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India's Proposed No-Fly Zones for Drones Will Do More Harm than Good

Devendra Damle and Shubho Roy
Mar 23, 2018
No advanced country in the world places a complete ban on drone use based merely on geography.

India’s draft guidelines for the regulation of civil drones was released recently by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). While the DGCA should be commended for opting for public consultation, it is clear that it has not conducted an assessment of the potential impact of the regulations against the projected benefits.

In particular, the impact of one provision in the rules –  clause 12.21 e) – which establishes a no-fly zone in all areas within 50 km of India’s land border may be short-sighted.

The clause states:

“12.21 No RPA shall be flown:
e) Within 50 km from international border which includes Line of Control (LoC), Line of Actual Control (LAC) and Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL)” [The draft guidelines refer to drones as “Remotely Piloted Aircraft” (RPA)].

In other jurisdictions, regulations like this go through a detailed cost-benefit analysis. Sadly, this was not done in India. What is the estimated effect of this regulation? The usage of geospatial analysis gives us a good starting point estimate.

Impact of the no-fly zone

It is difficult to predict the impact of any new technology. Before the internet, mobile phones or GPS became ubiquitous, it would have been impossible to predict all the innovative ways they would change human life. Similarly, drones are a disruptive innovation that may have a profound impact on us. In our analysis, we examine three sectors in which drones are already changing established processes or hold great promise to do so. One, ‘general services’ to the population. Two, agriculture. And three, infrastructure monitoring.

Drones can be especially effective in delivering goods and services in border areas, which are typically characterised by low connectivity. For example, to deliver blood and medicines to hospitals in remote areas. In urban areas, drones can be used for governance. In Gurgaon, for example, drones are being used to conduct land-use surveys, for assessing property tax, checking encroachments and urban planning.

Drones hold promise to change agriculture. In Karnataka and Haryana, drones are going to be deployed for spraying pesticides on crops. In Maharashtra and Gujarat, they are being used for expediting agricultural insurance payments.

India’s growing infrastructure will require require regular maintenance. Drones can be used for inspection and monitoring of infrastructure projects. Gas Authority of India Ltd. is using drones to inspect sections of gas pipelines that pass through difficult terrain. The Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, recently suggested using drones to monitor rural road construction projects and to keep illegal mining in check.

Methodological issues

How do we measure the impact of a no-fly zone? Our approach starts by first mapping the 50 km no-fly zone using geospatial analysis. Then, we estimate the agricultural area, operational landholdings and agricultural workers inside the no-fly zone.

Similarly, we estimate the total population, urban areas and infrastructure (such as roads, bridges, railway stations) lying in no-fly zone. We make three estimates: optimistic, pessimistic and realistic. Each estimate assumes a different level of impact because of the no-fly zone.

The area covered under the drone ban.

More than a quarter of India’s districts (168 out of 640) across 18 states fall at least partially within the 50 km no-fly zone. In more than 10% of India’s districts (65 out of 640), the no-fly zone covers more than 90% of their land area. Of these, 39 districts fall completely inside the no-fly zone.

This area houses 8-10% of the total population of India. It will impact between 6-9% of all farmers in India. The total affected population in the pessimistic scenario (141.27 million) is greater than the total population of the 75 largest cities in India put together (140.33 million). Jammu and Kashmir (20 out of 23) and Assam (20 out of 27) have the highest number of affected districts, followed by Uttar Pradesh (15 out of 71) and Bihar (14 out of 38). In terms of percentage of total number of districts affected, Mizoram, Sikkim and Tripura are at the top, at 100%. This means that every single district in these states is at least partially in the no-fly zone. These three states are followed by Jammu and Kashmir (91%), Manipur (89%) and Meghalaya (86%).

In terms of percentage of total land area covered, the ban disproportionately affects the northeastern states. Sikkim and Tripura are entirely covered by the no-fly zone. The no-fly zone covers 86% of the land area in Mizoram, more than 60% in Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya, and more than 50% in Nagaland. These are all small states, which one would expect to have high coverage, but some of the larger states are also heavily affected. The no-fly zone covers nearly 44% of the total area of West Bengal, nearly 39% of Bihar and nearly 33% of Punjab.

