While Rahul Gandhi is being hounded for inquiring after the relationship of Narendra Modi with Gautam Adani, the regime wishes to also silence him for another reason. He recently set the cat among the pigeons, bringing up the ‘C’ word on China: ‘Cowardice!’
A regime boasting a 56” chest has had to reassert its masculinity. Its spin master, S. Jaishankar, had done a hit-wicket with his egregious contribution to strategy – that would’ve drawn a frown from his strategist father – with his ‘small economies don’t fight big economies’ theory. The damage resulting needed to be rectified.
It has trotted out the Army Chief, General Manoj Pande, four times since to stall the breach.
The first of two choreographed interviews was with a regime favourite, who – though son of a military strategist – maintained twice over that ‘the nature of war has changed’. The latter two were appearances of the Chief at invited talks.
The Chief’s landmark take on China
The latest of the four was a landmark talk on China. Strangely, the Army Chief pitched the talk at the political level, which ordinarily should have been covered by a political leader or a senior diplomat, or perhaps by Jaishankar himself, whose identity is conflicted between the two.
It is not self-evident how these topics fall within an Army Chief’s brief: ‘predatory economics, weaponising resource supply chains, financing large infrastructure projects with little consideration for environmental and safety standards, burdening countries with unsustainable debt, IPR theft, stealing trade secrets and technology from foreign companies and unfair trade practices.’
The General waited 35 minutes to take to the podium for his 40-minute talk. It took the Chief some 15 minutes to get to content that can be – expansively viewed – taken as in the Army’s remit; getting to the strategic meat at the 25th minute; and taking another 12 minutes to get to military specifics, with its four minutes so wrapped up in jargon as to be abstruse.
For the vehemence and higher order material way above the Chief’s pay bracket and outside his mandate, the National Security Adviser could have been considered, but that he was not deployed shows an avoidance. It is true, however, that though a Special Representative, Doval is out of his depth – restricted as his domain expertise is to intelligence and its murky underworld.
The Army Chief is a better bet to fire-off trenchant criticism of China – mostly echoing the Western narrative on China’s rise and nefarious intent.
So what’s keeping the regime?
This abdication of responsibility to take up what is essentially a political task by the political leadership shows that Rahul Gandhi was right. If the political leadership needs the Army Chief to give voice to its sentiments and thought, what prevents it from doing so itself?
The ‘cowardice’ is in an inability and unwillingness to take ownership of policy assumptions on China given out by the Army Chief. By implication, the follow-on policy would be of a certain kind, which the government would be loath to be held to.
The assumption that India as an independent pole in the international order would be able to withstand China’s rise is untenable, since India with its authoritarian turn has lost its way to any such pole position. The economic promise of a capitalism-governance fusion in the Modani model taking off has also rudely come apart.
For the Chief to have it that India is a leader of the South only shows him taking a recent preliminary G20 conference, Voice of the Global South, rather too seriously.
What is clear is that, properly, this is not the Army Chief’s territory. So, is this an Army Chief push for a particular policy direction? Is this an Army Chief held hostage by an anti-China lobby? Is the Army Chief just an unwitting obedient camp follower or is he a willing participant?
Or is this a stratagem on part of the regime to show China India’s policy choices, so that China is suitably conditioned in changing its policy of subordinating India for its rise? Is it pleading on India’s part with China to allow it space in Asia and South Asia?
Using the Army Chief for making such a strong case helps with plausible deniability of sorts. The government cannot be held to the implicit messaging, allowing it to step back and away if needed.
Not to forget, trial balloons also serve the purpose for domestic kite-flying.
The Chief in his lair
The Chief made his military-relevant case generally along the lines: wars are not quite history; nations indulge their hard power for raison d’état; wars could last long; technology is a great leveller; Atmanirbharta is the need of the hour; and the Agnipath scheme is a game-changer.
Given the absence of a national strategy document – evidence of competence levels of the national security establishment nine years into Ajit Doval’s overlordship – Pande cannot be faulted for using the opportunity for some bureaucratic politics.
Not waiting for either the national security doctrine or a follow-on joint doctrine (though the elapsed five years since its second iteration meriting an update), the Air Force unilaterally updated its doctrine, ten years to the date. Since there is also vocal strategic advocacy for looking to the seas for coping with the China challenge, the Army has had to stake out its Himalayan turf – with the Chief slyly torpedoing the Navy in his reference to the Moskva taken down with low-cost munitions.
