In the late afternoon of Sunday, May 19, Iran was traumatised by the news that the helicopter carrying its president, Ebrahim Raisi, and foreign minister, Hossen Amir-Abdollahian, had crash-landed in the mountains dividing Iran from Azerbaijan from where the president was returning home after a bilateral visit. The next day, the aircraft was spotted by a Turkish drone. Rescue workers reached the site and affirmed that the two Iranian dignitaries had been killed.
Even before the formal announcement, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had told his people to “rest assured that there will be no disruption in the country’s affairs”. This assurance was made in the background of the ongoing seven-month-long war in Gaza and the fact that, just a few weeks earlier, Israel and Iran, for the first time in recent history, had directly attacked targets in each other’s territories.
As the country plunged into grief, the Supreme Leader quietly completed the constitutional formality of appointing the First Vice President Mohammed Mokhber as the Acting President. The first official act of the latter was to convene a meeting of the cabinet and appoint deputy foreign minister and nuclear negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani as the Acting Foreign Minister. Again, as per the constitution, the presidential election has to take place within 50 days; thus, the election has been fixed for June 28.
Hostile Western assessments
Given the visceral hostility towards Iran in large sections of Western political establishments, most commentaries on the country and its departed president have been hostile. Barbara Slavin has written that, in her last 45 years of reporting on Iran, she has “never seen the Iranian people so demoralized and so utterly disconnected from Iran’s political leaders”. She recalled Raisi as an “apparatchik” who has left behind a “miserable economic record” and was responsible for the “vicious crackdown” during the hijab-related protests in September last year.
Robin Wright, writing in the New Yorker, has been even more harsh. She described the Iranian regime as “xenophobic, paranoid, and rigid”, and believed that “the theocracy in Tehran is in deep trouble on every front”. Her considered impression is that “the regime is down to a small core” and “the nation is deeply shaken about the future”.
What is generally missing in most Western writings is any reference to the deep hostility directed at Iran by the US and its Western allies since the revolution in 1979, largely in the shape of sanctions which have crippled every aspect of the country’s economy, denying it access to food, medicines, health equipment and the latest technological developments in diverse fields. These sanctions have impoverished large sections of its people through inflation and currency depreciation.
Nor do western commentators point out with the emphasis it deserves that it was the US that unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear agreement and reimposed sanctions on Iran that was, till then, in full compliance with its obligations under the agreement. Trump imposed about 1,500 sanctions on Iran, while Biden retained all of them and added another 700 during his administration. Again, the US has publicly committed itself to bringing about regime-change in Iran, mainly by encouraging its various minority communities towards subversion and insurgency, while periodically assassinating its senior officials.
Raisi’s legacy
Raisi’s presidency has to be assessed in this background. Given the tribulations to which the Islamic Republic was constantly subjected, his record is substantial.
One, in negotiations on reviving the nuclear agreement, Iran insisted on a US guarantee that future administrations would not unilaterally withdraw from a new agreement and that the IAEA would finally close investigations into allegations relating to Iran’s earlier attempts (over two decades ago) at developing nuclear weapons.
The negotiations broke down since the US could not accommodate either of these reasonable demands, affirming its bad faith and lack of seriousness in reviving the nuclear deal. However, sections of the Western media still insist that the talks failed because Iran made “unreasonable” demands. One consequence of this US failure has been that Iran has expanded its nuclear programme and reached the status of a “threshold state”.
Ebrahim Raisi. Photo: X/@raisi_com
Two, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to normalise their relations and work towards expanding their political, security and economic ties. This agreement, mediated by China and concluded in Beijing in March 2023, ended a serious divide that had, on occasion, threatened to pull West Asia into a regionwide conflagration. Indeed, the US had attempted to shape a regional coalition in which it would partner Israel, the UAE and Saudi Arabia against Iran and its allies. Instead, the Beijing agreement heralded Saudi Arabia’s commitment to strategic autonomy in terms of which it would balance ties with the US by expanding links with China and Russia and de-escalate regional tensions through the Iran outreach.
Three, despite the US’s efforts to isolate Iran in the region, the latter has built substantial ties with major regional states – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Turkey – as also with India that, in May 2024, entered into a ten-year agreement to fund the development of Chabahar port. Besides this, Iran has become a full member of both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, two major groupings that have non-western members and advocate a new multipolar world order.
Four, in terms of the regional security scenario, Iran has significantly improved its position vis-à-vis Israel. The Gaza war has shown that the “axis of resistance” shaped by Iran – that brings together the Hamas, the Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon, the Popular Mobilisation Units in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen – is today the most cohesive and powerful force confronting Israel.
Again, in the tit-for-tat military exchanges between Israel and Iran that took place in April, seven Iranian missiles penetrated Israel’s “Iron Dome” and damaged the Nevatim airfield from where Israeli aircraft had attacked the Iranian embassy in Damascus on 1 April. Iran thus displayed its ability to hit selected targets in Israel, an ability that Israel also showed with its missiles directed at Isfahan on April 19. Thus, Iran has affirmed its strategic parity with Israel, conveying to Israel that any attack on Iran could evoke a devastating assault on Israeli territory.
