock when the Strait of Hormuz was closed. The probability of this closure could have been foreseen, since the country is energy import dependant to the extent of 85% or higher. The magnitude of the crisis became apparent only after it occurred, and it took the prime minister’s intervention with the council of ministers to lessen the burden on the civil population.
Further, Chinese technology and Chinese-origin components have contributed to the military capabilities of the two forces that can threaten India's two critical maritime chokepoints. That should have been part of India's national strategic assessment long before the crisis. The record of Chinese weapon supplies to China is monstrously large.
Also read: India Needs a Clear National Security Strategy—Now More Than Ever
That the whole world treated this as a non-proliferation problem is also acceptable, but after the US intervened in 2000, China assured Washington that its weapon sales to Iran would be limited. But it merely went underground. It was also clear by the late 1990s that Iran was pursuing a sea denial strategy, which was upgraded in 2000 to state that Iranian strategy was ‘to close the Strait of Hormuz’.
It was also clear that New Delhi did not anticipate any danger despite the following:
- The 2005 US Congress hearing where a witness stated that Iran was preparing to close the Strait of Hormuz.
- The 2006 report by the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) director, that Iran was preparing to close the Strait.
- The 2012 Congressional Service Report titled ‘Iran’s Threat to the Strait of Hormuz’.
- The journal of the IISS, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, which specified Iran’s objective of interfering with the world oil supply.
- The 2018 US State Department public statement that Iran intended to ‘leverage’ both Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb.
So what could be the best interpretation of New Delhi’s failure to read all this data? This was not another Kargil, it was something much larger. It was a failure of intelligence and a failure of perception and assessment of national security threats, as well as of where the threats come from. India was again looking somewhere else with a number of set ideas when the shock arrived.
At the other end of the Arabian Sea, the Houthis, already capable of threatening Red Sea shipping with missiles and drones, advanced along Yemen's Red Sea coast and seized the strategically important island of Perim and the coastal area near the Bab-el-Mandeb, connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal.
A very large proportion of India's trade with Europe and the Mediterranean depends upon this maritime route. If that route becomes unusable the costs to India will be even larger than the $7 bn dollars of damage caused by the Hormuz closure.
Supporters of Yemen's Houthi at a rally in Sanaa, Yemen, September 18, 2026. Photo: AP/Osamah Abdulrahman
Even a graduate seeking admission to the Indian civil service would be aware that 50% of Indian exports and 30% of imports pass through the Bab-el-Mandeb. The closure of this chokepoint would actually achieve the impossible – changing geography – converting India from a maritime nation into virtually a continental one.
Particularly disturbing is that the military technology behind these two vulnerabilities developed over decades, from Iran’s acquisition of short range Chinese Silkworm missiles during the 1980s, which gave Tehran the capability to threaten shipping in the Gulf to its subsequent acquisition of long range anti-shipping missiles, clearly intended to challenge a large navy. Along with these came Iranian purchases of Chinese Earth Observation Satellites, to be launched from China, that enabled it to strike US military facilities in the Gulf.
Also read: If a Two-Front War is to be Fought, India's Defence Procurement Battle Must First Be Won
The Chinese connection to the Houthis is more recent and equally important. The US Treasury explicitly identified Chinese companies supplying components and equipment used in Houthi missile and UAV production. In June 2024 it identified China-based Ningbo Beilun Saige Machine and Dongguan Yuze Machining Tools as suppliers of equipment used in Houthi weapons production.
In October the same year, the US treasury identified Shenzhen Boyu as a logistics company facilitating shipments of dual-use components to the Houthis and Shenzhen Jinghon and Shenzhen Rion as suppliers of critical missile and UAV components.
The presence of IRGC commanders in Yemen was also reported before the Houthis struck, as well as the presence of a Houthi financier in China.
Against this context, the Kargil Committee's warnings about India’s strategic failures become even more relevant. India knew that Iran possessed Chinese-derived anti-ship technology. India knew of Iran's relationship with the Houthis. It knew that the Houthis possessed increasingly sophisticated missiles and drones. It knew the extraordinary economic importance of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb. It knew that China had been supplying Iran with military technology and that Chinese companies were subsequently appearing in Houthi procurement networks.
But knowing each fact separately is not the same as understanding the strategic connection between them. That is the essence of the Kargil lesson.
Whereas the Kargil Committee observed that India's political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments had developed an attachment to the status quo and that national-security management tended to recede during peacetime, 27 years later, the danger is that India has once again become excessively compartmentalised.
Subsequent reforms after the Kargil Committee created institutions such as the Integrated Defence Staff and Defence Intelligence Agency, but the continuing need for reform has repeatedly been acknowledged. The recently released ‘RAKSHA Defence Diplomacy Document’ even mentions that India aspires to be a net security provider in the Indian Ocean. In that case, the country must be able to connect energy dependence, maritime geography, foreign military assistance, Chinese technology transfers, proxy warfare, shipping routes and economic consequences before a crisis.
The only difference is that Kargil was a warning about surprise on a mountain frontier, while Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb are warnings about surprises at sea. When Xi Jinping was in Cairo, Egypt was offered advanced military hardware, like Iran was. The country cannot be made to suffer anymore catastrophic surprises.
Rear Admiral Raja Menon is the author of the highly regarded Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars.
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