Media seldom informs of Maoist casualties other than the tally of their dead in encounters in the jungles of Chhattisgarh. Curiously, Maoists only die; they don’t seem to get injured, surrender at the site or get captured in operations.
The narrative usually has it that on receiving information, security forces deploy. Pursuant to a firefight in the jungles, that results in minimal casualty figures on the security forces side, over a couple of dozen Maoists perish.
It doesn’t take experience in jungle bashing to spot, but even an armchair strategist or media commentator ought to know that those undertaking operations are not all marksmen, invariably killing all those targeted.
It’s reasonable to assume that not all shots fired result in kills, but may instead, injure. An Adivasi fighter at the recipient end of bullets would more likely be placed out of action, hors de combat.
There is no indication yet that Adivasi fighters are imbued with a fidayeen mentality or are sworn to die in combat, like the Tamil Tigers.
It’s possible that the Maoist leadership, with a price on their heads and their immediate troop of loyal bodyguards, might put up a ‘last man, last round’ stand. But such encounters are not routine and senior Maoists are also known to surrender.
So, how is it so consistently that there are no reports of injured fighters being captured and evacuated? How is it that there are no surrenderees reported in the aftermath of such encounters?
If it were the case that injured Adivasi fighters are taken care of humanely, one would expect a mention in the media, given that it shows the benign face of the state and is good counter-insurgency practice.
It makes tactical sense to entice surrenders and incentivise a less fearsome last stand by Maoist, one liable to exact a higher price in security force casualties.
True, there are several reports on surrenders, including en masse, even if some are stage managed for propaganda value – all par for the course in counter insurgency.
Usually some insurgents survive the firefight, either unable to carry on the fight due to being wounded or sufficiently conditioned by the cordite to give themselves up. It’s possible that some of those wounded are carted away by compatriots, but casualty figures of over a score on their side suggest that such a display of camaraderie is fraught.
Per Amit Shah in parliament, ‘380 Naxals have been killed within a span of one year in Chhattisgarh since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government came to power in the state in December 2023.’
To put it mildly, that is a somewhat high casualty figure for a somewhat desultory insurgency. It would be concerning if injured Adivasis are subsumed in this figure.
This begs the question: Are security forces departing from the straight and narrow?
The straight and narrow
It can be argued that International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is not the applicable body of law as the case in central India is not one of armed conflict.
To be sure there is an insurgency on, but for applicability of IHL, the situation in central India has never met the two thresholds: that of intensity and the armed groups as ‘party to the conflict.’
Even so, there is Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, on ‘conflicts not of an international character’. India is a signatory of the Conventions and it is reproduced in domestic law. Common Article 3 reads:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities…and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by… wounds, detention… shall in all circumstances be treated humanely….
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,…
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions…(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
Irrespective of the applicability of treaty law, there is customary humanitarian law to be cognisant of. These mandatory observances,
apply to all civilians in the power of a party to the conflict and who do not take a direct part in hostilities, as well as to all persons who are hors de combat… these fundamental guarantees are overarching rules that apply to all persons….
These structures are non-derogable, applicable even in time of ‘emergency’ – a situation threatening the life of a nation. They are also applicable non-reciprocally.
India is sworn to align domestic law with IHL, with Common Article 1 stating: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.’
Domestic law, the relevant body of law, covers both murder and human rights, neither of which is permissive of elimination of insurgents when they no longer pose an armed threat.
Consequently, the curious case of absence of injured and captured insurgents from statistics emerging from Central India calls out for accountability.
Pressures of performance skewing the act?
At the structural level, there is the apparent hurry with which the operations are sought to be wound up.
Union home minister Amit Shah has ordained, “I say it in this House with a responsibility that Naxalism in this country will be eliminated by March 21, 2026.”
There are no national and state assembly elections about then, that may make the deadline loom large.
In a recent interview, Shah clarified where the date apparently sprung from, saying, “Confidence by itself doesn’t eliminate Naxalism. I made the statement based on the work already done.”
He elaborates on the ‘work already done’ along four lines of a ‘clear, hold, build’ strategy: energising operations; ink blot expansion of secure areas; strangling the funding; and shift to development.
Apparently, the trendline from the four prongs operating simultaneously culminates at the end of March next year.
