Before normalcy returns to Bangladesh, many political dramas will be enacted. The current euphoria about the suave Muhammad Yunus will be temporary not for any fault of his but that is what the noisy Bangladesh democracy will ensure.
We argue here, one, that Bangladesh politics is not a zero-sum game, that is, once the secularists are out the Islamists are in, and vice versa, and two, whether India really matters that much to influence the politics of Bangladesh for it has its own home spun dynamics.
Its electoral experience tells that besides their core voters both the major parties, Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), keep poaching into each other’s constituencies. If not so, how can one explain their alternating in power? Now that AL is out of power after 15 years it is most likely that BNP will come to power whenever the election takes place.
It may as well be noted that AL is not all that secular nor its rival, BNP, is rabidly Islamist. Before we proceed to further understand this reality let us recognise another reality that the creation of Bangladesh was more the consequence of Pakistan’s political blunder than East Pakistan’s political wisdom.
Some sociological studies conducted just a few years before the liberation war of 1971 had shown that the province was not bent upon seceding. Had the verdict of the 1970 election been honoured by the Pakistan military junta and the victorious AL was allowed to rule Pakistan, history could have been written quite differently.
The Bangladesh politics can be broadly divided into three segments: AL regimes (1971-75, 1996-2001, 2009-24), BNP regimes (1979-82, 1991-96, 2001-6), and the military/quasi-military regimes (1977-81, 1983-90). Besides, there are short spells under the leadership of National Awami Party (Bhashani), Janadal/Jatiya Party (Ershad), and Independents.
Hence, AL has ruled Bangladesh for 24 years, BNP for 13 years, and the military for11 years. To put it differently, the ‘secularists’ and ‘Islamists’ have ruled the country for almost half-half periods.
Since the ruling AL massively rigged the 2018 and 2024 elections (BNP boycotted the latter resulting in only 40% voting), their results would not give us any clue to the current political mood of the nation. But if the earlier elections are any guide one would see that Bangladesh politics is quite evenly balanced between AL and its rivals.
The 1991 and 2001elections, both won by BNP, showed that the borderline voters were in a large number. The 1991 election, held 20 years after the creation of Bangladesh, has been probably the fairest of all elections. First, it was held under the auspices of a caretaker government, and second, since both AL and BNP were out of power for many years it provided a real level playing field which enabled us to read the nation’s pulse accurately.
Figuratively, two assassinated leaders were in the ring – Mujibur Rehman and Ziaur Rahman. There was no clear verdict for either. The AL-led eight party alliance polled 33.8% votes while the BNP 30.87%. Two other parties, Jamaat-e-Islami and Jatiya Dal together polled 24% votes. Since the latter were ideologically closer to BNP one may say that the AL-BNP+ divide was: 34:54 percent.
In the election of 2001 also the votes of AL and BNP were balanced though because of the multi-party dynamics BNP secured much more seats. The AL got 40.24% votes and 63 seats. BNP got 37% but its Four Party Alliance got 46.9% votes and 201 seats. It gave the impression to the pro-Islamic forces that it was their victory which it was not.
The most vocal Islamic party, Jamaat-e-Islami, won only 17 seats. But in spite of this lacklustre performance of the Islamic parties there were indications to suggest that Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Indianism were on the rise. There was a systematic disparagement of the ethos of the liberation movement.
It was largely engineered through the manoeuvring of the Muktijuddho Bishoyok Mantranalaya, the ministry dealing with the liberation war. That the message reached the masses was evident from such innocuous sights in Dhaka like Mujib’s busts (even in privately owned lawns) being covered by jute cloths. History books were rewritten to prove that it was not Mujibur Rehman but Ziaur Rahman who was the real hero of the liberation war for it was the latter who had first given the call on 26 March 1971 for the liberation of East Pakistan.
If the above electoral statistics are analysed, one may surmise that had the elections of 2018 and 2024 been fair the AL might have lost them. If so, it was rather outlandish on the part of Sheikh Hasina to ride roughshod over the opposition and behave autocratically. I would not imagine that these trends were not closely watched by the Indian high commission in Dhaka or the Bangladesh desk of the Indian foreign office.
It was a simple academic exercise and no exotic intelligence input was required to know the direction of the political wind. If so, why was India caught unawares when Hasina was ignominiously ousted? I suspect it was symptomatic of the larger malady when institutional professionalism was subverted by extra-constitutional interferences.
Given the political reality of Bangladesh it can be argued that the heaven would not fall if a pro-Islamist ruling class assumes power in Dhaka. Have not India’s Muslim neighbours, likewise, got accustomed to all kinds of anti-Muslim vitriol routinely dished out by the ruling BJP?
The Narendra Modi government can censor the local media but it cannot control the international media, particularly the social media. During my visit to Dhaka in 2020 even my taxi driver seemed to be so much informed about the way Muslims were being abused and humiliated in India on a daily basis.
In conclusion, let me make three points. One, Bangladesh has a split personality and if Bangladesh asserts its Islamic identity, it cannot justify its liberation struggle, as that was not only directed against Islamic Pakistan but was also actively aided by ‘Hindu’ India.
Alternatively, if it displays its Bengali credentials, it runs the risk of merging its identity beyond recognition with that of West Bengal and its major city, Kolkata, which remains the cultural capital of all Bengalis in India and abroad. Even a simultaneous assertion of Bengali and Islamic identities serves a limited purpose because it still does not adequately distinguish Bangladesh from West Bengal.
Accounting for 27 per cent of the state’s population, West Bengali Muslims number 24.6 million, equal to about 16.3 per cent of Bangladesh’s Muslim population. The dwindling Hindu population of Bangladesh, down from nearly 14 percent in the early 1970s to about 8 per cent today, complicates the matter further.
These demographic realities need deft handling by the Indian state. Instead, what we have witnessed are brash and offensive statements, particularly during elections. Amit Shah’s frequent reference to Bangladeshi migrants as ‘termites’ is only the most egregious of such examples.
Two, India and China are natural competitors in South Asia. Despite a complicated history with China, Bangladesh is no exception to this rule. When India took a huge military and diplomatic risk and went to war with Pakistan to aid the creation of Bangladesh, China not only opposed Bangladeshi liberation but came out in full-throated support of Pakistan and America (the US-China rapprochement was in full swing; with Pakistan playing a crucial role).
China refused to even recognise Bangladesh for four long years after its liberation. Recognition came only after the assassination of Mujibur Rehman in August 1975. India has reason therefore to feel aggrieved because the same China has today outpaced India as Bangladesh’s primary economic partner.
It is feared that post-Hasina Bangladesh may draw even closer to China. But India’s complaint holds only so much water. After all, Modi’s India too has made China its biggest trading partner, with a balance of trade heavily in favour of the latter.
My last point draws from what Dean Acheson, U.S. Secretary of State during the Harry Truman presidency, confessed about the limited efficacy of a foreign intervention. In his memoirs Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, Acheson lamented that America did not leave any stone unturned to prevent the ‘fall’ of China to the Communists yet the forces at play were too powerful for America to defeat.
Obviously, his Indian counterpart, S. Jaishankar, must not have contemplated anything similar to that in Bangladesh. But what was expected of him was to alert his political bosses not to keep all the eggs in the Hasina basket. It would be preposterous, therefore, to discuss whether India suffered an intelligence failure in Bangladesh!
Partha S. Ghosh is a retired professor of JNU.
