In a shock move on October 26, President Maithripala Sirisena of Sri Lanka dismissed the prime minister of the country, Ranil Wickremesinghe, and appointed in his place a former nemesis – Mahinda Rajapaksa.
Two weeks later, President Sirisena dismissed the parliament and announced new elections early next year.
Both moves are in violation of the 19th Amendment of the Sri Lankan constitution, which was adopted in April 2015, soon after the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe coalition came to power, and on Tuesday the country’s Supreme Court pulled the plug on them. That particular amendment was an initiative of Sirisena himself – designed to curb the powers of the president, which had been grossly abused by none other than Rajapaksa.
Sirisena dissolved the parliament on November 9 out of desperation. Together, Sirisena and his new prime minister control 97 legislators in a house of 225. A delay in convening parliament was meant to help them cobble together a majority – but they could only take their tally to 105.
Sirisena even lobbied with the Tamils and other smaller parties, but in vain. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and the Tamil National Alliance refused to endorse the so-called ‘constitutional coup’.
The conflict between Sirisena and Wickremesinghe
Sri Lanka’s crisis has been brewing for a long time. In January 2017, Sirisena appointed a presidential commission to investigate the Central Bank Bond scam, which implicated Prime Minister Wickremesinghe and his close associates. In April 2018, Sirisena promised to support a vote of no-confidence against the prime minister moved by the Joint Opposition led by Rajapaksa, only to dither at the eleventh hour.
The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe conflict has generally been explained on three counts:
- The fundamental ideological incompatibility between Sirisena’s Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the Wickremesingh’s United National Party (UNP);
- The working style of Prime Minister Wickremesinghe;
- External factors.
The SLFP and the UNP have been rivals for six decades. In spite of harbouring sharp differences on issues of language, ethnicity, development strategy and foreign policy, they joined hands in 2015 – primarily to oust Rajapaksa. Upon his defeat, both the UNP and the SLFP leadership consolidated their respective constituencies for future electoral battles. This spirit of coalition waned, and its promises of good governance was the casualty – rendering the government very unpopular.
Also read: Explained: The Constitutional Crisis in Sri LankaConsensual decision-making also began to fail. Sirisena has since complained that the prime minister did not inform him about decisions. He underlined this in his address to the nation on October 29, after sacking Wickremesinghe:
“Once in the Government, Mr. Wickrermesingeh arrogantly and stubbornly avoided collective decisions and tended to take individual decisions. This behaviour led to many conflicts… When many senior leaders were around, I have suggested to him to work together and work collectively… However, he ignored.”
In a cabinet meeting prior to Wickremesinghe’s dismissal, Sirisena also blamed the prime minister for not investigating conspiracies aimed at assassinating him. India’s intelligence agency, R&AW was also dragged into this conspiracy though this was publicly denied subsequently.
Maithripala Sirisena with Ranil Wickremesinghe. Credit: Reuters
The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government was also under pressure from the international community. The US, UK and the EU have been pushing the government to establish accountability for the military victory over LTTE under Rajapaksa that caused severe human rights violations in 2009.
These violations involved the killing of thousands of innocent Tamils, hundreds of disappearances and responsibility for countless acts of repression. Resolutions adopted at the Geneva Human Rights Commission list specific mechanisms to establish accountability. While Wickremesinghe has been soft on implementing these resolutions, Sirisena also has reservations and does not want to hurt Sinhala sentiments or offend the army and other security establishments.
Also read: Srisena’s Assaults on Democracy Make a Mockery of Parliamentary SystemInternational pressures
Regarding international pressures, Sri Lanka is home to a deepening strategic competition between China on the one hand and India and the West on the other. China’s expanding economic and strategic presence in Sri Lanka is a matter of concern to India and many others. Many Indian projects have faced delays in clearance and slowdown in implementation. For instance, the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement still awaits finalisation.
On the question of Colombo Ports Eastern Container Terminal, there appear to be serious differences between President Sirisena and Wickremesinghe. Sirisena reportedly told Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Kathmandu BIMSTEC summit in August 2018, that he was not aware of Wickremesinghe’s offer of this project to India, indicating that he does not want to relinquish such national assets to foreign interests. Curiously, he has not taken this position on any of the projects given to China.