This is hardly the legacy of a leader whom several commentators have dismissed as “the weakest and the most incompetent [president] since 1979”.
Implications for domestic politics
The immediate challenge before the political order is to elect Raisi’s successor. Prospective candidates will file their nominations between May 30 and June 9, while campaigning with take place during June 12-27. The nominations will be vetted by the Guardians Council which is likely to reject several nominees.
In this context, observers recall that in the run-up to the election in 2021, the Guardian Council had rejected several candidates from the moderate and reform groups in order to ensure Raisi’s victory. The understanding then was that Raisi was being groomed to succeed the aging Supreme Leader. This vetting had discredited the election process so that the voter turnout was just 49%, the lowest in Iran’s history: it had been 85% in 2009, 76% in 2013 and 70% in 2017.
However, unlike in previous years when presidents had usually been from moderate or reformist groups and had had frequent differences with the Supreme Leader, Raisi’s tenure witnessed the first coming together on ideological basis of all arms of the state order – the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the military and security services. Hence, most commentators believe that Khamenei could opt for a similar person to succeed him.
However, an alternative opinion has emerged that Khamenei might in fact back a moderate in order to imbue fresh credibility into the elections process and Iran’s political system in general. The argument backing this view is that, unlike in 2021, Iran is now well-placed regionally and globally and would benefit from the leadership of a high-profile moderate president.
The name being mentioned in this context is that of the Majlis Speaker Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf who stood for president in the 2005 and 2013 elections and then withdrew in favour of Raisi in the 2017 elections in which the latter was defeated by Rouhani. Qalibaf has recently separated from the hard right group and is viewed as a “semi-moderate” by the distinguished commentator Syed Hossein Mousavian. Such a president could change Iran’s hardline posture and possibly re-engage with the western powers.
The next Supreme Leader
According to the Iranian constitution, the Supreme Leader is the guardian of the Islamic Revolution and national security, and exercises the “ultimate authority” over all branches of the government.
Not surprisingly, both Iranian and western commentators are more concerned about the implications of Raisi’s death for the selection of the next Supreme Leader. This is because Raisi was seen as Khamenei’s successor, or failing that, as one who would play an influential role in selecting Khamenei’s successor as a member of the 88-member Assembly of Experts that is charged with selecting the Supreme Leader. Raisi was elected to this assembly in the March 2024 elections and was expected to be selected as its chair in June this year.
Before Raisi’s death, there had been two names circulating for the office of Supreme Leader after Khamenei – that of Raisi himself and of Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba (b. 1969). After Raisi’s passing away, there is fresh focus on Mojtaba’s candidature.
In May, former president Hasan Rouhani had brought the issue of succession into the public domain when he had complained about the rejection of his candidature for the Assembly of Experts in the March elections. He said his disqualification had been “politically motivated” and that the exclusion of one from an “independent and dissident faction” was to ensure that the next Supreme Leader would be an “insider” who would represent “the minority rather than the majority”. This was viewed as machinations at the highest level to influence the succession.
Two weeks before Raisi’s death, the distinguished commentator, Shahir Shahidsaless had examined Mojtaba’s claim to the office of Supreme Leader. The principal argument against his candidature is that his appointment would smack of hereditary rule, something the leaders of the revolution had used against the Shah. Both Khomeini and Khamenei have repeatedly criticised hereditary rule as unIslamic and illegitimate.
In March 2024, Ayatollah Mahmoud Araghi, a member of the Assembly of Experts, revealed that, in the context of Mojtaba’s candidature, Khamenei had said that this “raises suspicions about the leadership’s hereditary issue”. Another commentator, Mohammed Mazhiri, has also pointed out that, besides the hereditary issue, Mojtaba also “lacks an executive and governance record”.
A new name circulating for the Supreme Leader’s position is that of Alireza Arafi (b. 1959). He is an ayatollah and has a substantial clerical background as the head of the Al Mustafa International University and director of the Supreme Council of Qom Seminary that handles policy-making and supervision of the seminaries in the country. In 2018, he became a member of the Guardian Council and in March this year he obtained the highest number of votes in elections to the Assembly of Experts. Following Raisi’s demise, he could become the chair of this assembly in June. He has called for seminaries to engage more closely with modern technology and artificial intelligence. He has been described by Khamenei as an “original, intellectual and resourceful jurist”.
Media reports are also speculating that Mojtaba might use his wide network within the state order, including his ties with the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to wield effective power outside the public gaze. This might not actually work: after Khomeini’s death, former president Rafsanjani had assumed that he would exercise full authority in the country by subordinating the new Supreme Leader Khamenei to his will; he had been out-manoeuvred by the latter who asserted his constitutional authority and kept the president in his place.
Outlook for foreign policy
After Raisi’s death, Syed Hossein Mousavian has made the important observation that, absent any American or European efforts to seriously engage Iran in dialogue in place of focusing on “increasing sanctions, threats and bullying”, Iran will probably “press ahead with acquiring nuclear capabilities”.
