The civil war in Myanmar entered its fourth year on February 1 and has been fanning unrest and insurgency in India’s northeast.
Union home minister Amit Shah’s decision last month to fence the entire 1,643-km border with Myanmar and suspend Free Movement Regime (FMR) has been rejected by both chief ministers of Nagaland and Mizoram as these measures will divide their kith and kin across the border.
In the last few months, fighting between the junta and resistance forces spilled over to north east from Rakhine and Arakan states in Myanmar and nearly 800 junta soldiers who had taken refuge on the Indian side were flown back. Manipur’s insurgent groups sheltering in border regions of Myanmar have exploited the intense violence (since early May last year) that has been fuelled by the loss of 6,000 weapons from Manipur state armouries.
While the situation in Manipur has been grossly mismanaged by state and central authorities, India’s once dormant eastern border has become live and vulnerable due to the junta losing operational control to resistance forces.
The coup in February 2021 is the sixth successful coup since 1962 by Myanmarese military, also called Tatmadaw or Sit Tat. Junta forces have inflicted coups more times than any other military in the world with profound expertise.
But this is the first time that a national resistance has been cobbled to try to unhinge the military rule though the opposition has not thought about the end game. Resistance forces consist of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), local militias, and the People’s Defence Force (PDF), a majority Burman ethnic group created by the National League of Democracy’s parallel National Unity Government (NUG).
EAOs have enjoyed autonomy following ceasefire agreements with the military. Not all have submitted to ceasefire arrangements, though. For instance, the powerful Arakan Army (AA) which operates in Rakhine, Chin and Arakan states broke its ceasefire in November last year and went on the offensive to defeat the junta in these two states. It is believed that Rohingyas may have joined AA. The Chin National Army also operates in this region.
Also read: How the Armed Resistance Is Testing Myanmar Junta’s Grip on Power
Take a look back. On September 7, 2022, the Special Advisory Council of International Experts Supporting Democracy released a paper which showed that the junta control 72 of 333 major towns and 17% of land area. The EAOs were reportedly controlling 52% of territory while 23% was contested. Those were early days.
Two major offensives were launched in October and November last year called 1027 and 1111, (the last two figures denoting month and next two figures the date of operation) by an alliance of three EAOs along with PDF and militias. These operations stretched from Rakhine in the south to all of the northeast up till Lashio. The AA seized control of territory bordering India including Sagaing region, pockets in Mandalay and Bago. The biggest setback for the junta was in the northern Shan state and Kokang Special Region where it lost Laukkai, one of its seven operational command centres. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) which spearheaded attacks in the north, scored major successes and closed down five border trade centres and crossing points with China. A number of Chinese living in the north had to flee to Yunnan (China). General Peng Deren, commander of the MNDAA, said wresting control of the north from the junta and restoring its writ to end criminal activities was sweet revenge.
The Chinese, after a series of negotiations, brokered a ceasefire with the junta on January 12, which some EAOs in MNDAA did not acknowledge. Clearly these offensives in the north and northeast could not have been launched without Chinese complicity. For some time now, the Chinese have wanted to stop and eliminate various drug and gambling rackets that have been going on with the knowledge and possible cooperation of the military.
Junta retaliation to its losses has come mainly through artillery shelling, strafing by helicopters and jets of towns that it evacuated after being outgunned. Many Brigadier Generals, Colonels and soldiers surrendered without fighting. Sui Lee Wei writing in The New York Times on December 23, reported that around 4,500 (this figure often varies and rises to 6,000 in some accounts) personnel could have defected among a total of 21,000 estimated casualties.
The junta does not reveal its losses but experts estimate that Junta strength is still around 300,000 to 400,000 soldiers with modern weapons. They are encountering difficulties in making up shortfalls as last year, only 83 cadets joined the defence academy compared to 1,000 in 2022. On New Year’s day, coup General Min Aung Hlaing issued honorary titles for combatants and praised the junta forces for their dedication. Hlaing offered a political resolution to resistance forces asking them to stop fighting a war they could not win.
The last big win for EAOs was by AA in Pauktaw close to Sittwe, where India operates its deep sea port for implementing its Act East policy that includes constructing infrastructure like the multi-modal Kaladan river project. Paletwa town which rests on Kaladan was captured by AA earlier this month and is key to India’s trilateral highway from Moreh in India to Moe Sat (Thailand) passing through Sagaing region. So now, AA has become the key interlocutor for New Delhi to ensure peace and stability in its border in Rakhine and Arakan states and Sagaing region, the areas it controls. New Delhi should recalibrate its policy towards the junta.
With the naval base at Sittwe under threat, (members of the Pauktaw garrison are known to have escaped by boat on January 19) the junta has lost control of an arc of territory covering Myanmar borders with India and China including loss of trade with China. Fighting had crept towards Junta headquarters at its new capital Naypitaw but is still some 200 km to its north. Most of the central and southern regions as also bordering Thailand is under Naypitaw control. The Bamar heartland is the Yangon valley. The junta’s naval and air bases are in this region. The losses by any count are significant and can be described as a strategic shift in direction of civil war and in relative balance of power resulting from tactical defeats.
While the resistance’s successes are outstanding, they do not represent military victory. The resistance would have to capture a major air base and secure key pockets in Yangon to pose an existential threat to junta. Further, despite desertions and defections, cohesion of military formations who realise they have high stakes in the war are intact: so are the elite divisions not committed in battle. But the next round of fighting will be in and around Sittwe and that may be the clincher.
Also read: Three Years of Coup in Myanmar: What Explains India’s Pro-Junta Position?
EAOs in the resistance have dominant interests mainly confined to their states or regions and seek bigger influence with Naypitaw to enhance their autonomy. General Deren’s New Year statement indicated that MNDAA has achieved its objective. A resistance alliance that will venture into the heartland is unlikely to take shape. Further, EAOs have political differences though they can cooperate militarily, but locally. Although the current initiative and momentum are with the resistance, their differences with NUG is another impediment to military unity.
China, which has big political and economic interests in Myanmar will not allow defenestration of junta forces. Along with Russia it will double down on providing military and economic support to Junta. Beijing has strong links and influence with EAOs like AA whom it has been supplying weapons. China will be a key actor in any long term political solution, not just because it is the dominant external player but also due to its huge political and economic investments. While it has a love-hate relationship with the military it also enjoyed friendly and stable relations with the democratic polity post 2011 during the hybrid rule era. China will want a cohesive Army to keep the country together as it has since 1948.
With its back to the wall, the junta has no good options to break the stalemate. Two main choices are:
a) A negotiated political solution under the ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus. As time is not on its side the junta will try to secure an end to fighting – a ceasefire followed by cessation of hostilities. Although the balance of advantage is with the resistance, Junta forces are as yet invincible. But a political solution acceptable to the NUG and democratic forces must result in a significantly diminished role for military in governance and politics. For example it will no longer be represented by a political party with 25% seat reservation; ministers of defence, interior and border – hitherto from military – must be civilians; and the 2008 military-drafted constitution suspended. This climbdown by military will not be easy to negotiate.
b) The second option is to keep fighting and broker ceasefire deals with EAOs in order to break the unity among the resistance. The junta cannot afford to lose the war as that holds the spectre of generals facing the International Court of Justice at the Hague over allegations of genocide against the Rohingya in 2019 and Burmans during the civil war. The United Nations has in its contingency planning cupboard for fragile and failing states, detailed plans for “the day after”. I have seen one for Afghanistan in 2015 when the end game was being explored.
Ashok K. Mehta, a major general, is a founding member of the erstwhile Defence Planning Staff, now the Integrated Defence Staff.
