The recently released US national security strategy (NSS) is a wonder to behold, not least because it lays out the Donald Trump administration’s priorities in unambiguous terms. In that sense it is vastly different from everything that came before, even the 2017 NSS released by the first Trump administration.

The 2017 NSS, like previous (and Joe Biden’s NSS) emphasised the place of the US in global institutions, the critical need to deal with climate change, and shoring up alliances against perceived adversaries, including Russia.

The 2025 NSS, in comparison, pours scorn on American leadership of the world, explicitly rejects “globalism and so-called ‘free trade’”, focusses primarily on domestic power, and “reject[s] the disastrous ‘climate change’ and ‘Net Zero’ ideologies that have so greatly harmed Europe, threaten[s] the United States, and subsidise our adversaries”.

Much of the commentary has focussed on Russia, Europe and White supremacy – the NSS 2025 explicitly ties the common interests of Europe and the US based on race – maybe more striking is what is not mentioned. There is not a single mention of the United Nations/UN, the World Bank, or the IMF. There is a throwaway remark on “International financial institutions, including the multilateral development banks, possess[ing] combined assets of $1.5 trillion”, but this is explicitly in the context of serving US interests.

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NATO is mentioned five times and the focus is that non-US NATO members must spend more, that “certain NATO members will become majority non-European” so may have different interests, and that it should not expand to include more countries (read: Ukraine). The Quad is mentioned once, and in the context of India sharing greater responsibility.

The throughline across all of this is that the US no longer considers any international organisation relevant. In the few that it is willing to participate in, it wants others to shoulder greater burden while reducing US exposure and pursuing narrow US interests that cannot be seen as global ones. Bluntly put, the US under this administration is articulating that it does not wish to shape or influence the global order, but is largely seceding from it.

It is hard to overstate how much of a break this is from traditional US foreign policy. Although there has always been an isolationist tradition in the US, the dominant view since has been that US retreat after the first World War, particularly from the League of Nations and into tariffs was one of the reasons for both the Great Depression and the second World War. In creating, and leading, much of the institutional structure of global governance the US saw global trade and security architecture as serving both US and global interests.

During the Cold War it fashioned itself as the “leader of the Free World.” Post the collapse of the USSR, George Bush Sr, spoke of a “New World Order” (although this was discontinued as it was quickly adopted as an anti-Semitic trope, just as “globalism” is also used as one).

Hillary Clinton’s speechwriters coined the term “the indispensable nation,” and even the younger Bush saw the world in global terms when he waged his incompetent and brutal Global War on Terror. Obama’s pursuit of the Paris Climate Agreement was possibly the last such great endeavour by the US, and when Joe Biden was elected, among his first statements was, “America is back.”

To be fair, there has been no shortage of criticism of US-led global governance. Critics have highlighted US warmongering and the skewed role of the US in the global economy because of the US dollar as the reserve currency and its ability to impose punishing unilateral sanctions.

The argument that the US and its allies can violate the rules of a “rules-based order” such as during the illegal invasion of Iraq or the support of war crimes by Israel, has raised serious questions of whether US leadership and global governance are actually compatible. In an odd confirmation of “horseshoe theory” – which states that beliefs can be shared by those on the opposite ends of the spectrum – the US NSS 2025 validates these ideas.

What does this mean for India? Firstly, and most importantly, the idea that the US would go out of its way to help India build financial, industrial, and other capacities as part of the Quad and to compete with China should be gently abandoned, at least for the duration of this administration.

Foxconn is building a $1.5 billion plant in India at the explicit displeasure of the Trump administration. While Foxconn may continue with the investment, the signalling by the Trump administration is likely to discourage other companies to follow suit. The US NSS 2025 adds the US as a competitor for manufacturing in India, along with existing competitors such as Indonesia and Vietnam.

Also read: In National Security Document, Trump Repeats Claim of Brokering India-Pak Peace

Secondly, the one point of continuity is competition with China, but this comes with caveats. The most important one is that the US is explicitly asking India to step up its role in confronting China. More problematically this role is focussed on the South China Sea and Taiwan, and Indian core concerns are in the Indian ocean and along the Line of Actual Control.

For India, the most dangerous situation is a two-front challenge with Pakistan and China, and maybe third actors. This is a challenge, because as Trump’s treatment of Europe and Ukraine shows, he wants his allies to fight for the US and could not care a fig about their strategic concerns. Making this even more difficult is the mention of Trump imposing peace on India and Pakistan – the first time India is mentioned in the strategy.

During the Kargil conflict, the US went out of its way to pressure Pakistan to withdraw in a conflict that lasted nearly three months. Does anybody believe that if such a situation were to recur the US would show this much focus, determination, and patience, or would Trump be posting about a ceasefire within days?

Thirdly, if the US retreats from global institutions, India must decide on what to do. There is no way that such a huge vacuum will go unfilled, and whichever country or (more likely) group of countries steps in, they will play an outsize role in determining the future of trade, migration, conflict management, climate, healthcare, and a host of other issues. Even if the next US administration reverses the current decisions, the effects of three years is going to be a big one.

India is hardly alone in facing this predicament, and it is a large and important country as well as an economic power. It could, if it is so inclined, try and forge new rules with other partner countries. Currently, though, India is at best a second-level actor in institutions it is involved in, whether the UN, the G20, the BRICS grouping or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The organisations in which it was a first level actor – Saarc and Bimstec – have withered, except maybe the Quad, where any rule making is going to run directly into US strategic positions.

Lastly, and maybe most importantly, the US NSS 2025 places a massive bet on AI. This is when there is near unanimity that the market is likely to correct against the heavy valuation of AI stocks. Gita Gopinath, the former chief economist at the IMF, is one of the more sceptical, and believes a value correction could wipe out about $20 trillion from US wealth and $35 trillion from global wealth.

To put this into perspective, the whole GDP of the US is only about $30 trillion, and the 2008 financial crisis wiped out (only!) $2 trillion worldwide. Even if Gopinath’s calculations are wildly wrong, and the effect is only a tenth of what she estimates, it will still be almost twice as bad as the 2008 crisis.

It is important to remember that all of George W. Bush’s badly-waged wars, all the illegality and criminality of the Global War on Terror had less impact on US power than the 2008 financial crisis. More than anything in the US NSS 2025, such an outcome, which is beyond the power of the Trump administration to control, is what will redraw the map of global governance. For all that the new strategy suggests a planned secession of the US from global governance on its own terms, a financial crisis may not leave anybody with a choice.

Omair Ahmad has worked as a political analyst and journalist in India, the US, and UK.

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