Has the military leadership been instructed by its political master to hold back for longer?

Two political facets are currently at play in Manipur. The first is majoritarian incest, between the local and the national. The second is the marginalisation of the military in a sphere of its professional mandate and competence. Taken together, they forecast a national disaster ahead.

The speech made by Gen Manoj Pande in Pune recently had the vehemence and also higher order material way above the Army Chief’s mandate. This should have been covered by a political leader or a senior diplomat, or perhaps by Dr. Jaishankar himself, whose identity is conflicted between the two.

The government's strategy is to bring China around to accept India as an independent pole, even if it is a China-influenced world order. It has deployed military, economic and diplomatic instruments towards this end.

Some roles must be explicated or distinctly enhanced. A uniform chain of command can ensure directness and simplicity.

Important military developments, both within India and in the neighbourhood, as well as several military reforms took place during his tenure, all of which must be seen in totality to understand how history will remember India's first chief of defence staff.

Mosques in Srinagar have broadcast appeals to defend the minorities and Kashmiri leaders have voiced their protest at the terrorist killings but what the Kashmiris say is never enough for those who seek to blame them for the violence.

It is not clear how the front-specific theatre concept acquired traction and stole a march over the option of joint commands with a sub-front geographical spread, which are more beneficial.

The deployment of the 8 Mountain Division, in spite of the other reserve formation being on hand, has had implications not just in casualties but also in the mobilisation of the Indian military's current day integrated battle groups meant for quick response tasks.

A review of Happymon Jacob's book 'Line of Fire'.

A review of Happymon Jacob's book 'Line of Fire'.

On the tenth anniversary of 26/11, India does not appear any safer.

In what is now an election year, Modi knows he needs to focus on the domestic and can do without the distraction of a border crisis, especially with a superior foe.

Army chief Bipin Rawat may have benefitted from the 'invisible hands', but he should take a strong stance on keeping the army free from ideological penetration.

If the uncertainty injected into Indo-Pak relations makes war plausible, and conflict strategy risks being contaminated by ideological biases embedded in the Modi-Doval security doctrine, then an apolitical military cannot be seen as buying into the party line.

Brushing things under the carpet to preserve the rhetoric of heroism does nothing for the army's morale, as Lt Gen Hooda has shown.

While the hijack of grand strategy by the intelligence community is amply evident, what is not clear is whether this is the product of the rise of majoritarian political forces or a logical extension of the state's existing predisposition towards relying on its intelligence arm.