While a large chunk of the population affected by the no-fly zone will be from rural areas and small towns, some large cities will be affected as well. In all, 3,127 km of canals, 70,829 km of roads, 550 railway stations and 3,349 bridges cannot be monitored using drones because of the ban.

Thirteen cities, like Amritsar and Jammu, and four state capitals fall inside the no-fly zone. With such large areas affected by the proposed ban, it becomes necessary to ponder the costs and benefits of such a blanket ban.

Drawbacks of blanket bans

These draft regulations will exclude a substantial part of India’s population from the benefits of drone technology. For the government, a blanket ban seems attractive because it (apparently) requires the least amount of state capacity to enforce. In the case of the no-fly zone, all the government has to do is penalise any person flying drones in the no-fly zone. The government also does not have to invest in setting up offices and systems to license and monitor use. However, blanket bans are also the most expensive form of regulatory intervention. They do not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate activity, and treat both the same way. In doing so, blanket bans impose huge costs on those they regulate.

India’s economic history is peppered with instances where blanket bans were imposed, only to later realise they were hampering economic development. Banning entry of foreign investors, financial derivatives, and private participation in banking and insurance are a few notable examples. Thankfully, the country has begun to undo them gradually, but the damage has already been done.

In some cases, India has not taken the ban approach. India did not ban mobile phones and internet near the border. Instead, in many border areas, the government has worked harder to provide last-mile internet and mobile connectivity. While mobile phones and internet also pose national security concerns, the country did not choose to go down the banning route for them.

Similarly, for drones, we might need a more nuanced approach to regulation that tries to balance national security with the legitimate needs of residents in the no-fly zone. For example, even today, farmers in Punjab are allowed to grow crops in no-mans-land, beyond the border fence with Pakistan. The security concerns there are addressed by security checks rather than a complete ban on farming. Farmers in ten districts of Punjab (situated well away from the same border) will be unable to use drones for agriculture. In Punjab, a state which already suffers from overuse of pesticides, drones can decrease their use by only spraying affected crops. The security concerns, like in the case of farming in no-mans land, can be met with monitored use.

This particular blanket ban also ignores India’s border policy. Thirty-three districts (in Uttarakhand, UP, Bihar and Sikkim) are near the Nepal border (but not China). Similarly, 12 districts in Assam are near the Bhutan border (but not China or Bangladesh). India has good relations and an open border policy with both these are nations. The ban in these districts demonstrates a lack of risk-based regulatory approach.

No advanced country in the world places a complete ban on drone use based merely on geography. The US, Canada, New Zealand and the UK all have some restrictions on flying commercial and recreational drones in certain notified areas, but none of them place a complete ban on flying them anywhere in the country. Commonly, flying drones close to airports is usually not permitted, or is heavily restricted. However, all these countries provide an exception for pilots who take prior permission from the government. The US does not ban flying drones near any of its borders, despite its border with Mexico being considered sensitive. Significantly, the US and New Zealand do not place a complete restriction on flying drones even near military bases and other sensitive facilities. The US only bans recreational drones 15 miles of Washington DC and within a certain distance of the President of USA (commercial drones are not under a blanket ban).

We have argued before that India needs a regulatory framework for drones. The advent of any new, disruptive technology creates tension between the freedom of people (to use to it, to improve their lives) and national-security concerns. Building state capacity is hard, and building it close to borders is harder. However, bans cannot be a substitute for it. In the case of civilian drones in border areas, closer monitoring, cooperation with border forces, involvement of local authorities, and higher security clearances are some alternative approaches that could better balance the tension. Our drone regulations need to create this balance.

Devendra Damle and Shubho Roy are researchers at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi. A more detailed version of the this article was published on Ajay Shah’s blog here. The authors thank Shekhar Harikumar for valuable inputs.

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