The recent demise of Iran President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash while drawing worldwide news coverage, is unlikely to shift Iran’s entrenched political, social, or foreign policy dynamics. Contrary to speculations of impending political turmoil, the history of the Islamic Republic demonstrates its uncanny resilience against such political shocks.
Political stability in the face of adversity
Raisi’s sudden death will not disrupt the political machinery of Iran.
Historical precedents, such as the assassination of key figures early in the Islamic revolution or during sensitive periods like the Iran-Iraq war, have not derailed the regime’s agenda. Instead, these moments have been utilised to consolidate power further and fortify the revolutionary ideology. The regime has shown a robust capability to manage crises, evidenced during the transition after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, a period fraught with potential for upheaval.
If there was ever a time ripe for a crisis of succession in Iran, it would have been upon the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini, a uniquely charismatic leader of the 20th century, seemed irreplaceable. Moreover, his death coincided with the end of the brutal ten-year Iran-Iraq war – a moment that could have been seized upon, given the widespread economic strain and the formation of new demographic pressures as more people moved to cities, facing poor economic opportunities and decaying social infrastructure. Yet, the transition of power proceeded smoothly. This precedent suggests that even the future passing of the current Supreme Leader may not induce the anticipated crisis.
A portrait of Ayatollah Khomeini on the facade of the Ali Qapu Palace in Esfahan, Iran. Photo: A.Davey/Flickr (CC BY 2.0 DEED)
Regarding the impact of Ebrahim Raisi’s death, given his relatively weak and uncharismatic political presence, it is almost certain that it will be business as usual in Iran. It is important to understand that the role of President in Iran’s political system is more accurately likened to that of a prime minister serving under a powerful clerical monarch. Thus, the idea that Raisi’s passing could lead to significant political turmoil underestimates the nature and structural depth of Iran’s leadership.
Unyielding grip on civil liberties
The prospects for Iran’s civil rights movements are equally unpromising. Despite the heroic displays of resistance, such as the recent woman-led protests triggered by the Mahsa Amini incident, the regime’s response has been ruthlessly suppressive. The death of a relatively peripheral figure like Raisi does little to alleviate the pressures faced by activists. His role did not extend to controlling the levers of power that enforce the state’s repressive measures, and as such, his absence will not ease the state’s grip on civil society.
Foreign policy: A steady course
Turning to foreign policy, I don’t see any significant change being ushered in by the death of Raisi or the foreign minister. Three areas stand out as particularly important.
War in West Asia and regional geopolitical trends
The ongoing violence in West Asia, especially Iran’s involvement in conflicts like the Hamas-Israel war, is not controlled by the Iranian President or Foreign Minister. Authority over these matters lies with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Quds Force. This division of control was highlighted a few years ago when leaked audio revealed that a former foreign minister had no influence over decisions related to Middle East geopolitics, which are exclusively managed by the IRGC.
Nuclear weapons programme
Similarly, the final say or oversight of Iran’s nuclear weapons program does not fall to the President or the Foreign Minister. The parliament and administration are generally barred from even discussing the nuclear issue. Over the past two decades, Iran has adeptly positioned itself as a threshold nuclear state, showing no signs of changing its strategic direction.
General negotiations and relations with Western powers
In broader foreign policy matters, including negotiations and relations with Western countries, neither Raisi nor the Foreign Minister have had a significant role in setting strategic directions. The longstanding confrontational stance toward the West, established in 1979, is bolstered by Iran’s alignment with an anti-Western bloc that includes nations like China and Russia. This coalition, which also comprises countries such as North Korea and Nicaragua, effectively mitigates the impact of Western isolation on Iran and secures the regime’s longevity.
In conclusion, the structure of Iranian foreign policy, deeply rooted in the authority of the Supreme Leader and the IRGC and supported by strategic international alliances, remains unaltered. The passing of figures like Raisi is unlikely to change the fundamental policies and postures of the Iranian regime.
A futile focus on a singular event
In conclusion, the death of Raisi should not be seen as a turning point for Iran. The regime’s enduring strategy of power consolidation, suppression of dissent, and independent foreign policy manoeuvring assures that his passing will likely be a footnote in the broader narrative of the Islamic Republic. This event, while notable, underscores the continuity rather than change in Iran’s complex political landscape. Despite its potential to incite speculation and concern, the regime’s likely controlled response to Raisi’s passing reaffirms the established order’s resilience and the improbability of significant change stemming from a single event in such a strategically calculative regime.
Kian Tajbakhsh is Lecturer and Presidential Fellow, Committee on Global Thought and Adjunct Professor of Urban Policy, SIPA, Columbia University.
