The early weeks of 2024 have cast a chilling shadow reminiscent of the Nazi era in Germany, sending shockwaves through the traditional political establishment. The Corrective‘s investigative report has exposed a secret meeting held by the far-right political party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Attended by AfD politicians, members of the main opposition party (Christian Democratic Union of Germany or CDU), and influential business leaders, the gathering discussed a unsettling proposal: the mass deportation of individuals with immigration backgrounds or non-German heritage, a notion that starkly echoes the repugnant Nazi ideology of racial purity.
As AfD continues to consistently secure high polling numbers across Germany, it emerges as a formidable force, poised to become the second-largest party. In contrast to the prevailing belief that AfD’s appeal is primarily confined to East German states, formerly the German Democratic Republic, the party has not only thrived but has achieved substantial electoral success in prosperous states such as Hessen and Bavaria in West Germany. This broadening of influence serves as a significant departure from preconceived notions surrounding regional voting patterns and underscores the party’s ability to resonate across diverse geographical and demographic landscapes. AfD’s electoral success challenges the oversimplified claim that economic distress is the sole driving factor behind the rise of far-right populism. The party’s appeal extends beyond economic concerns, emphasising a more complex and nuanced set of factors contributing to its widespread support.
Michael Miebach, a speechwriter at the German Federal Chancellery, perceptively observes, “AfD is evolving into a people’s party.” They have mastered the art of tapping into people’s emotions and leveraging it to their advantage. Their organised cadre network passionately supports their political agenda, providing a grassroots presence that mainstream ruling parties like the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) lack, particularly in East Germany. Miebach points out, “Are you on TikTok? Consider AfD’s message—it is simple, straightforward, and emotionally resonant. In contrast, our (SPD) messages are laden with complexity, filled with difficult terminology and big words.”
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As Miebach and our group of policy students from the Brandt School engaged in this hotly debated topic in Berlin, just 700 metres from Germany’s seat of power, large-scale demonstrations are being held in major cities, opposing AfD. Academics like Cas Mudde echo this sentiment, stating on X (formerly Twitter), “the far right is not ‘the people’!”
Thorsten Frei, an MP from the CDU, adds a nuanced perspective, cautioning against dismissing the high polling numbers of parties like the AfD. He asserts, “If a party like the AfD polls so high, there must be reasons. There’s no point in insulting voters.” Frei’s statement underscores the importance of understanding the underlying reasons behind the rise of far-right parties, urging a more thoughtful examination rather than a dismissive approach that non-populist often take and belittle the concerns of a significant portion of the electorate.
The rise of far-right politics is not confined to Germany alone; it reverberates across Europe and beyond. From the recent triumph of anti-Islamist populist Geert Wilders in the Netherlands to the fractured mandate in Spain, and return of Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia, far-right populism is no longer a shocking revelation like Brexit was. It is a geopolitical reality. It finds resonance in India, home to the world’s largest population and democracy. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), reigning since 2014 and touting itself as the world’s largest political organisation, persistently positions itself as the voice and representative of “the people”.
Who is “the people,” really?
Far-right populism, whether in Germany or India, constructs its narrative of “the people” by perpetuating an “alternative reality” that traditional political elites have long denied. This elite class is embodied by established politicians and political parties, who, according to far-right narratives, have neglected the concerns and aspirations of the common citizen. Consequently, an unambiguous division is drawn between “the people” and “the elite,” with the latter positioned as the perceived adversary in this ideological struggle.
On January 22, 2024, India found itself at a crucial juncture, witnessing the culmination of a far-right movement that traces its roots back to the fervent call to demolish the Babri Mosque decades ago. The BJP-led governments’ messaging, echoing Miebach’s observation about the AfD, simplifies the nation’s identity by presenting it as a collective of Ram devotees – hence Hindu, framing BJP supporters as the liberators of Hindus from 500 years of perceived oppression.
However, upon examining the voter data from India’s 2019 and 2014 general elections, a pattern emerges. The BJP, with its claim of representing “the people”, garnered substantial support, but the question remains – is this truly reflective of the diverse ideologies and voting patterns within the Indian population? The “non-far-right”, though not as well-organised, find themselves ensnared in the same illusion propagated by far-right propaganda – the fallacious notion that all people constitute a monolithic, homogeneous entity. Their lack of consolidated mobilisation and the absence of a unified message contribute to their inability to counter the far-right narrative effectively.
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The non-far-right citizens and parties, despite their inherent diversity grapples with the challenge of presenting a cohesive front compared to the well-structured far-right movements. Trapped in the same narrative crafted by far-right propaganda, they inadvertently contribute to the perpetuation of the misconception that the population is a homogenous whole, devoid of divergent political ideologies and voting patterns. This shared illusion is further exacerbated by the non-far-right’s tendency to refrain from consolidated voting, a phenomenon stemming from their limited mobilisation efforts.
A notable illustration of this struggle is evident in the opposition parties like the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in New Delhi and the Congress-led state government in Himachal Pradesh. Here, we witness a pattern of mirroring the BJP’s actions, such as declaring a half-working day for government employees, following the BJP’s lead.
Examining historical instances reveals a lack of ideological consistency among opposition leaders. For instance, Kamal Nath, a seasoned Congress leader and former chief minister eyeing victory in the 2023 state election in Madhya Pradesh, adopted BJP’s Hindu rashtra rhetoric, a move indicative of a willingness to align with opposing ideologies for political gains. Similarly, in neighbouring Chhattisgarh, the Congress government strategically employed religious rhetoric akin to the BJP, appealing to the Hindu vote.
This inconsistency in ideological stances within the “non-far-right” is not confined to regional politics but extends to the broader national landscape. The inability to forge a unified narrative and present a clear alternative to the far-right further contributes to the challenges faced by the “non-far-right” populace. As the far-right propagates a simplified and emotionally resonant message, the lack of coordination and a shared vision among the “non-far-right” strengthens the far-right’s illusion of representing the entirety of “the people”.
Pius Fozan is a public policy student at Central European University and the Brandt School.
