It looks like life is coming full circle. The Warsaw Pact (1955), a collective defence treaty shaped during the Cold War, was a response by the Soviet Union and eastern European states to counterbalance NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), a military alliance of European and North American states. Today, Warsaw, the capital of Poland, is requesting the United States (US) to position nuclear weapons on their territory to deter possible aggression from Russia.
Interestingly, the US has already forward-deployed nuclear weapons at six NATO bases across five countries in Europe: Belgium, Germany, Italy (at two bases), the Netherlands and Turkey. The US has probably deployed around 100 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs at these locations. But Poland feels that this deterrence mechanism is “lacking teeth.”
Why is Polish President Andrzej Duda pushing to include Poland in the list of countries for the forward deployment of nuclear weapons? One possible reason could be the uncertainty about US commitment to NATO and even its possible withdrawal.
Secondly, President Trump may not respond to NATO’s calls, even if the need arises, from the point of view of limiting conflict and avoiding the possibility of escalation. It appears that Duda likes the suggestion made by French President Emanuel Macron – on extending the protection offered by France’s nuclear arsenal to its European associates – but is uncertain about its effectiveness.
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In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and since then the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have been fearful of becoming Russia’s next target. Today, it appears that owing to existing US policies, Russia will have an upper hand in the Ukraine theatre.
There is a possibility that after winning Ukraine, Putin could set his sights on areas that were under Moscow’s control in the past. Poland shares a 232 km-long border with Russia. Poland also understands that while Trump may claim anything about his relations with the Russian president, taming Putin is just not possible. Having nuclear weapons on Poland’s soil could potentially dissuade Putin from being aggressive. However, there is a possibility that such a move could turn counterproductive and provoke him unnecessarily.
As per Duda, NATO’s borders moved eastwards in 1999, when Warsaw joined the alliance. However, NATO (read the US) never made any policy decision regarding the rearrangement of nuclear structures. Duda feels that when Putin announced in 2023 that Moscow would move tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, the world accepted this without much opposition, so why should anyone be concerned about how Russia would see this move.
He also understands that the provocation from Russia could happen anytime and hence rejected Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s suggestion that Poland should develop its own nuclear arsenal, since that would take decades.
Duda is not ready to solely depend on the French nuclear umbrella, but may look at it as an additional nuclear shield. France has a sovereign nuclear deterrent mechanism and their nuclear arsenal is not under NATO. French nuclear doctrine speaks about the nuclear option, if their vital interests are threatened. Since there is no specificity about what is vital, President Macron may not find it difficult to expand the area for nuclear umbrella cover. In fact, in 1964, then French President Charles de Gaulle had argued that France would consider itself threatened if, say, the Soviets attacked Germany.
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However, France is not likely to relocate their nuclear weapons and they would be required to undertake major military, technological and financial investments for expanding the nuclear umbrella.
Until 2008, there were US nuclear weapons placed in the UK. Today, the UK has its own nuclear deterrence mechanism. However, they still have a certain amount of dependence on the US to maintain their nuclear weapon architecture. The UK acquires the aeroshells for the warheads and the Trident missiles, used as delivery vehicles, from the US.
Two key questions
Against this backdrop two critical questions emerge. One, will Europe and states like Japan, and South Korea remain secure without American nuclear patronage? Two, is there a need to reconceptualise the existing notion of nuclear deterrence, which, in its present format, is not enough for Russia?
Under the current scenario, it cannot be said with certitude that the US would abide by the policy of extended deterrence agreement with NATO. For NATO to survive, France needs to reshape their nuclear policies. But that is easier said than done. It would take time for NATO to evolve a nuclear edifice based on the British and French nuclear weapon stockpiles and delivery platforms. NATO just cannot blindly replace the existing US nuclear weapons on the six European sites with weapons from the UK and France.
It would be naïve to think that France can replace the US weapons based on sites in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands just because they are in close vicinity. The France-Italy distance is around 1,000 km, still not much in the hypersonic era. But this is not just about repositioning the fighter aircrafts, which can carry the nuclear payload at the airbases in these states. There would be a need to integrate the nuclear weapons and their delivery systems into NATO’s already established nuclear configurations and command and control structures.
It is too premature to predict if the UK and France would be required to produce more nuclear warheads, however such a possibility cannot be ruled out. All this may take time; though in the long-term interest of the EU, it would be important to establish a UK-France maintained nuclear deterrence mechanism for NATO.
Today, Trump 2.0 is posing significant challenges to NATO’s existing nuclear deterrence mechanism. The conflict has raised concerns about how nuclear weapons can influence global security. The notion of deterrence relies deeply on the receiver of the threat choosing to be deterred.
Is Russia getting dissuaded from expanding the ambit of conflict? If the Polish president’s views are taken seriously then the answer is no. NATO member states are worried that the US may ditch them. That is probably why the states like Poland are directly approaching the US. President Duda understands that existing deterrence structures are all about the continuation of the status quo and that may not be working.
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war could be viewed as a Black Swan event in the history of nuclear deterrence. Russia, a nuclear-armed state, is involved in conflict with Ukraine, which, while not possessing nuclear weapons, is supported by NATO, a nuclear power alliance.
Under this scenario, this lopsided deterrence strategy is not effective. NATO is avoiding direct intervention in the conflict due to the fear of nuclear escalation, while Russia has been escalating the nuclear rhetoric for the past three years. It looks that the US and NATO have largely succumbed to these threats.
One critical question is whether the presence or absence of a nuclear umbrella for countries like Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia would make any difference to Putin should he decide to invade them. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict is challenging the established framework of nuclear deterrence and forcing a re-evaluation of its effectiveness.
Trump’s actions are only adding to the instability of the existing nuclear deterrence framework. The US needs to continue to support NATO fully, as the alliance remains vital to Europe’s security. For Europe, which is not a major military power, the most viable option today is to continue relying on collective security mechanisms. Trump’s modern-day Perestroika style efforts to restructure the US economy should not lead to the dismantling of NATO or the weakening of the EU.
Ajey Lele researches space issues and is the author of the book Institutions That Shaped Modern India: ISRO.
