We now have the preliminary results of the 10th European Parliamentary (EP) elections, the second largest in the world, after India’s and ahead of the United States. The election campaign was decisively different from the one in 2019, when two main developments had influenced the elections.
A ‘global strike of Fridays for Future’ on May 24, 2019, drew hundreds of thousands of protesters. The protests were timed to coincide with the 2019 European Parliament election which resulted in a huge rise in votes for the Green Parties. Brexit was the second major development.
The UK has not been a member of the EU since January 1, 2021. The loss of one of its most important member states shocked the EU. There are good arguments that progressive laws like the Minimum Wage Directive, which also boosts collective bargaining of trade unions across the EU, were stimulated by Brexit as there might have been the need to provide a more social EU.
The 2024 elections, however, took place in a different environment. Russia’s war against Ukraine, which borders three EU member states, shifted the discourse to a securitisation of different policy fields. It was then easy for the foreign policy hawks in the EU to frame the rise of China within a new discourse pitting free Western democracies against the authoritarian China-Russia axis.
The “Green Deal” of the EU had already run its course. People in the EU, for the first time, realised what ecological transformation under a mostly neoliberal regime meant for their daily lives: costs are largely individualised via higher CO2 costs for energy (housing and mobility), while billions of Euro are used to subsidise rich private enterprises, most often, without social or environmental conditionality.
The elections polls in 2024, therefore, predicted a massive rise of the far right and fascist forces in the elections to the EP. The results, however, are more nuanced.
Banners for the 2024 European elections campaign on the Agora Simone Veil of the European Parliament in Brussels. Photo: flickr.com/European Parliament/ CC BY 2.0 DEED
With an electorate of 373 million voters in 27 EU countries, the EP elections take place according to national electoral laws (majority or proportional representational plus potential thresholds) and it is not easy to draw straight concluding remarks. Let’s start with some basic numbers:
- The EP had 705 seats last time, it now has 720. The conservative European Conservative Party (EPP) won 190 seats compared to 176 in 2019.
- The social democrats (S&D) won 136 as opposed to 139 last time. The German SPD had their worst national results since 1887 where they reached 10.7% under Chancellor Bismarck.
- The liberal Renew Europe won 80 compared to 102 in 2019.
- Formerly the fourth largest group, The Greens now only have 52 seats instead of 71.
- The right-wing European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) are now the fourth largest group with 76 seats, up from 69 in 2019. Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party lost 7 seats, bringing their total to 20, while Giorgia Meloni’s governing party, Brothers of Italy, gained 18 seats, bringing their total to 24.
- They are followed by the extreme right-wing group ID (Identity and Democracy, France) with 58 seats, up from 49. Le Pen’s party won 7 additional seats, bringing their total to 30, making them, along with the German conservatives, the largest national delegation in the EP. In Germany, the hard-right party AfD gained 15% of the vote (they were recently expelled from ID for being too far to the right). Their win is actually much bigger, as in some German provinces they gained more than 40% of the votes.
- Last but not least, The Left group grew from 37 to 39 seats. La France Insoumise gained 3 seats, bringing their total to 9 with 10%. Die Linke from Germany lost 2 seats, now holding 3 with 2.7%. The Finnish Left Alliance gained 2 seats, now totalling 3 with 17%. The Swedish Left Party retained 2 seats with 11%. Sinistra Italiana, in alliance with the Greens, will have two seats in the Green and Left Alliance. In Greece, Syriza gained 4 seats following its split and shift towards more social democratic policies, while the left split from Syriza failed to gain enough votes. Spain’s Sumar (4.7%) fell short of its expectations (12% in the 2023 national election), and its leader, labor minister Yolanda Diaz, stepped down from party leadership. Podemos, on the other hand, fared fairly well with 3.3%.
Some conclusions from the elections
With the very small exception of the radical left group, all political families left of the conservative EPP lost votes, while all right-of-centre parties gained votes. Contrary to pre-election speculations, there was no breakthrough for the radical right (ECR and ID groups). The big winners were the centre-right parties, particularly the party family of Von der Leyen, who will most likely be the next Commission President. The Green parties suffered significant losses. As a result, the EPP party is now in a more comfortable position to choose between left and right partners for the upcoming parliamentary work.
Lessons for European left parties
It is not easy to do justice to the radical left parties when summarising the results of EP elections, but some results seem to stand: the biggest surprise winner is the Finnish Left Party with 17%. It seems that a pragmatic political style helps. Internally, a program was presented for a social-ecological transformation towards a climate-friendly economy based on social policies and good jobs. In terms of international relations, they oppose the attacks of Russian and Israeli armies, support Palestine and are in favour of weapon exports to Ukraine as well as an acceptance of NATO accession. The same policies were pursued by the equally successful Swedish left party.