Recent statements from senior Iranian officials support this view. In April, just after the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israeli targets and in anticipation of an Israeli response, General Ahmad Haghtalab, the commander of the IRGC brigade for the protection of Iran’s nuclear facilities, had said: “It is imaginable for us to revise nuclear policy and doctrine and breach the previous commitments and limitations.” A hardline member of the Majlis, Javad Karimi Ghoddousi, added: “If the permit is issued, it will be only one week before the first test is conducted,” referring to a possible green signal to test from the Supreme Leader. Another parliamentarian, Ahmad Bakhshayesh, has added to the nuclear buzz by suggesting that Iran had been emboldened to attack Israel on April 14 since it already possessed nuclear weapons capability.
Besides what it sees as its “epic triumph” in its direct encounter with Israel in April, Iran has also gained considerable strategic confidence through its close ties with China and Russia. This has been acknowledged by the latter in warm messages after Raisi’s death. Chinese president Xi Jinping has praised Raisi for “having made important contributions to maintaining the security and stability of Iran … and having made positive efforts to reinforce and deepen Sino-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership”. Putin has recalled Raisi as “a true friend to Russia who made an invaluable personal contribution to establishing neighbourly relations … and to elevate them to the level of strategic partnership”.
These two relationships are likely to be at the centre of Iran’s global diplomacy. Both Iran and Russia have cooperated in Syria since 2015 to support the Assad regime and ensure the unity and integrity of the country in the face of external interventions. Iran has provided its indigenously manufactured drones to Russia, a crucial weapon in its war with Ukraine, and in return has obtained advanced aircraft and air defence systems. China’s comprehensive strategic partnership agreement of March 2021 with Iran provides for cooperation in energy, economic, infrastructure, intelligence and security, and envisages projects valued at $400 billion over 25 years.
Both countries extend considerable diplomatic support to Iran at the UN and other international fora, and have brought Iran into the SCO and BRICS. Both China and Iran oppose US “hegemonism and bullying”, and all three have conducted joint naval exercises annually over the last three years. The three countries acting together have placed themselves at the heart of a new multipolar order that seeks to challenge the US-led global hegemony in place over the last eight decades.
The Saudi-US security agreement
However, despite considerable increase in Russian and Chinese influence in West Asia and Iran’s new self-confidence in handling regional affairs, it is important to note that the US has not given up on its deep historic ties with Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states, nor has it abandoned its vision to shape an anti-Iran coalition made up of itself, Israel and selected GCC states, including Saudi Arabia.
All through April and May, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has been discussing a “security pact” with Saudi Arabia. Initially, it appeared to be a rehash of the deal the US had been discussing with the kingdom just after the Saudi-Iran normalisation agreement in March 2023.
According to reports, in return for normalisation of relations with Israel, the Saudi side had been seeking: one, US support for a civilian nuclear programme in the kingdom; two, supply of the latest military equipment from the US, and, three, an “iron-clad” American security agreement to defend the kingdom. Israel, at that time, was required to announce a formal commitment to support a sovereign Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories.
The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7 and the subsequent Israeli assault on Gaza ended all talk of this deal. In any case, at no stage has Netanyahu agreed to make any announcement accepting a Palestinian state. However, despite the carnage in Gaza and the deepening divide between Netanyahu and the Biden administration, the US has not given up on the Saudi-US security agreement.
According to reports in April, Blinken was now working on a bilateral Saudi-US security agreement, an agreement that did not involve Israel. In fact, the discussions seem to have made so much progress that on 2 May there were reports that the finalisation of the deal was imminent. Media reports said that the US seeking to revitalise its security ties with the GCC states and anchor its regional security role on the basis of an anti-Iran coalition and diluting the regional influence of Iran and China.
The matter temporarily withered away when US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan made a public statement that there could be no Saudi-US security agreement without the normalisation of Saudi-Israel ties. Attempts to revive it have floundered because Netanyahu has refused to give even lip-service to the idea of a Palestinian state.
Last words
But the US has still not given up on shaping its military coalition. As an interim measure, it is pursuing with GCC states the idea of an Arab air defence shield that would protect the region from Iranian drones and missiles. However, as of now, progress is slow since the states concerned are reluctant to do deals amidst the ongoing Israeli assaults on Gaza, even as Saudi Arabia has even restricted use of its air space for attacks on the Houthis. American sources however keep on trumpeting the deal that will “change the shape of the Middle East”.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has warned his Arab neighbours about “turning a blind eye on Israeli crimes” since a deal with Israel “will pit their own nations against them”, a reference to widespread Arab anger directed at their rulers if there is normalisation of ties with Israel at this juncture.
In his recent book, What is Iran?, the UK-based scholar, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam has pointed out that respite from war in West Asia is not guaranteed by the heavy American military presence; in fact, the US has been the source of instability, even as the states and their people oppose the militarisation of their region. As the Saudi-Iran accord has shown, peace has come through diplomatic engagements and people-to-people interactions.
Diplomacy, not a new military coalition, will change the shape of the region.
Talmiz Ahmad is the former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE. He holds the Ram Sathe Chair for International Studies, Symbiosis International University, Pune. He is also Consulting Editor, The Wire. His latest book, West Asia at War, was published by HarperCollins in 2022.
