Earlier this week, U.S. President Donald Trump, with more candour than his predecessors, declared that Palestinians will have “no choice” but to leave Gaza, announcing that the U.S. had plans to “take over” the strip. While this has sparked fresh fears and condemnations of ethnic cleansing, such forced mass displacement is unlikely in the near term.
Israel has failed to destroy armed resistance groups within Gaza despite substantial U.S. military aid and 15 months of no-holds barred attacks on the strip. Further, patent illegality apart, both Egypt and Jordan have categorically refused to take a substantial number of Palestinian refugees – both in October 2023, when the plan was tentatively explored by the Biden administration and in response to Trump’s latest ramble.
This is not just a moral position against ethnic cleansing. Both countries are aware that taking in Palestinians en masse, as they did in 1948 and 1967, will alter their own demographics, and eventually make them the direct target of Israeli hostilities. Nothing the U.S. guarantees can offset this risk.
There is however a more realistic threat – if Israel and the U.S can block reconstruction efforts substantially, the people of Gaza may find themselves with no choice but to leave of their own volition, or concentrate themselves into the few pockets in south and central Gaza which retain some basic infrastructure.
By all accounts, the damage to Gaza is catastrophic. Using satellite data, the UN estimated that 69% of all structures in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed, including 2,45,000 housing units. Clearing the rubble alone is estimated to take up to 15 years. The overall cost of reconstruction has been estimated by the UNDP to be 80 billion USD.
Some areas in the north of Gaza like Beit Hanoun and Jabalia, where Israel forcefully depopulated entire neighbourhoods, have been declared disaster areas, with houses, water and drainage infrastructure almost completely destroyed. Despite this level of destruction, residents of these areas returned in large numbers in the first phase of the ceasefire. But without a concrete plan for reconstruction, including temporary shelter, and urgent infrastructure repairs to water and sewage systems to make these areas fit for human life, the return may remain symbolic.
Trump’s latest statement, where he likened Gaza to a “big pile of rubble” and his administration’s efforts to sell this latest attempt at ethnic cleansing in more humanitarian terms, is a signal that the nature of the genocide in Gaza has changed – from a direct physical extermination, to a longer and slower genocide by deprivation, forcing Palestinians to leave “voluntarily” just to survive. Israel’s defence minister in the aftermath of Trump’s statements has already instructed their military to draw up “voluntary” migration plans.
Trump will be aware of the illegality of his own suggestion of forced Palestinian displacement, but he also knows that the world needs to do more than express shock at the rhetoric to counter this – they will have to come up with a workable alternative plan for reconstruction. This is easier said than done.
In Gaza, reconstruction is not simply about raising the funds (which is challenging in itself). It is curtailed and shaped by three factors: the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of Gaza, Hamas’ status in the West as a proscribed terrorist organisation, and the perpetual threat of renewed hostilities with Israel.
Blockade: Egypt and the international community
Since 2007, Israel has kept the Gaza Strip under a stringent blockade under which Israel controls all materials and people entering and leaving the strip. Under this blockade Israel has frequently enforced a total ban on construction materials, or any materials that Israel classifies as “dual use” from (materials which could ostensibly be used by resistance factions in Gaza) entering the strip. Steel, concrete, cement, iron and plaster have all at various points been prohibited from entry.
Pursuant to an agreement between Israel and Egypt, goods imported through the Rafah crossing, the Egyptian controlled border into Gaza, also require Israeli approval. Under this blockade, the UN has estimated that reconstruction could take up to 350 years (effectively meaning that Gaza will not be rebuilt).
The blockade however can only be maintained with Egyptian cooperation. The genocide in Gaza has tested Egypt-Israel relations in several ways. In particular, the unrest within Egypt from Israel’s refusal to allow adequate humanitarian aid through Rafah in the initial months of the conflict and Israel taking control of the Rafah crossing in June 2024 leading to its closure, have all contributed to tension. Egypt has since also joined South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the ICJ.
Further, one of Egypt’s core reasons to uphold the Gaza blockade, and cooperate on security with Israel, was tighter security control over the Sinai peninsula – specifically, cutting any potential support from Gaza for armed factions like Wilayat Sinai that operate in the peninsula. Being forced to host a substantial number displaced Palestinians in the Sinai peninsula would run contrary to this interest.
In these circumstances, increased pressure from Trump is likely to be counterproductive. If Egypt realises (as it seems to) that the speedy reconstruction of Gaza is the only real safeguard against mass displacement, it would likely influence their willingness to maintain the blockade. Israel seems aware of this, which explains their reluctance to withdraw fully from Rafah, despite handing the crossing back to Egyptian control under the first phase of the ceasefire.
The international aid community has to date done very little to principally challenge Israel’s blockade of Gaza. They have instead focussed on building mechanisms for reconstruction that work within and normalise the blockade. The 2014 Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM) brokered by the UN, which is used by several UN organisations to fund and undertake construction projects in Gaza essentially makes all development in Gaza subject to Israeli approval.