One hard lesson for all parties is that the left suffers when it splits, as evidenced by Germany, Greece and Spain. The German Die Linke suffered heavily after a year of preparation of its conservative part (around Wagenknecht, Sevim Dagdelen) to split away and build a new party called after their leader (and former Die Linke Parliamentarian) “Bündnis Sarah Wagenknecht”. The political direction of this new party so far seems to be socio-politically right (work ethics, against “criminal foreigners”, against gender identity changes, nothing on climate policy (see her recent interview in NLR)) and economically right-wing social democracy (praising “our” small and medium enterprises, EU as international space for cooperation between “national democracies”). The dramatic loss of Die Link is hence not a European-wide phenomenon but based on specific problems in Germany itself.
Also read: The Lesser Eye-Catching Truth About Far-Right’s Rise in the European Parliament Election
In Spain’s case, the relation between leadership, parties and social movements seems not to have worked properly for Sumar. The right wing turn of Syriza and the split of its left faction have left both diminished. On the other hand, the re-entry of Italian left Parliamentarians show that pragmatic cooperation works.
The great success of LFI in France also seems to be based on a good cooperation between party and its local bases and simultaneously having a rather pragmatic stance towards international relations. Without this, the common “New Popular Front” Program could not, on page six under the header “Defending Ukraine and peace on the European continent, state: “France should “unwaveringly defend the sovereignty and freedom of the Ukrainian people and the integrity of its borders, by delivering the necessary weapons…”.
Having said this, we can’t establish a rule that there is only one way to deal with NATO or weapon support for Ukraine for left forces in the EU. The Workers’ Party of Belgium (PtB/PVDA) had partly very good results, won one additional seat, and had a strict Anti-NATO position. The question of how to engage with Russia’s war in the Ukraine seems to depend also on how close a country is to this theatre of war.
Early national parliamentary elections in France as result of the EP elections
One last issue must be mentioned: although at the surface we just see a continuation of a trend from recent years, with voters turn increasingly to the right, it could be that structural changes are on the horizon. The most dramatic example is the announcement of national election in France by President Emmanuel Macron on the evening of the election in which his party lost nearly half the seats.
The left-of-centre political parties immediately began to build a New Popular Front in which the Social Democrats, LFI, Communists and Greens work together with dozens of other smaller parties. In just a few hours, they managed to write an election manifesto 24 pages long and divide up the constituencies.
On the other side of the political spectrum, we see the self-destruction of the Conservative Party. Its leader wanted to vote for Le Pen’s radical right-wing party. That is why he was removed as party leader.
The daily newspaper Le Figaro has published projections suggesting that only two party-groups might remain in the next parliament: the stronger group around Le Pen’s radical right and the New Popular Front. Conservatives and the remaining Liberals could disappear completely. It is hard to imagine an absolute majority for the radical right on July 7 with their current 30% of votes at the EP elections, but there is a great danger that Macron will gamble away his Vabanque game. We might see a radical right government in a few weeks in the second biggest state of the EU, with access to all government institutions and knowledge of an old imperialistic power.
The European Union Flag. Photo: Pexels
The EP will tend to lean conservative and right-wing. Currently, at the EU level, there is only one left-leaning government with significant impact: Spain. Germany is governed by a highly fiscally conservative government, Italy by a post-fascist and right-wing coalition, and Poland, the largest country in Central Eastern Europe, is also governed by a conservative government.
That means that the new incoming European Commission will reflect these new tendencies and will focus more on security, competitiveness and a more interest-oriented international policy of the EU.
The strategic agenda of the EU
On June 12, the member states received the first “Draft Strategic Agenda 2024-2029” from the Presidency of the Council, the body in which the governments decide the most important EU institution. Until then, only a two pager with bullet points was leaked. The first leaked paper sounded rather extreme in its focus on EU’s international role, competitiveness and lack of any climate conscious policies. The second paper, which is now available to the public, has toned down its real political tone and included some positive policies with which the left can work.
Some good news
After a short introduction, the paper consists of three chapter beginning with ‘A free and democratic Europe’, then discussing ‘A strong and secure Europe’ and ending with ‘A prosperous and competitive Europe’.
The first chapter starts with mentioning human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and last not least respect for human rights. These values would “remain the corner stones of our Union.” It is the third part on a prosperous and competitive Europe which offers most for progressive and left actors. First, it is mentioned that “significant collective investment effort(s)” are needed. That a statement like this is worth being mentioned might sound strange in the ears of non-EU citizens, but in our times the acknowledgement that “collective investment” is needed, hence fiscal mechanisms beyond the national budgets, is indeed a good sign.
