One of the more alarming things about the Trump disruption is the fate of the global nuclear order. In 1968, during the height of Cold War, alarmed by the French test of 1960 and the Chinese one of 1964, the United States and Soviet Union pressed for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a pact with three clear goals: prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote disarmament, and encourage peaceful use of nuclear energy.
To discourage proliferation, the US and Soviet Union adopted the strategy of extended deterrence where they promised to defend their allies against conventional and nuclear threats. Thus, the US provided guarantees to its western allies, as well as Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. The Soviet Union provided similar protection to members of the Warsaw Pact.
The NPT, which, as of 1970, recognised five “legal” nuclear weapons powers – the US, Soviet Union, UK, France and China – did not end nuclear proliferation, but it did slow it down. Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea have broken through and joined the ranks of nuclear powers. But many other countries ranging from Sweden in Europe, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, South Africa in Africa, and Taiwan in Asia gave up their nuclear weapons programmes. In a special category were countries like Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan which surrendered their Soviet-era nuclear weapons.
Today, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the US has some 3,700 nuclear weapons, Russia 4,400, France 290, UK 225, China 500, India and Pakistan 170 each, North Korea 50 and Israel 90.
NPT members which have breached or sought to breach the NPT have often been driven by security concerns such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria and Taiwan. And a lesson from the first of these is that possession of nuclear weapons does deter big powers from inflicting the kind of destruction that Iraq, Libya, Syria and Ukraine have seen, and Iran is being threatened with.
As is obvious, extended deterrence, which is the notion of fighting and taking the risk of devastation to protect a distant country, has to be based on a huge measure of credibility. To enhance it, the US has had a concept of “nuclear sharing” where some of its nuclear weapons are stationed in countries like Germany, Turkey, Italy, Greece, Belgium and Netherlands. The weapons remain under American control, but the air forces of host countries practice carrying and delivering them.
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All this has been put to risk now for American allies because of the shifts arising from the perceived unpredictability of US foreign policy – marked by a transactional stance toward NATO and President Trump’s skepticism about traditional alliances.
Today, big questions confront the countries that have lived for so far under the US nuclear umbrella. Russia’s nuclear sabre-rattling over Ukraine, its arsenal of over 4,000 warheads and exercises with Belarus, have further heightened European anxiety.
The first option being explored is that of expanding the role of French and British nuclear arsenals and creating a European nuclear umbrella. European leaders are debating whether France and the United Kingdom – the continent’s only nuclear powers – could extend their nuclear deterrents to protect other European nations.
Earlier this month, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed integrating France’s nuclear arsenal into a broader European defence framework, suggesting a “strategic dialogue” on how France’s deterrent could bolster collective European security. Similarly, figures like Germany’s, Friedrich Merz, have called for discussions with France and the UK about “nuclear sharing” or extending their nuclear protection to allies like Germany. This could involve France and the UK enhancing their arsenals or coordinating deterrence strategies to cover non-nuclear NATO members, though both nations remain hesitant to cede control over their independent nuclear forces.
The second and more alarming thinking relates to countries developing their own nuclear weapons to hedge against a potential US withdrawal from NATO. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, for instance, has openly suggested that Poland “would be safer with our own nuclear arsenal.” He said that this was because of the “profound change of American geopolitics.”
There has been some talk in Germany too about a stand-alone German nuclear arsenal, though this will be a hard sell given the country’s World War II guilt. As of now, the talk is more about partnering with the UK and France to extend nuclear coverage to Germany and other states of the EU.
However, each pathway faces obstacles: France and the UK are reluctant to dilute their sovereignty over nuclear weapons, an EU bomb is logistically and politically daunting, national proliferation risks destabilising the region, and US redeployment depends on a wavering American commitment. These discussions reflect a continent at a crossroads, seeking to balance deterrence, autonomy and alliance dynamics in an increasingly uncertain world.
The situation in East Asia is equally nuanced, especially since it has two states with the technological capability of making them. Some South Korean leaders have indicated that the country could develop nuclear weapons given the fears of North Korea and the unreliability of US defence commitment. Public sentiment, too, has begun to seriously consider the idea.
As for Japan, given its history, there has been no open talk of developing nuclear weapons, though leaders have explored the idea of allowing the US to station nuclear weapons in the country. Japan’s huge stockpile of plutonium, which it says is to make fuel for nuclear reactors, and its undoubted technological capability have driven concerns in neighbours like China and North Korea that it is adopting a hedging posture for the present.
Concerns over the reliability of US extended deterrence are not the only threats to the global nuclear non proliferation order. A number of arms control treaties like START and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty have expired. The new START treaty is set to expire next February and as yet there are no signs of follow-on negotiations.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has yet to enter into force, though till now most states are observing it. Project 2025, which is associated with the new Trump administration, has recommended resumption of nuclear weapons tests. Russia, China and the US have maintained and even expanded the infrastructure for testing. A breakout by one country could immediately lead to others, and even newer nations following suit in testing weapons and destabilising the global security framework.
Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