Palestinian scholars have found the arbitrary bureaucracy of the GRM to hinder construction rather than speed it up. In an alternative track, Governments like Qatar have used their relationship with Israel to coordinate directly with the government of Israel to obtain permission to construct in Gaza. In the aftermath of October 7 and the Gaza genocide, it is clear that these routes will no longer be available, or viable. This makes it necessary for the international community to take a clearer stance against the blockade.
Government in Gaza
Hamas’ status as a proscribed terrorist organisation in the U.S. and much of the West has meant that funding for reconstruction in Gaza has, since 2007, been routed through organisations with no links to or contact with Hamas. This has often slowed down construction, since organisations like the Gaza municipality cannot be involved in these projects. The UNRWA has been the preferred vehicle for international (including Indian) donations to Gaza for decades.
Since October 7, Israel has renewed its onslaught on the UNRWA, insisting that its members were involved in the October 7 attack (a charge strongly denied by the UNRWA). In October 2024, the Israeli parliament passed a law barring the UNRWA from operating in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which came into effect in January 2025. By delegitimising the UNRWA, Israel seeks to curb one of the few international routes for reconstruction investment into Gaza. To what extent the international community will permit this remains to be seen.
Some Western commentators see reconstruction as an opportunity to force Hamas to hand over Gaza to the administration of the Palestinian Authority. And while the Palestinian Authority is more than willing to play this role, they are unlikely to find acceptance or legitimacy in Gaza.
China appears to recognise that large scale reconstruction will require direct engagement with and involvement of the government in Gaza to be effective. Their push on this has been to build a unified, national consensus government across Gaza and the West Bank that can be recognised and supported internationally.
In July 2024, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the signing of the Beijing Declaration for Palestinian National Unity among 14 Palestinian factions including Hamas and Fatah. The declaration envisages an interim national consensus government being formed across Gaza and the West Bank. While the idea has potential, given the escalation of the conflict in the West Bank and the role being played by the Palestinian Authority in curbing armed resistance factions there, it would appear that this has not materialised as expected.
The risk of continued conflict
On the face of it, the Trump administration does not appear to share Israel’s enthusiasm for returning to active conflict in Gaza. Contrary to expectations, negotiations for the second phase of the ceasefire have commenced. The second phase, which includes Israel’s complete withdrawal from Gaza, however remains extremely challenging. Even assuming the current ceasefire holds and moves into its next phase, donors will likely remain wary of donating to infrastructure projects in a region that has seen five full scale armed conflicts (including the current genocide) in 15 years.
Despite international legal action against Israel with respect to war crimes in Gaza, international efforts to curb arms sales to Israel, that could prevent a repeat of such decimation, remain in their nascent stages.
The China factor
China’s influence in the region remains a curiously under-discussed factor in this conflict. Egypt is the largest recipient of Chinese investment in the Arab world. China is also Egypt’s second largest trading partner, and the Chinese ambassador to Egypt often writes linking the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to Egypt’s own development goals. In a poll of Egyptians in 2022, 64% believed that it was somewhat or very important to maintain good relations with China (for comparison, 58% felt this about their relationship with the U.S.).
Given Egypt’s centrality to maintaining the Gaza blockade, China’s influence, should they choose to become involved in the reconstruction of Gaza, will be of critical importance. The U.S. is aware of this, which is why military aid to Egypt (along with Israel) was expressly exempted from Trump’s latest freeze on overseas American spending.
While it seems clear from their efforts at forming a unity government that China has some interest in the reconstruction of Gaza (which ties closely with the general aims of the BRI), there are challenges to overcome. To date, China’s approach in the Middle East has been to build and deploy influence quietly without necessarily going head to head with the U.S.
For example, while China used diplomatic efforts to protect the Assad government in the security council, and repeatedly called for the lifting of sanctions on Syria, they maintained sufficient distance to ensure that the collapse of the Assad government didn’t materially impact them in the manner in which it impacted Iran and Russia.
Further, the BRI isn’t an aid program. It is typically characterised by high interest rate loans that are only waived or converted into grants for projects that are of very specific strategic interest to China. As a result, China has hitherto been wary about investments into conflict zones that cannot secure the infrastructure they build from physical destruction. Despite signing a memorandum of understanding with the Assad government in 2022 on Syrian participation in the BRI, for example, very little was actually invested into Syrian reconstruction.
In the end, after 15 months of brutal violence, it is relatively clear that Palestinians in Gaza will not be displaced or broken by force. But it is a mistake to think the genocide has ended. What decides the outcome of the genocide in Gaza will now be the speed with which the international community develops and executes a comprehensive reconstruction plan for Gaza.
Sarayu Pani is a lawyer by training and posts on X @sarayupani.
Missing Link is her new column on the social aspects of the events that move India.
