Omair Ahmad 
After the Hamas attack in 2023, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu articulated two goals for the war that was launched – the rescue of the civilians and soldiers captured by Hamas, and the destruction of Hamas itself. As the second ceasefire went into effect on January 19, Israel had achieved neither of these objectives, and there seems to be no plan for the day after, when the multi-stage ceasefire deal comes to an end.
This is not to say that Israel has not achieved some objectives – Hamas has been degraded militarily, as has Hezbollah in Lebanon, while the Iranian-led regimes and groups opposed to Israel have been substantially weakened. These were part of the unsaid goal of the war – the restoring of deterrence after the abject failure of the Israeli security apparatus to foresee or thwart the Hamas attack. The recent resignation of the chief of staff of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), lieutenant general Herzi Halevi, and the chief of the IDF’s Southern Command, major general Yaron Finkelman, for their failures to prevent the October 2023 attack, suggests that the military feels it has recovered some of its deterrence capability.
On the other hand, the offhand statement by incoming US President Donald Trump, “That’s not our war, it’s their war,” undercuts any strategic gain. US economic, diplomatic, and military backing has played a significant role in deterring attacks against Israel, and every Israeli administration has made it a strategic priority to portray Israel’s wars as part of the US strategy.
During this current war, pro-Israeli pundits have tried to paint the war as the defence of “Western civilisation,” and this type of argument extends all the way back to the founding of the Zionist movement itself. By drawing the line, though, Trump has done something that few US presidents have publicly done. He may have stocked his cabinet with pro-Israel hawks, and may identify Israel as a key ally, but Trump is not in the business of helping allies – as his remarks against NATO, Canada, Japan, South Korea and other point to – instead he wants to see how they help him.
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This, though, is a hypothetical, and until the ceasefire is tested, or until the next major attack on Israel, it is entirely unclear how the Trump administration will respond. Still, it can be fairly said that with his focus on fundamentally challenging institutions within and outside of the US, and with his inexperienced appointments at the Department of Defence and key intelligence agencies, Trump will struggle to put together the type of broad, all-encompassing security umbrella that the Biden administration provided for Israel during the latest war.
Trump has a visceral hatred of anything he identifies as the “Deep State,” or the unchallenged underlying assumptions of US policy. One of those assumptions has always been that the security of Israel is America’s responsibility. In numerous statements, and in this last comment, Trump has clearly signalled that he does not believe this.
That said, even the threat of losing US support for its wars, as important as that might be, pales in comparison to the challenge that Netanyahu faces at home as the ceasefire deepens and becomes a de facto cold peace. Over a year and half, Israel has killed some 2% of the population of Gaza and destroyed most of the medical and educational infrastructure in the area.
Much of this has been obscured from global attention, as Israel restricted almost all foreign reporting from the region, and murdered – whether intentionally or by happy accident – dozens of Palestinians reporting from the region. Of course, those that wanted to know, knew, but now far more stories will emerge in the global media, and none of them are likely to show Israel in a good light, however critical of Hamas they might be.
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Then there is the critical question of reconstruction. Israel has so far run its occupation of Palestinians on the cheap, letting other nations pay for what, under international law, is its responsibility. It will not rebuild Gaza, and the Trump administration will not fund anything of the sort, with its pick for the UN ambassador position ranting against the aid agency for Palestinian refugee work, UNRWA. The EU is unlikely to do much, either. It is already facing a funding crisis, and with Trump bullying NATO members to increase military contribution and the ongoing Ukraine war, there is even less money to go around.
This leaves largely the Arab states, Turkey, and maybe some funding from countries like Indonesia and Malaysia for hospital infrastructure. And maybe China, if it chooses to insert itself in the region. To refuse such funding will paint Israel as even more barbaric, but to allow it will mean that accepting limitations that will leave Israel with even less manoeuvring room against demands to deal with Palestinians as if they have human rights.
Lastly, and most importantly, the devastation in Gaza will force more and more Israelis to confront what an unending military occupation looks like. Some of them will rejoice, as the extremist parties have done, glorying in the elimination of the living conditions of a people they wish to replace. But Israel, like any other country, is not merely its most extreme wing, even if they are the loudest and currently dominant. Netanyahu has never had answer to this question. The current war was, to some degree, an outcome of his persistent drive to deny this reality. The war is ending, the reality remains.
Omair Ahmad is the editor of The Third Pole.