At the operational level possible pressures stem from the first prong of strategy, which in Shah’s words is: “…take ruthless action on those who had picked up guns and were responsible for the violence. We employed maximum force.”
The verbiage is reminiscent of a general in Kashmir when figures for those surrendering in operations was near zero in 2018 and early 2019.
It’s also questionable if ‘maximum force’ is doctrinally compliant, in which the terms usually used are ‘minimum necessary’ or ‘optimum’ application of force.
It is true that under influence of the Americans and Israelis, Indian doctrine has ‘advanced’ beyond earlier limitations on use of force. What escapes such a perspective is that the two militaries were not fighting their own citizens.
Amit Shah, in parliament, put New India’s new doctrine rather colourfully, “We shoot them between the eyes as soon as we spot them.” Marksmanship appears to have improved lately, while discrimination and the duty of precaution appear to have been scuttled.
At the tactical level, counter-intuitively, there appears to be little reason to be gung-ho.
Security forces have benefited from a technology and equipment upgrade, including weapons with area effects and drones. In contrast, photos of weapons recovered from sites of firefights show weapons in Maoist possession as abysmal.
Despite the asymmetry, there is no case that security forces need to imperil themselves in eking out armed fighters from the bush when they can well pulverise it.
By all means security forces must prevail and exercise caution against incurring casualties. Casualty figures in low single digits in each such otherwise massive encounter shows security forces need no reminding on this score.
However, it is impossible to visualise that there are no Adivasi hors de combat at such sites.
Finally, are the structural factors – doctrine and its imbibing in training.
The missing link between the law and operational conduct is doctrine. There is no known counter-insurgency doctrine that the central armed police and state police forces involved subscribe to.
The N.N. Vohra task force on internal security, as part of the post Kargil reforms, recommended the increased engagement of the central armed police forces in counter insurgency.
The central police forces got an opportunity right away with the Red Corridor exaggerated by former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as the primary national security threat.
The army opted to stay out when the incidence of violence was higher. I had made the case that it is an infantry man’s job and the army must take it on, fearing that the learning curve of the substitute, central police forces, would be at the cost of human rights – quite like that of the Rashtriya Rifles in Kashmir.
Clearly, there are miles to go.
Adhering to doctrine would have obviated critical commentary, such as how the cash incentive for kills is skewing the body count. It appears the army gave up the practice, a best practice the men in khaki would do well to follow.
The perceived lack in ethical operational conduct could also be due to the heavy lifting being done by locals. Given a loose rope, they keep the ‘kills’ counter ticking. This owes to a structural weakness in leadership, wherein higher order commanders – from an elite service – are seldom on the frontline.
Even if there is pressure to show ‘results’ and ‘kills’, as is usually the case for institutional and personal reasons, there is no excuse for a ‘no quarter given’ approach.
Any illegal orders to the effect – ‘take no prisoners’ – is not merely a violation of IHL, but is chargeable as murder in individual cases and as an international crime: crimes against humanity.
Training company commander in my time at the Military Academy, Basant Ponwar, who trained generations of state police men at the Chhattisgarh battle school, is hardly likely to have given such instruction.
Nor would my commando instructor and regimental legend, Santosh Kurup, be instilling in Maharashtra police commandos training under his supervision any such notion.
However, since nothing succeeds like success quantified, there is little close scrutiny of what’s going on and wrong.
The price of liberty, vigilance
The leadership chain, which, under the doctrine of command responsibility extends right up to Shah, needs reminding that unrestrained tactics leave behind ugly human rights scars and a helpful trail for future transitional justice.
It is obvious from Shah’s lauding of the District Reserve Guards that locals are at the forefront of operations. What this is doing to Adivasis as a people is easy to reckon.
Recall the manner the Ikhwans were used against the Kashmiri militancy. At least there the rationale of a proxy war and higher intensity operations held true.
An accounting will loom larger when Adivasi lands continue to be handed over progressively to corporates – which incidentally may well be Shah’s unstated compulsion.
Even if as a Shah-appeasing headline has it, the State is ‘Winning the War’, why it is being fought and how it is being ‘won’ must exercise minds.
Today it’s the hapless Adivasis, tomorrow it could be anyone’s turn for the attention of security forces with a heightened, if false, sense of impunity, accomplishment and proficiency.
Ali Ahmed is a strategic analyst. This post first appeared on the author’s Substack and has been lightly edited for style.
