New Delhi: Bangladesh rolled out the red carpet for China’s involvement in the Teesta River project, a special economic zone in Chattogram, the Mongla Port expansion, and discussions on acquiring fighter jets, while endorsing President Xi Jinping’s global initiatives, signalling a deeper shift towards Beijing during Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus’s visit.
The Nobel peace laureate, who has been the head of Bangladesh’ interim government since ouster of Sheikh Hasina after 15 years in power, concluded a four-day visit to China, his first ever bilateral foreign trip as chief adviser.
On the last substantive day of his China visit, Yunus met with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Friday (March 28).
As per a Bangladeshi readout, the two leaders also discussed China’s support for the Teesta River project, the purchase of multiple-role combat aircraft and multimodal transport connectivity linking the southern Chinese city of Kunming with Bangladeshi ports. Nine agreements were inked, including one on economic and technical cooperation.
Yunus had wanted to visit India at first, but there had been no response
Ahead of this visit, his media advisor Shafiqul Alam had told The Hindu newspaper that Yunus had wanted to visit India at first, but there had been no response. The China visit, with its takeaways, also comes ahead of the forthcoming visit to Thailand for BIMSTEC summit where Indian PM Narendra Modi will also be on the same platform.
Bangladesh had formally asked for a meeting of Yunus with Modi on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC summit, but India has not yet given any indication that it is on the cards. While a formal delegation-level meeting appears unlikely, avoiding Yunus in informal settings at the summit, where only six national leaders will be present, may be difficult for Modi.
India’s relations with Bangladesh relations have remained tense since August last year, with Dhaka displeased over New Delhi citing what it views as inflated figures on attacks against minorities, particularly Hindus. There is also resentment within Bangladesh’s political establishment and the broader public, who believe that Hasina stayed in power for so long without credible elections due to India’s support.
The last time that a Bangladeshi leader visited China was Sheikh Hasina in July 2024, less than a month before a students-led movement forced her to leave the country and escape to India. While she was perceived to be close to India, Hasina also maintained strong ties with Beijing, particularly in defence.
A comparison of the joint statements from Hasina and Yunus’s visits highlights notable new proposals and a shift in tone, but whether the interim government can implement them remains uncertain.
A key addition to the 2025 joint statement was Bangladesh’s explicit welcome of Chinese participation in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP).
When Hasina last visited Delhi as prime minister in June 2024, India had announced plans to send a technical team to assess the project, aiming to pre-empt China, which had already expressed interest.
China’s interest in the Teesta project
The Teesta project, estimated at around $1 billion, involves constructing a large reservoir to store monsoon run-off, deepening the riverbed, and building wide embankment roads along with satellite cities.
Bangladesh had reportedly sought a $725 million loan from China, but Beijing was hesitant due to concerns about the project’s long-term financial viability.
India has opposed China’s involvement in the project, viewing it as a strategic expansion of Beijing’s influence in Bangladesh, where Chinese firms have already executed several high-profile infrastructure projects.
After her China visit, Hasina told reporters in July 2024 that while Beijing was ready to take on the project, she preferred India to handle it.
In February 2025, Bangladesh’s interim adviser for environment, Syed Rizwana Hasan, announced that the deadline for China’s state-owned Power Construction Corporation to finalize a master plan had been extended by two years to 2026, with an initial plan expected by the end of 2024.
Water was a focus of Yunus’ talking points, with the Chief Advisor having made a request to China to draw up a 50-year-master plan for management of Bangladesh’s rivers. A new round of dialogue on maritime cooperation would also be held at an early date.
The joint statement also mentioned that the two side “agreed to strengthen cooperation in such areas as hydrological forecasting, flood prevention and disaster reduction, river dredging, integrated management of water resources, water resources development and related technology sharing”.
It specifically referred to the signing of the Implementation Plan of the MoU on Exchange of Hydrological Information of the Yarlung Zanbo-Jamuna River. Like India, Bangladesh is downstream of the Yarlung Zangbo in Tibet, where China plans to construct a mega dam.
The other infrastructure projects mentioned in the latest joint statement was Bangladesh inviting participation in the Mongla Port Facilities Modernisation and Expansion Project, and the Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone (CEIZ) in Chattogram.
According to a post on Yunus’ official Facebook page, Bangladesh has secured $2.1 billion in Chinese investments, loans, and grants for these projects, including a $400 million loan for Mongla Port modernization, $350 million for the development of the CEIZ, and an additional $150 million in technical assistance. Furthermore, nearly 30 Chinese companies have reportedly committed to investing $1 billion in the CEIZ.
Incidentally, China has been looking into the Mongla port project for several years, but it had languished so far.
Bangladesh’s support on issues that are China’s core interests
The proposal for a Chinese special economic zone at Chattogram is new, but whether the interim government can navigate the complexities of land acquisition in its short tenure remains uncertain.
India had also agreed to develop an SEZ at Mongla through a government-to-government deal in 2015, but the project never took off. Similarly, Adani was selected to develop an SEZ at Chattogram in 2019, but it seems to have been abandoned.
Bangladesh and China emphasise the need to initiate free trade agreement negotiations at the earliest, a prospect previously considered by the Hasina government.
On issues that were of China’s core interests, Bangladesh gave a stronger support this time.
The One-China policy was reaffirmed in both the 2024 and 2025 joint statements, but this time, Bangladesh explicitly opposed “Taiwan independence.”
The March 2025 joint statement also reflects a stronger endorsement of China’s global initiatives compared to July 2024. While the earlier statement only noted discussions and China’s willingness to share its experience, the 2025 statement explicitly mentions Bangladesh’s appreciation of the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the “importance” of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI).
During Hasina’s term, China made no mention of Bangladesh’s internal governance. This time, however, the joint statement expresses Beijing’s support for the interim government in “effectively exercising governance, preserving unity and stability in Bangladesh, and leading the country onto a path of development and prosperity.”
As part of the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations, the March 2025 joint statement designated this year as the “Year of China-Bangladesh People-to-People Exchanges.”
Additionally, it mentioned China’s support for Bangladeshi patients seeking medical treatment in Yunnan Province. With India scaling down its visa operations in Bangladesh due to security concerns, more patients have turned to China, Thailand, and Singapore for medical care. China also announced that it would build a robot physiotherapy and rehabilitation centre in Bangladesh.
