It is fairly established that state actors alone do not drive foreign policy. Much of Joseph Nye’s work on soft power revolves around the role played by individuals and corporations in geopolitics, and in getting other states to “want what you want”. While the South Korean use of Hallyu or the Korean wave, through k-pop, dramas, beauty and food, provides an excellent modern example of effectively using cultural assets to build this soft power, it is possible to argue that India is currently engaged in the reverse — a depletion of longstanding foreign goodwill due to the disruptive aggression of a series of Hindu nationalist social media influencers, whose primary content focus is stoking anti-Muslim sentiment and fears within India.
While the developments in Bangladesh in the wake of Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, and what this means for Bangladesh’s minorities, remain shrouded in uncertainty, large Indian X (formerly Twitter) accounts have stepped in to circulate information (and a fair bit of misinformation), often with graphic videos of doubtful veracity, about the fate Bangladesh’s minority Hindu population. Some have gone further with outlandish suggestions including that India take military action to protect minorities in Bangladesh. The size and reach of some of these accounts, many with hundreds of thousands of followers each, has meant that people in Bangladesh have both seen these posts and been forced to take steps to counter the narratives being set in India, including with images of students protecting minority places of worship. This back and forth on X between Indian and Bangladeshi accounts runs in stark contrast to the Indian government’s official silence.
Online misinformation wars are now a fairly standard part of any modern political upheaval, but it is of concern here that in the vacuum created by New Delhi’s wait and watch approach, the first Indian position emerging in the Bangladeshi popular perception is being driven by a series of highly aggressive right wing influencers.
This phenomenon has not been limited to Bangladesh. A defining feature of Indian foreign policy in the Narendra Modi years has been a tendency to use it to grandstand for domestic audiences. From a spate of foreign tours designed to showcase Modi’s personal popularity, to the unprecedented publicity blitz while hosting the G-20, foreign policy has been covered by the Indian television media in a manner perhaps better suited to a spectator sport. Some of these large social media accounts have been at the forefront of this push to repackage foreign affairs for a domestic audience, spiced up with a potent mix of conspiracy theories (often Islamophobic) and interpretations designed to showcase rising Indian power in the world.
Also read: Bangladesh Crisis: India’s Silence so far, Implications and View from Dhaka
Indian foreign policy often bears little resemblance to these representations of it. While India was voting for the UNGA resolution demanding a ceasefire in Gaza in December for example, several of these accounts were cheering on the slaughter of Palestinian civilians and circulating Israeli propaganda. Similarly India’s deepening relationship with Iran or any other developments that run counter to the populist anti-Muslim sentiments echoed by these accounts are usually ignored.
In the past, this dichotomy between Indian foreign policy and foreign policy as repackaged for local consumption has not mattered. It has even allowed the Indian ministry of external affairs to carry on with fairly uncontroversial foreign policies and use the drama generated by these accounts to keep their voter base happy. Yet, as these social media accounts have increased in reach and in overseas visibility, it has become harder to reconcile their aggressive (and often misinformation driven) approach with coherent foreign policy aims. And as their views are increasingly read and circulated outside India, they have slowly moved into being foreign policy actors in their own right.
In January, for example, a fairly innocuous post by Modi, promoting the Indian islands of Lakshadweep as a tourist spot, sparked an online spat with the Maldives that quickly escalated into a full blown diplomatic row. While Modi made no reference to the Maldives, a prominent Indian account that tweets under the name “Mr Sinha” and describes itself as a “political commentator” lauded it and referenced its impact on the Maldives, which he called a “Chinese puppet”. Three Maldivian ministers meanwhile, reportedly close to President Muizzu, responded to Modi’s post making disparaging statements about the prime minister and Indians in general. In the context of Muizzu’s then upcoming trip to China, it was quite a possibly a move calculated to provoke and shore up anti-Indian sentiments within the Maldives. And it worked. While the Muizzu government officially distanced itself from the remarks, in the storm that followed, with Indian and Maldivian social media accounts lobbing insults at one another, and calls for a boycott of the Maldives in India, this once calm relationship has deteriorated dramatically.
Also read: After Social Media Controversy, Maldives ‘Suspends’ 3 Ministers for Derogatory Tweets on Indian PM
As Indians have since shunned the Maldives as a tourist destination (as per the monthly statistics released by the Maldivian ministry of tourism, the first six months of 2024 show a 42% drop in the number of Indian tourists as compared to the same period in 2023), the gap has been filled by tourists from China (the number of Chinese visitors to the Maldives in the same period has nearly doubled). The calls for boycott therefore, while not seriously impacting the economy of the Maldives, have served to further decrease the relevance of India to the Maldives. It is difficult to estimate to what degree the Indian MEA supports these developments but it is fairly clear that aggressive online name calling has not helped navigate an already complicated relationship.
The reactions to the ongoing Israeli actions in Gaza offer another example of this growing dichotomy. While the official Indian position under the BJP is slightly more Israel leaning than it used to be under other governments, the position on Palestine has not changed as significantly as these online influencers would have one believe. Despite pressure from Israel, India does not recognise Hamas as terrorist organisation, and the ministry has sidestepped questions on this in parliament. This fairly studied position is in stark contrast to the virulent pro-Israel push by Hindu nationalist accounts which, since October 2023, have been at the forefront of pushing Israel friendly misinformation, and proudly declaring their support for the state of Israel which they see as a model to emulate. More troublingly, these accounts are often seen celebrating Palestinian civilian slaughter.
While there is nothing official about these accounts (at least on the face of it), it is undeniable that the positions driven by these accounts today shape perceptions of India and Indians in the global public imagination. Especially across the Arab world, this is rapidly eroding the goodwill of earlier generations that associated Indians with the occasional Bollywood film, and a vaguely post-colonial foreign policy. Some will still argue that these public opinions do not seriously impact India’s policy interests that are negotiated state to state, but as we have seen with the case of the Maldives, a negative public opinion once formed, makes it far harder for even the pro-India elements within the country to make their case for closer relations with India. As we begin to lose the global public, is not surprising that some of our most comfortable overseas relationships are now with authoritarian states, who are not answerable to their own public. This leaves us in the unenviable position of fearing, rather than cheering, the strengthening of democracy in our immediate neighbourhood and the world.
Sarayu Pani is a former lawyer and posts on X @sarayupani.