On page 7, surprisingly, “green and digital transition” is mentioned, another word for the Green Deal, which has become the centre of attacks from the conservative EPP lately. Here it is mentioned that the EU “will pursue a just and fair climate transition”. Mentioning “just transition” in connection with climate offers space for cooperation between climate movements and trade unions for just climate actions. The final subchapter, “Advancing Together,” is crucial for left-leaning actors. Firstly, the “social dimension” of the single market will be upheld. Secondly, the paper explicitly refers to the “Pillar of Social Rights” as guidance. Thirdly the “social dialogue” shall be strengthened, which means that that trade union rights and their abilities to fight for collective agreements must be strengthened. The current ILO Rights Index shows a dismal status of workers rights in the EU on pages 30-31. Fourthly, the EU sets itself the goal of reducing inequalities, and lastly, the economic, social, and territorial cohesion should aim at upward convergence. All these points offer space for intervention from left-leaning actors.
The not so good news
It is not accidental that the progressive parts of the strategic agenda nearly exclusively aim at the internal market. There is basically nothing in the paper which offers us hope that the governments understand the urgency of the climate emergency and the interconnections with ecology and planetary boundaries. Furthermore, there is nothing positive on international relations. Even considering that the EU is a usual status quo actor and a “party of perseverance” in the international system, the extent of the complacency is astonishing and disheartening.
On page two, a paragraph is dedicated to the general objectives of the EU. If you take a closer look, you realise that it is only about the economy and international relations. The climate catastrophe is mentioned only once and in very abstract wording as a “cleaner future” that would be needed. But the same paragraph gets very specific when mentioning: “We will take the necessary responsibility for our security and defence and become more influential in the world.” That is a clear goodbye to the long-cherished concept of the EU as a soft power. On page three, the EU acknowledges that it believes in the “spirit of entrepreneurship.” Then, unfortunately, a clear signal is sent against any idea that democratic economic planning might help us get out of the crisis. The EU instead says: “Trusting our companies to turn risk into opportunities will spur investments…” This is peak neoliberalism, believing that when we trust companies, they will make the right investment decisions. That does not bode well for the future. The second chapter clearly states that “increased defence spending” will come and that “we will invest substantially more and better together.” We need to remember here that in 2022 the European NATO states together accounted for 13.3% of global military expenditure (Russia 3.9%). Pages 5 and 6 mention the enlargement process towards Eastern countries, including Ukraine, as well as reiterating a migration policy which aims at further closing the borders against migrants.
Competitiveness without competition
Maybe the worst news in this whole concept comes at the end of the paper on page 7. This part needs to be read in conjunction with two other important documents that have been partially published: the “Letta Report” and the “Draghi Report,” both authored by former Italian prime ministers. These reports should guide the new EU Commission in their efforts to create a more competitive EU. The first paragraph is dedicated to the economic growth strategy for the next five years. As mentioned before, the EU wants to have collective investment, but this is hardly possible with the current right-wing and neoliberal governments.
If you don’t want to spend public money for economic development – what else can you do? As already discussed, you can “believe” in companies and you can see spirits, in this case the “spirit of entrepreneurship”. You can also believe that reduction of bureaucratic burden will help.
The EU knows that the US Inflation Reduction Act and China’s public subsidies are formidable adversaries. If there is no public money, then private money shall help. And so, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, stated on April 17, 2024 that the “Capital Markets Union is the best IRA we can develop”. The Capital Markets Union is the attempt to establish a single market for the capital markets of the EU member states. The main idea is to redirect pension savings to the stock market to offer cheap capital for investments as substitute for public money and delivering pensioners to the mercy of “the market”. This is already a massive attack to the rights of workers.
But it is gets even worse as the strategic agenda documents states that the Single Market is “our greatest asset… that enables economies of scale”. This is just another way of saying that the aim is to allow huge mergers across borders, especially in the three sectors – energy, ICT and defence – with the aim to build “European champions” which then could compete with USA and Chinese multinationals.
The growth model of the EU for the next five years would then look like this: realistically no big public investment, therefore the attempt to redirect private savings of workers to the needs of private companies, de-bureaucratisation in times of climate catastrophe, stagnation on new environmental laws and a huge push towards private monopolies.
It is not difficult to imagine how an EU based on these principles would behave internationally. Internally, however, there could be some redistribution towards organised labour, external isolation against migrants, more militarisation and a huge push for big private monopolies for the global market. This is not what a peaceful and cooperative international actor looks like.
There is a lot to do for the broader left in the European Parliament. Maybe the progressive, green and left forces there can learn from their French colleagues and comrades who so brilliantly built the New Popular Front which promises to fight fascism and neoliberalism.
Roland Kulke works for TRANSFORM! Europe – a network of 38 European organisations from 22 countries.
