President Vladimir Putin of Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022 ostensibly to discourage it from joining NATO. Another possible aim, which came into play later, was to annex the Russian-speaking areas, whose population had complained of being discriminated against. If these were indeed the aims, then in military terms these had not been thought through properly.
Before the war, Russian and Belarusian forces carried out joint exercises in the guise of which the concentration of force was achieved. The Russians started with massive armour thrusts on more than one axis, most importantly to take Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. At the start of the invasion, some analysts were of the opinion that Kyiv would fall in a matter of a few days whereas others were of the opinion that it was not possible within a short timeframe and that this goal could take many months. It appears that the Russian generalship had studied Clausewitz and aimed for the capital in the hope that once the capital fell the whole nation would crumble and surrender. Analysts who assumed Kyiv would eventually fall assumed that Moscow would establish a puppet government which would act as a buffer between NATO and Russia. That would also ensure that not only were Russian-speaking areas effectively annexed, but also that Russian domination of the Black Sea would be total and obviate NATO and others from using it for military or trade purposes, including the export of Ukraine wheat and grains to Europe and other places.
The timeframe was unrealistic, given the specific application of forces as well as the timing, when there was still snow and the temperature was around minus 20 degrees Celsius. Russian tanks found it difficult to move across the country for these reasons. The armour thrust on roads could be easily stopped by small groups of infantry commandos by knocking off a few tanks near bottlenecks or destroying bridges, which would make it impossible for the follow up tanks and more importantly the logistic elements which carry fuel for the tanks, ammunition, food and tents for the force which also included fuel for keeping them warm to save them from snow and extreme cold weather. The Russians had failed to consider the ground realities in detail.
As it happened, the Russian advancing columns were struck on all the axes, which was the first indicator of a major defeat in the ongoing operations. The troops in the tanks and open trucks had to bear the extreme cold without sufficient food or shelter, which is a great demoralising factor in war. It appears that the Russian general staff did not remember lessons from the Second World War, where the Nazi German attacks on Russia were defeated by “General Frost” and “General Mud” (weather conditions). The next important point was that before the Russian infantry started clearing Kyiv, which is a very large objective, it had to be isolated by tanks and infantry picquets out in the open to ensure that no reinforcements or logistics got into Kyiv from outside. This was not possible in the sub-zero temperature as the picqueting troops had to be supplied food, clothing and some cover and fuel to keep them warm, which was a Herculean task. Even if they were to isolate only a small portion of Kyiv, it was still unthinkable as major reinforcements from the rest of Kyiv would not allow that.
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Tanks are virtually ineffective inside a built-up area as their guns can fire only 15 degrees of elevation, and with high rise buildings on all sides even a small infantry section and a few snipers would not let the attacking forces dominate. I personally had some good experience of fighting in a built-up area during the capture of Maulvi Bazar in the Sylhet Sector during the 1971 Bangladesh War and the fighting in Somalia alongside US forces in Mogadishu. Small infantry detachments with molotov cocktails, snipers and small anti-tank weapons/ RPGs would stall the Russian advance. The Russian infantry was insufficient and with inexperienced soldiers, it was required to clear all buildings and lanes which was not possible. It appears that the only factor taken into consideration by the Russian general staff apart from the selection of Kyiv as the objective was the shock effect of armour, without analysing the holding power of the infantry with modern weapons and the ground factor of built-up areas.
It appears that the generals who planned this operation were selected for their higher command and staff duties based more on theoretical knowledge and, perhaps, favouritism and yesmanship. Otherwise the advice to the Russian president should have been more practical and candid. It was seen that as the war progressed many of them were deprived of their command and new commanders brought in, but that was too late.
Thus, the Russians lost the initiative so essential during an offensive operation and enough time was available to President Zelenskyy to take stock of all fronts and re-group his forces to deal with them, as well as for NATO to assess and plan their moves. Also, the Russians leaned heavily on the Wagner Group to capture important objectives like Bakhmut rather than their own elite troops. They were more dependent on missile attacks, which can never be sufficient in a major war to dislodge the defender. At this point, the Russian offensive got into a stalemate with prohibitive casualties on their side not only of troops but also tanks, artillery and mechanised columns and a large fleet of helicopters. The Russian foreign minister then professed that the aim was limited to some areas and not the whole of Ukraine – which was understandably an acceptance of failure.
Having lost the initiative, Russia, instead of going in for a negotiated cease fire, switched to missile attacks on civilian areas and the destruction of civilian infrastructure like electricity, water supply, hospitals, and schools – which is unethical and deplorable and un-soldierlike. The destruction of civilian infrastructure and heavy civilian casualties cannot result in a military victory. In fact, it hardened the resolve of Ukrainians to fight on.
Suspension of grain deals and stopping the movement of grain from Ukraine’s Odessa port, the destruction of silos and godowns holding grain and destruction of connected infrastructure is also in bad taste. It will not result in any benefit to the war effort but earns negative points and condemnation world over. Also, threatening ships only meant for grain is a retrograde statement and step.
The war also led to Finland joining NATO and may hasten the remaining neutral countries of Europe joining the alliance as individually they are not capable of taking on Russia.
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On the military front, the war has highlighted the importance of infantry as a war winning factor. The Russian side lacked not only sufficient infantry but also deployed conscripts with less experience, whereas the Ukrainian infantry steadfastly held the ground with support from limited armour and a lot of handheld infantry, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Drones too have played a major part in the destruction of Russian armour, command and communication centres and some pinpointed objectives.
Though Beijing has supported Russia selectively, it has also projected itself as a peace-broker. China would not like to enhance the capabilities of a neighbour – for obvious reasons but may also have considered the ‘positive’ consequences of Putin’s actions, such as keeping the US embroiled in Europe and reducing its effectiveness on the Taiwan front.
The war which the Russians expected to be a swift, short operation is now more than a year old, with no tangible end in sight. President Putin has rejected diplomatic and other methods of ending the war, more out of ego rather than realties on ground. On the other hand President Zelenskyy of Ukraine is sticking to his demand that Russia vacate all occupied areas before any peace talks commence. NATO has supplied all possible help to Ukraine, just short of formally declaring it a part of the organisation. As a result, Ukraine has now forced a stalemate. Therefore, there is an urgent need for Russia to consider a negotiated deal. NATO is much wiser from this experience and in any future conflict would know how to tackle it militarily. The Russian public is not in favour of prolonged war either. So, the main professed aim of Ukraine not joining NATO is already lost and short of a formal proclamation, in actual terms NATO is already there. The Black Sea is still open for everybody and Ukrainian wheat will keep moving out, albeit under an agreement or otherwise.
Therefore, a ceasefire should be proclaimed. One option could be for Russia to hand over the area under its control to a peace force composed of Indian, South East Asian and African troops, as matters move on to the negotiating table. We have seen a number of African leaders take the initiative in pushing for a ceasefire. India has influence and clout with both Russia and the big powers backing Ukraine and the world needs our leadership in deeds rather than mere words. It is time Prime Minister Modi and external affairs minister S. Jaishankar involved themselves in the search for a sustainable peace.
Brigadier Surinder Singh (retired) is a war veteran and commanded a brigade in the J&K Sector.