While the ideological differences between the SLFP and the UNP, working styles of the two leaders, coupled with the roles of India, China and the international community may explain part of the present Sri Lankan crisis, the real reason lies somewhere else – in the rise of a new, native Sri Lankan leadership embodied in President Sirisena.
While being aware that he is the longest serving Secretary General of the SLFF, Sirisena always felt that he was not given his due. Sometime around 2010, Rajapaksa assured Sirisena on a campaign trail that after winning, he would make him his prime minister. That never happened.
Sirisena’s hidden ambition was harnessed when Chandrika and Wickremesinghe offered him the presidential reigns of the anti-Rajapaksa coalition in 2014. After winning the presidency in 2015, he committed himself to only one term but soon changed his mind. The growing unpopularity of the Unity Government and Wickremesinghe’s behaviour led him to believe that he would not be able to win again in this coalition.
Mahinda Rajapaksa. Credit: Reuters/Dinuka Liyanawatte
In February 2018, the routing victory of Rajapaksa’s SLPP (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna) led Sirisena to explore the possibility of an alliance with his former adversary, in the hope of securing a second presidency. Whispers in Colombo do not rule out a deal where Rajapaksa would support him for a second term. This may suit Rajapaksa’s needs as he cannot contest for the third time; his brother Gotabaya has the handicap of having US citizenship (Dual citizenship provision).
Setting the stage for 2019 parliamentary elections
As a prime minister, Rajapaksa can exercise real power and exploit the provisions of the 19th Amendment, keeping Sirisena on the margins, just as Wickremesinghe has allegedly been doing. As a strong prime minister, Rajapaksa can also close many of the criminal and corruption cases pending against him and his family members. Sirisena’s suppressed power ambitions and his consciousness of being marginalised are aggravated by his sense of belonging to a humble social class.
The emerging dimensions of power rivalries in Sri Lankan politics cannot be fully understood without reference to the gradual rise of marginalised social groups against the high caste, westernised Sinhala elites. Its beginning were made in 1956, when SWRD Bandaranaike, even as an upper-caste, anglicised leader, won on the platform of Sinhala Only against the dominance of the English language.
President Premadasa, Rajapaksa and Sirisena belong to this rising leadership from lower social strata, which is not fluent in English. Instead, they are more comfortable wearing traditional Sri Lankan attire, eating the local cuisine and taking pride in their rural background and native Sinhala nationalism. Recall Sirisena’s national address on October 29, when he said,
“I believe that Mr. Wickremesinghe and his group of closest friends [belong] to a privileged class and [do] not understand the pulse of the people”.
Sirisena has made it abundantly clear that he will not reverse his decisions. Elections to parliament can only be stalled if the judiciary intervenes in favour of Wickremesinghe, who has so far not moved to the court. Who knows, maybe the court will eventually let the issue be decided by the ballot.
Also read: The Second Coming of Sri Lanka’s Mahinda RajapaksaSri Lankans, therefore, are prepared for aggressive campaigning in the months ahead. Rajapaksa won local elections on the failure of ‘good governance’, but parliamentary elections will be fought on the issue of the constitutional coup. Sirisena cannot absolve himself from his flawed governance, and Wickremesinghe will present himself as a victim of his president’s ambitions.
India has adopted an ostensibly neutral position. The MEA’s official statement expressed India’s respect for “democratic values and constitutional process”, hinting at disapproval of Sirisena’s actions. Deep down, India may not sympathise with the new alliance. Its native brand of anti-Western nationalism does not resonate. If this alliance holds onto power, it will bank on China as a counterbalance to pressures from India and the West.
S.D. Muni is Professor Emeritus JNU and member, IDSA EC. He was also India’s Special Envoy and Ambassador. Was awarded Sri Lanka Ratna, Sri Lanka’s highest honour for a foreigner in 2005. This article also draws from his visit last month to Colombo under Kalinga International Foundation.
