Following the dramatic collapse of the Sheikh Hasina government on August 5, 2024, amidst a massive student-led and people-powered uprising, Bangladesh swiftly established an interim government. Within three days, professor Mohammad Yunus, the nation’s sole Nobel laureate, assumed leadership.
Yunus assembled a diverse administration comprising seasoned technocrats and prominent student leaders. This move garnered immense public support, evident during a flood that struck within a month of his taking office. Citizens from all walks of life united to deliver and distribute aid to the affected regions.
In the initial weeks, with a reduced police presence – as most of them fled to escape public retaliation against their brutality – ordinary citizens stepped up to maintain order. They voluntarily directed traffic and conducted night patrols in residential areas, ensuring public safety. The end of the 15-year autocratic regime reignited a pervasive spirit of national belonging.
However, as the interim government’s tenure surpasses 100 days, the initial wave of optimism appears to be waning. The administration’s actions face increasing scrutiny, with growing public dissatisfaction and discontent. Failures in law enforcement and economic management have drawn widespread criticism.
The escape of several individuals responsible for the July massacre, allegedly facilitated by elements within the military or law enforcement, has fueled significant frustration. Additionally, concerns remain regarding inadequate treatment and compensation for those critically injured during the uprising.
Controversial appointments of advisors have further sparked accusations of nepotism. The heightened criticism may be attributed to the newfound freedom of the press, a stark contrast to the repressive environment under the previous regime.
In Bangladesh, interim governments – commonly referred to as caretaker governments – are traditionally tasked with organizing elections as quickly as possible, typically within three months. While the current political transition does not follow the usual regime change model, political parties are pushing for either an immediate election or a clear roadmap and date.
A graffiti of Sheikh Hasina, garlanded with shoes, beside the Raju Bhaskar statue at the Dhaka University. Photo: Shome Basu
Given the controversies surrounding the last three national elections in 2014, 2018, and 2024 – marred by widespread vote rigging or boycotts – the demand for a credible and fair election is strong.
Despite this widespread yearning, Yunus has hinted at a longer tenure. In a recent interview, he suggested that the interim government could remain in place for nearly four years, according to some interpretations.
Such an extended interim administration could lead to significant security and political challenges. The country’s law enforcement agencies and bureaucratic structures, heavily politicised during the Hasina regime, remain reluctant to cooperate fully with the interim government, undermining its functionality.
Why is a political government needed?
Like many other developing nations, Bangladesh’s political landscape too is heavily clientelistic, with local leaders serving as patrons who control access to resources, jobs, and security for their loyal followers. Elected officials typically wield unofficial but crucial authority in their constituencies, maintaining local stability through informal networks. This patronage-based system ensures organised governance and security at the grassroots level.
However, with the fall of the Hasina regime, the absence of these established networks has resulted in chaos. Competing factions from various political groups, including local muscle and thugs, are now vying for control over resources and influence. This lack of a structured patronage-police-administration nexus has left the country grappling with disorganised power struggles, leading to instability and uncertainty.
A prolonged interim government risks exacerbating these issues, highlighting the urgent need for a credible election to restore order and legitimate governance.
So, in the absence of an effective police force and proper administrative systems, Bangladesh’s unelected interim government evidently struggles to provide the grassroots-level patronage networks needed for long-term stability.
Among the country’s institutions, only major political parties possess robust, loyal, and regulated patronage structures capable of maintaining order and supporting governance. A politically elected government, chosen through a fair, credible, and transparent election, could restore stability, rebuild informal networks, uphold patron-client relationships, and work to revitalise the police force and bureaucracy.
An early election would also play a critical role in rebuilding trust among investors and the business community. This urgency was underscored by Moody’s recent financial assessment on November 18, 2024, which downgraded Bangladesh’s ratings and shifted its outlook from stable to negative. Moody’s stated, “The downgrade reflects heightened political risks and lower growth, which increase government liquidity risks, external vulnerabilities, and banking sector instability following recent political and social unrest that led to a change in government.”
Wall paintings on secularism and pluralism in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Photo: Shome Basu.
The report further highlighted key challenges, including “the absence of a clear election roadmap, the deterioration of law and order, and the nascent reemergence of community-based tensions,” as factors undermining the country’s economic prospects.
For businesses and investors seeking long-term stability, a fragile interim government with limited political networks and authority is far from reassuring. A timely, transparent election could provide the stability and governance structure essential to addressing these pressing challenges and restoring confidence in Bangladesh’s future.
How the interim government’s diversity backfires
The broad coalition that united against Sheikh Hasina during the July Uprising – spanning centrists, leftists, Islamists, the rich and poor, urban and rural populations – has begun to fragment in the aftermath of her departure. Once bound by a shared opposition to Hasina as the “common enemy,” these groups are now divided, with their differences surfacing in increasingly bitter ways.
A notable shift in sentiment is illustrated by a prominent YouTube commentator who once fiercely criticised the Hasina regime and supported the interim government. He has now labeled the Yunus-led cabinet a “circus.” The diverse groups that participated in the uprising now voice divergent opinions, each prioritizing their distinct personal and group interests.
The initial wave of overwhelming public and political support for the Yunus administration is rapidly fading. The interim government, a coalition of students, NGO workers, civil society members, and retired bureaucrats, suffers from a lack of cohesion, hierarchy, and synergy. This organizational fragility has left it struggling to navigate the competing demands of various stakeholders.
This scenario reflects a common challenge in post-movement transitions, such as those seen during the Arab Spring: the capacity to unite people for change does not inherently translate into effective governance. Without a shared vision or structured leadership, the coalition that once symbolised hope risks further fragmentation, undermining its ability to steer the nation through a complex and divided political environment.
The July-August uprising stands as a landmark moment in Bangladesh’s history, marked by immense sacrifice as thousands fought against fascism. Student leaders of the movement describe it as a “revolution” and aspire to enact sweeping reforms in governance, including changes to the constitution. They are working to form a new political party but have yet to present a concrete framework for their vision.
Flags, headscarves and bandanas. Photo: Shome Basu
While their ambition to extend their influence beyond university-based urban centres and build nationwide public support is commendable, it demands substantial time, effort, and resources. Attempting to leverage state-sponsored support to build their political platform would contradict their revolutionary ideals and undermine their credibility.
Nevertheless, the emergence of a youth-driven, centrist, and liberal political force could significantly benefit Bangladesh’s political future. To achieve this, student leaders must seize the opportunity during the next five years to establish themselves as a viable political alternative.
At the same time, established parties, particularly the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), should foster cooperative relations with emerging political forces. Building consensus on key historical issues – such as the 1971 Liberation War, Sheikh Mujib’s legacy, the architects of the nation, and the declaration of independence – can help bridge political divides.
Resolving these contentious matters would enable political parties to focus on policy debates and work collectively toward a stronger economy and an independent foreign policy grounded in liberal democratic values.
To restore Bangladesh’s political trajectory after over 15 years of misrule, the interim government must prioritise preparing for a fair election. Establishing an elected governance system with transparent and accountable administration and fostering informal networks to maintain local-level stability will be critical for the country’s revival.
Competing groups should concentrate on ensuring the next elected government delivers on promised reforms and remains accountable to the people. This unified effort could pave the way for a re-energized and democratic Bangladesh.
Saimum Parvez, PhD, is a lecturer at the DW Academy and Bonn Rhein-Sieg University in Germany.
