Nothing is absolute in politics, but based on current developments, one can anticipate that there is a least possibility of Sheikh Hasina returning to power in Dhaka. The political door is not completely shut for the Awami League, but anyone replacing Hasina, except someone from her close family, in the leadership position may not be as close to New Delhi as she was. India’s Bangladesh policy pivoted around her during her first term (1996-2001) and 15 years (2009-2024) of consecutive rule.
During Hasina’s term, as reported in the international media and published in many international human rights organisations’ reports, a number of political opponents, critics of her rule and dissenters were repressed and physically tortured. She had been also accused of winning the consecutive elections by using unfair means.
Her supporters largely masked Hasina’s “autocratic” rule by showing economic development and growth the country had achieved under her. Bangladesh’s phenomenal economic growth, transforming itself into an economic model for many small-world countries, is largely attributed to her leadership skill. However, the fruit of economic growth is unevenly distributed, benefitting only to some people.
A section of the Bangladeshi population strongly believe that Hasina was in power because of India’s support. Some of the important deals Hasina signed with New Delhi, such as on defence cooperation, shared river waters etc, were largely seen by opposition and the critics as Hasina’s way to “selling country to India” which she had strongly denied and maintained that Bangladesh’s interest is supreme for her.
Due to her strong handed rule and a wide perception that India supports Hasina, political disillusionment and “anti-India” sentiments was prevailing in the country from a long time. Hasina politically managed the anger, preventing it from outburst. In 2024, Hasina was again accused by the opposition parties and countries such as the USA for using unfair means to win general elections.
Soon after the January elections, “India Out” campaign was started by the Bangladeshi social media activists. An exiled Bangladeshi Hindu physician Pinaki Bhattacharya, who fled the country in 2018 due to alleged harassment by the government, was a key figure in the social media campaign to boycott Indian goods.
The social media activists blamed India for the democratic backsliding in Bangladesh to secure its economic and security interests. Tarique Rahman, acting President of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and son of former prime minister Khaleda Zia, is considered to be the man behind the “anti-India” campaign in Bangladesh. Dissatisfaction over quota judgement and student protest since June this year became an immediate cause for toppling Hasina’s government.
Even China was very close to the Hasina-led political establishment; notwithstanding, Beijing has never been accused by a wide section of Bangladeshis of interference in the country’s “internal” matters. This is mainly because of decades-old entrenched perception in Bangladesh that India “interferes” in the sovereign matters while others do not.
This is not accurate. In 2021, then Chinese envoy to Bangladesh Li Jiming stated that Bangladesh should not join QUAD group (Australia, USA, India and Japan), if it does, Dhaka’s ties with Beijing would suffer “substantial damage. To it, then Bangladeshi Foreign Minister A. K. Abdul Momen said “We are an independent and sovereign state. We decide our foreign policy. Any country can uphold its position. But we will take decisions considering the interest of people and the country.”
On August 8, 2024, the Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus took an oath as the head of the interim government. It is unclear how long the interim government will be in power, when the fresh general elections will be held, and how effective and decisive Yunus’s voice will be in the interim government.
Moreover, how long will it take for the government to establish law and order in the country? At present, despite appeals from the government, Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s leadership and Jamaat, the religious minorities, mainly Hindus and supporters of Hasina are attacked by the unruly mob. Hindu temples and their houses have come under attack.
To protect themselves, hundreds of Hindus have approached the Indo-Bangladesh border seeking refuge in India. About 300 Bangladeshis have lost their life since protests broke out in the country over quota issue.
In such challenging situation, New Delhi has to recalibrate its Bangladesh policy. There is a need to provide enough space to engage with different important political actors and civil society leaders instead of pinning its entire policy on an individual or a coterie. Second, a big section of Indian media and opinion makers have to understand that anger against Hasina does not mean that everyone in the country wants to establish an Islamist state.
Attempt to vandalise the statue of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, father of the nation, and the vandalism of 1971 Indian memorial statue by the protestors are disgraceful and condemnable. But another dimension to read such attacks is that the protestors do not want any symbol with which Hasina and her narration of politics and history are associated. However, one cannot deny that the Islamists are on the loose due to the existing political and law and order situation in the country.
The interim government has to take some bold decisions to control them, establish the rule of law in Bangladesh and protect the religious minorities. In the present political environment, ideologically right-wing and Islamic groups are likely to acquire political significance in the country. To deal with such a situation, political patience, wait and watch, and caution are the keywords for New Delhi.
Third, in matters related to foreign and foreign economic policies, it is widely presumed that the new power elites may prefer other foreign capitals over New Delhi. Such a step by Dhaka will affect its ties with India and create a ripple in the present regional order, impacting India’s position in the subcontinent. Hence, New Delhi has to wait for a correct political time to engage with Dhaka.
India has to realise that due to its geographical spread, political position in the region, significance in Bangladesh’s economy and presence in the everyday life of many Bangladeshis, whosoever in charge of the affairs in Dhaka cannot afford to remain at a distance from New Delhi for a long time. He/she has to engage with India sooner or later.
There is a lot of evidence from India’s neighbourhood to support this statement. Finally, India has to re-work on its neighbourhood policy. The present one seems to be not effectively addressing all the challenges India faces in the neighbourhood. New Delhi has to understand that a politically challenging neighbourhood is detrimental to its ambition to play a bigger role in global politics.
Amit Ranjan is a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Views in this article are personal.