Photo: Public domain
Interestingly, the Chief in his elaboration of the regime’s China policy assumptions does not refer to two significant points he made elsewhere (which on account of their salience could reasonably have figured in his China talk): the first on the strategic deterrent and the second on conflict resolution.
His cryptic reference – since unelaborated – to the strategic deterrent at the technology seminar was put forth as, “It is important to recognise that infirmities in border management can lead to wider conflict. Therefore, the first imperative that comes across is that ‘possession of strategic deterrence instruments is essential’.” The term ‘full spectrum conflict’ (a derivative from the Pakistani term Full Spectrum Deterrence) can only include nuclear conflict.
The second is his mention of ‘conflict resolution’. He said, “It is only through dialogue and talking to each other that we can find resolution.” While this would not be out of place for a peace studies professor to declaim, an Army Chief pushing for talks as the preferred strategy is to throw in the towel.
The Chief outlined India’s strategy as being settlement of the remaining friction points through talks, while in the interim keeping up troops deployed and at a high level of alert. It is only correct to give talks a fair chance and keep our muscle honed, in the interim.
This presumably presupposes that should talks not make a dent, then India has other options. Apparently, some 20 rounds of talks at the military and diplomatic levels over three years don’t suffice. Amazingly, the Chief has ruled out the military option, even as a notional threat-in-being to influence further rounds of talks.
Taking the two together – readiness of the strategic deterrent and conflict resolution – indicates the usual reticence of professional militaries countenancing war. The Indian military is playing its advisory role in highlighting that wars escalate, making the strategic deterrent loom larger. Consequently, it makes sense to settle matters without resort to war through conflict resolution.
This contradicts the lesson learnt suggested by the Chief – that wars are pursued in the national interest.
Even if an unsettled border might provide a spark, the house need not burn down in a border war. It is easier to keep a war limited, since the site of the fighting allows for this. The Army is well versed with Limited War theory, which presumably is also well war-gamed.
Indeed, the Cold Start doctrine it had put out in wake of Operation Parakram, building on the lessons of both the Kargil War and Parakram, was Limited War theory compliant. It had taken care not to modulate its offensive so as not to offer any nuclear provocation to Pakistan.
Consequently, there is no call for the Army Chief to pronounce that there is ‘only’ one way for conflict resolution: dialogue. Leave such language to leftist intellectuals, peace activists and writers as this one in the Asokan tradition.
That similar homilies (‘Not an era for war!’) were mouthed by the prime minister on the Ukraine War shows that India continues to be uncomfortable with accepting ownership of the use of force. It remains strategically inept.
Red-flagging for the Chief
This begs the question, why is the Chief weighing in on the side of prudence by overcautiously putting his eggs in a negotiator’s basket? Is the regime using him doubly – to back-up its spin master Jaishankar’s skittishness? Is the regime using the Chief to cover up its pusillanimity, fully on display at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s meet of National Security Advisers at which Doval brought up ‘territorial integrity’?
The Chief needs cautioning that the regime could use advice publicly transmitted by him to claim that this is what holds it back from asking him to militarily deliver up an end-state restoring Indian territory.
The Chief might merely be voicing elements of policy but is opening himself to being double-crossed – with the policy being laid at the military’s door. After all, the nation still does not know why Fire and Fury Corps held back, even if surprised by the Chinese. Was the Northern Command reined in or did it lack ‘go and gumption’ in the first place?
The only redeeming thing about the Chief’s conflict resolution push is if it turns out to be strategic deception at a grand scale, lulling the Chinese while the military quietly turns the table at Depsang and Demchok.
But that is not going to happen in election year. Not only is India hosting two multilateral summits in its national capital, but the capriciousness of war cannot be allowed to interrupt Narendra Modi’s run up to a hattrick in national elections.
Penultimately, the Chief needs being made wary of being used as the stalking horse on Atmanirbharta. The Modani controversy shows a proportion of the thrust for indigenisation comes from profits to accrue to the regime’s cronies. The now defunct windfall from Rafale for Ambani Jr. is a salutary case. Indeed, there is concern wherefrom Rs 20,000 crore were used to underwrite the Adanis, Sr. and Jr.
Finally, the preparation of Agniveers for corporate security duties post-release by when capitalism will be in a hyper riot in Modi’s third term – plus as potential recruits as right-wing storm troopers – shows up agendas the professionally-oriented Chief is unwary of. An uncritical ‘positivity’ needs to cease.
The Army Chief’s talk has had the plus point of allowing him feedback. It should make him more possessive of his broad shoulders here on.
Ali Ahmed is a strategic analyst and this article is an abridged version of a post on his Substack.
